| Parnell v Mareddy |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 00660 [69 AD3d 915] |
| January 26, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Michael Parnell et al., Respondents, v Babureddy Mareddyet al., Appellants, et al., Defendant. |
—[*1] Bruce Egert, Richmond Hill, N.Y., for respondents.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants BabureddyMareddy and Jyothis Babureddy appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County(Iannacci, J.), dated June 4, 2009, which denied their renewed motion for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the renewed motion of thedefendants Babureddy Mareddy and Jyothis Babureddy for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaint insofar as asserted against them is granted.
The defendant Babureddy Mareddy hired P & M Builders (hereinafter P & M) to demolish ahome Mareddy owned with his wife, the defendant Jyothis Babureddy (hereinafter together thehomeowners), and to erect a new home on the site. The plaintiff Michael Parnell, a carpenterworking on the second floor of the home, was injured when he stepped, lost his balance, and fellinto an open stairwell.
The injured plaintiff, and his wife, derivatively, commenced this action against thehomeowners and P & M. The complaint asserted, inter alia, a cause of action alleging violationsof Labor Law §§ 200, 240 (1) and § 241 (6) and § 241-a.
The homeowners moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as assertedagainst them. The Supreme Court found that triable issues of fact existed as to whether thehomeowners directed or controlled the work being performed on the home and, accordingly,denied the motion. We reverse.
The homeowners made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of lawby offering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any triable issue of fact (seeAlvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49NY2d 557 [1980]). To receive the protection of the homeowners' exemption, a homeowner hasto satisfy two prongs required by the statutes (see Chowdhury v Rodriguez, 57 AD3d 121, 126 [2008]). First, ahomeowner has to show that the work was conducted at a dwelling that is a residence for onlyone or two families (see Labor Law[*2]§ 240 [1];§ 241 [6]; Chowdhury v Rodriguez, 57 AD3d at 126). Here, it is undisputed thatthe work was performed at the homeowners' one-family dwelling. "The second requirement ofthe homeowners' exemption is that the homeowners 'not direct or control the work' "(Chowdhury v Rodriguez, 57 AD3d at 126, quoting Labor Law § 240 [1]; §241 [6]). This inquiry focuses on whether the homeowners supervised the methods and mannerof the work (see Chowdhury v Rodriguez, 57 AD3d at 127; Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d 54[2008]). The evidence submitted by the homeowners here demonstrated as a matter of law thatthe homeowners did not direct or control the work (see Labor Law § 240 [1];§ 241 [6]; Chowdhury v Rodriguez, 57 AD3d at 126-127; Arama v Fruchter, 39 AD3d 678,679 [2007]; Ferrero v Best ModularHomes, Inc., 33 AD3d 847, 849-850 [2006]; Garcia v Petrakis, 306 AD2d 315,316 [2003]; Tilton v Gould, 303 AD2d 491, 491-492 [2003]). In response, the plaintiffsfailed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64NY2d 851 [1985]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]). Thus, thehomeowners were entitled to summary judgment dismissing those causes of action which allegedviolations of Labor Law § 240 (1) and § 241 (6) insofar as asserted against them.Moreover, the Court of Appeals has held that the homeowners' exemption from liability underLabor Law § 240 (1) and § 241 (6) applies to Labor Law § 241-a (seeKhela v Neiger, 85 NY2d 333, 337 [1995]). Thus, the homeowners were entitled tosummary judgment dismissing the cause of action which alleged a violation of Labor Law§ 241-a insofar as asserted against them.
Finally, the homeowners were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the cause of actionwhich alleged a violation of Labor Law § 200 insofar as asserted against them (seeOrtega v Puccia, 57 AD3d at 62-63; Arama v Fruchter, 39 AD3d at 679; Ferrerov Best Modular Homes, Inc., 33 AD3d at 850-851). Rivera, J.P., Dillon, Belen and Roman,JJ., concur.