| Matter of Jeremiah S. (New York State Commr. of MentalHealth) |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 00265 [69 AD3d 730] |
| January 12, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Jeremiah S., Respondent. New York StateCommissioner of Mental Health, Respondent; Thomas J. Spota, as District Attorney,Appellant. |
—[*1] Mental Hygiene Legal Service, Mineola, N.Y. (Sidney Hirschfeld, Felicia B. Rosen, andDennis B. Feld of counsel), for respondent. Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Benjamin N. Gutman and Laura R.Johnson of counsel), for petitioner-respondent.
In a proceeding pursuant to CPL 330.20 (13) for the issuance of a discharge order withrespect to Jeremiah S., Thomas J. Spota, Suffolk County District Attorney, appeals, bypermission, from an order of the County Court, Suffolk County (Braslow, J.), dated February 2,2009, which, after a hearing, granted the petition, terminated an order of conditions of the samecourt (Weissman, J.), dated March 18, 1996, and unconditionally discharged Jeremiah S. fromsupervision. In a decision and order on motion dated June 4, 2009, as amended August 13, 2009,this Court, inter alia, stayed enforcement of the order dated February 2, 2009, pending hearingand determination of the appeal, and denied the cross motion of Jeremiah S. to vacate the stay.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
In 1986 Jeremiah S. was indicted on charges of rape in the first degree (six counts), burglaryin the first degree, kidnapping in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, and assault in thesecond degree (two counts). In a commitment order dated July 23, 1987, the County Courtconcluded that Jeremiah S. was not responsible for his acts by reason of mental disease or defectin accordance with a plea pursuant to CPL 220.15 (see CPL 330.20). The courtcommitted Jeremiah S. to the custody of the New York State Commissioner of Mental Health(hereinafter the Commissioner) for confinement in a secure facility. Subsequently, Jeremiah S.was transferred, pursuant to court order, from a secure facility to a nonsecure facility(see CPL 330.20 [1] [l]). In 1996 the County Court issued a release order and anorder of conditions. The release order directed the Commissioner to terminate Jeremiah S.'sinpatient status without terminating the Commissioner's responsibility for him (see CPL330.20 [1] [m]). The County Court extended the order of conditions in 2001, and the order ofconditions expired by its terms on April 23, 2006.
In 2006 the Commissioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPL 330.20 (13) for[*2]the issuance of a discharge order, so as to terminate the orderof conditions and unconditionally discharge Jeremiah S. from supervision under the provisionsof CPL 330.20 (see CPL 330.20 [1] [n]). The court held a hearing on February 2, 2009,after which it granted the petition and issued a discharge order pursuant to CPL 330.20 (13). Weaffirm.
The governing statute, CPL 330.20 (13), provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he court mustgrant the application and issue a discharge order if the court finds [1] that the defendant has beencontinuously on an out-patient status for three years or more, [2] that he [or she] does not have adangerous mental disorder and is not mentally ill, and [3] that the issuance of the discharge orderis consistent with the public safety and welfare of the community and the defendant." Thehearing court found that Jeremiah S. has been continuously on an outpatient status for three yearsor more, that he does not have a dangerous mental disorder and is not mentally ill, and that thedischarge order is consistent with the public safety and welfare of both the community andJeremiah S. Thus, it terminated the order of conditions and unconditionally discharged JeremiahS. from supervision under the provisions of CPL 330.20.
In reviewing a determination made by a hearing court, the power of this Court is as broad asthat of the hearing court, and the Appellate Division may render the determination warranted bythe facts, bearing in mind that in a close case, the hearing court had the advantage of seeing andhearing the witnesses (see Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town ofBedford, 60 NY2d 492, 499 [1983]; Bartow v Lugo, 66 AD3d 936, 937 [2009]). Here, the parties donot dispute that Jeremiah S. has been continuously on an outpatient status for three years ormore. Indeed, all of the evidence at the hearing suggested that he had been on an outpatientstatus for more than 10 years.
