| People v Allison |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 00270 [69 AD3d 740] |
| January 12, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Jerrick Allison, Appellant. |
—[*1] Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, JohnnetteTraill, and Kristina Sapaski of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County(Cooperman, J.), rendered July 11, 2007, convicting him of robbery in the third degree (twocounts) and attempted robbery in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his present contentions regarding thedenial of his two applications to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.30 (see CPL470.05 [2]; People v Robinson, 47AD3d 847, 848 [2008]; People v Davilla, 272 AD2d 552 [2000]). In any event, theSupreme Court did not err in denying those applications under the circumstances herein (seeCPL 210.45 [1]; see also People v Smith, 259 AD2d 768 [1999]; People vCarter, 115 AD2d 551 [1985]).
The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the defendant'srequests for a new assigned counsel (seePeople v Stevenson, 36 AD3d 634 [2007]; People v Sanchez, 7 AD3d 645, 645-646 [2004]; People vBrown, 277 AD2d 246 [2000]; People v Jessup, 266 AD2d 313, 313-314 [1999]).The Supreme Court conducted a sufficient inquiry regarding the basis of the defendant's requestand no further inquiry was required, as the defendant's assertions did not suggest the seriouspossibility of a genuine conflict of interest or other impediment to the defendant's representationby assigned counsel (see People v Stevenson, 36 AD3d at 634-635; People v Moore,228 AD2d 622 [1996]; People v Gaines, 212 AD2d 727, 727-728 [1995]). Duringthe pendency of the proceedings, the Supreme Court granted the defendant's two prior requestsfor new assigned counsel. Moreover, the defendant was not deprived of his right to berepresented by counsel of his own choosing by the trial court's refusal to adjourn the trial."[A]bsent exigent or compelling circumstances, a court may, in the exercise of its discretion,deny a defendant's request to substitute counsel made on the eve of or during trial if thedefendant has been accorded a reasonable opportunity to retain counsel of his own choosingbefore that time" (People v Arroyave, 49 NY2d 264, 271 [1980]; see People v Campbell, 54 AD3d959 [2008]). Here, the defendant had ample opportunity to retain counsel of his ownchoosing before his request, and he failed to demonstrate that the requested adjournment wasnecessitated by forces beyond his control and was not a dilatory tactic (see People vCampbell, 54 AD3d at 959; People v Grigg, 299 AD2d 367 [2002]; People vBrown, 277 AD2d 246 [2000]).[*2]
The Supreme Court did not err in allowing the defendantto represent himself during part of the trial. The defendant's clear and unequivocal waiver of hisright to counsel was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made (see People v Providence, 2 NY3d579 [2004]; People v Savage,29 AD3d 1022, 1023 [2006]; People v Zuga, 306 AD2d 505, 506 [2003];People v Riddick, 299 AD2d 562, 563 [2002]; People v Harris, 292 AD2d 633,634 [2002]). The trial court undertook a sufficiently searching inquiry of the defendant to bereasonably certain that the dangers and disadvantages of giving up the fundamental right tocounsel were impressed upon him (seePeople v Providence, 2 NY3d 579 [2004]; People v Savage, 29 AD3d at1023-1024; People v Riddick, 299 AD2d at 563; People v Harris, 292 AD2d at634).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]).Dillon, J.P., Florio, Hall and Sgroi, JJ., concur.