| Matter of Segreto v Grannis |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 00860 [70 AD3d 704] |
| February 2, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Anthony J. Segreto et al.,Appellants, v Alexander B. Grannis, Respondent. |
—[*1] Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Benjamin N. Gutman, Robert C.Weisz, and Sudarsana Srinivasan of counsel), for respondent.
In a proceeding, in effect, pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination ofAlexander B. Grannis, Commissioner of the New York State Department of EnvironmentalConservation, dated February 1, 2008, the petitioners appeal from an order and judgment (onepaper) of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Weber, J.), dated September 18, 2008, whichgranted the respondent's motion to dismiss the petition and, in effect, dismissed the proceeding.
Ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The Supreme Court properly granted the motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that ithad already rendered a determination on the issues raised. Pursuant to the doctrine of resjudicata, a valid final judgment bars future actions between the same parties on the same cause ofaction (see Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 93 NY2d 343, 347 [1999]). The issuesraised in the instant proceeding are the same issues raised in the petitioners' prior CPLR article78 proceeding (see Matter of Karmel v Delfino, 293 AD2d 473 [2002]), and the reliefsought here is essentially the same as that sought in the first proceeding (see Yerg v Board ofEduc. of Nyack Union Free School Dist., 141 AD2d 537 [1988]). The Supreme Court madea determination on the merits in the first proceeding that there was no basis to disturb therespondent's determination. The dismissal of the first proceeding, by judgment dated July 22,2008, mandated dismissal of the petitioners' claims in the instant proceeding under the doctrineof res judicata (see Rapoli v Village ofRed Hook, 41 AD3d 456 [2007]).
If the petitioners were dissatisfied with the court's determination in the first proceeding, theirremedy was to appeal from that judgment within the applicable time period, not to initiateanother proceeding (see Matter of Vogel v Board of Educ. for Dunkirk City School Dist.,259 AD2d 831 [1999]). To the extent that the petitioners rely on CPLR 5516, we note that thisstatute only applies to judicial orders and judgments, not administrative determinations.
In light of our determination, we need not reach the petitioners' remaining contentions.Skelos, J.P., Dickerson, Lott and Roman, JJ., concur.