To the extent that the District Attorney contends that Jeremiah S. is "mentally ill," within themeaning of CPL 330.20 (13), that term means "that a defendant currently suffers from a mentalillness for which care and the treatment as a patient, in the in-patient services of a psychiatriccenter under the jurisdiction of the state office of mental health, is essential to such defendant'swelfare and that his judgment is so impaired that he [or she] is unable to understand the need forsuch care and treatment" (CPL 330.20 [1] [d]). Such a finding would be at odds with the court'sprior release order, since the 1996 release order specifically found "that [Jeremiah S.] no longerhas a dangerous mental disorder . . . and that [Jeremiah S.] is no longer mentallyill," and directed the Commissioner to terminate Jeremiah S.'s inpatient status. Moreover, noneof the evidence adduced at the hearing suggested that Jeremiah S. required inpatient treatment.
To the extent that the District Attorney contends that Jeremiah S. suffered from a "dangerousmental disorder," within the meaning of CPL 330.20 (13), that term requires that (i) he suffersfrom a "mental illness," i.e., that he has "an affliction with a mental disease or mental conditionwhich is manifested by a disorder or disturbance in behavior, feeling, thinking, or judgment tosuch an extent that the person afflicted requires care, treatment and rehabilitation" (MentalHygiene Law § 1.03 [20]) and (ii) he is a physical danger to himself or others(see CPL 330.20 [1] [c]). Such a finding would be inconsistent with the release order.Moreover, from the time of the 1996 release order to the time of the hearing on the petition for adischarge order, neither the Commissioner nor the District Attorney sought recommitment on theground that Jeremiah S. had a dangerous mental disorder (see CPL 330.20 [14]).Moreover, the evidence adduced at the hearing included, inter alia, the testimony of Jeremiah S.'spsychologist that Jeremiah S. did not require further treatment, and a report from anotherexamining psychologist, stating that there was no need for or benefit from continued mentalhealth treatment.
In light of the foregoing, the court's determination that Jeremiah S. does not have adangerous mental disorder and is not mentally ill was warranted by the facts (see Matter ofKelly, 265 AD2d 154 [1999]; cf. Matter of Seltzer v Hogue, 187 AD2d 230 [1993];Matter of Boggs v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 132 AD2d 340 [1987]).
Further, the facts developed at the hearing warrant the determination of the hearing court thatthe discharge order is consistent with the public safety and welfare of the community andJeremiah S. The evidence at the hearing demonstrated that Jeremiah S. had a history of engagingin violent behavior, most notably the underlying criminal offenses. However, the evidence at thehearing also tended to show [*3]that Jeremiah S. had not engagedin violent behavior since the time of his release from inpatient treatment in 1996, and the DistrictAttorney presented no evidence to the contrary. Jeremiah S. also had, according to the evidenceat the hearing, a history of alcohol and cannabis abuse. The District Attorney presented evidencethat Jeremiah S. had not abstained from these substances during his treatment and since hisrelease from inpatient treatment. Nonetheless, one examining psychologist opined that JeremiahS.'s ability to function adequately despite the occasional consumption of alcohol boded well forhis long-term stability, and suggested that, though such behavior was not "ideal," Jeremiah S.had learned to manage his alcohol intake without developing symptoms of a substance abusedisorder. Similarly, an examining psychiatrist indicated that, since 1996, there had been noreports of substance abuse by Jeremiah S. Moreover, it was established at the hearing that theCommissioner's supervision was not required to ensure that Jeremiah S. took medication, sincethe undisputed evidence presented at the hearing demonstrated that Jeremiah S. had not been onmedication for at least 14 years.
Although one examining psychologist opined that Jeremiah S. was "not a good candidate"for discharge from the order of conditions, another examining psychologist and one examiningpsychiatrist recommended that the order of conditions should be terminated. Further, yet anotherexamining psychologist indicated that there was no evidence that Jeremiah S.'s stability orbehavior would change if the order of conditions were to be terminated.
On this record, the hearing court's determination that the issuance of a discharge order isconsistent with the public safety and welfare of the community and Jeremiah S. is warranted bythe facts (see Matter of Kelly, 265 AD2d 154 [1999]; cf. Matter of Seltzer vHogue, 187 AD2d 230 [1993]; Matter of Boggs v New York City Health & Hosps.Corp., 132 AD2d 340 [1987]). Rivera, J.P., Leventhal, Belen and Austin, JJ., concur.