| People v Grant |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 00868 [70 AD3d 711] |
| February 2, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v JohnGrant, Respondent. |
—[*1] Robert DePalma, Staten Island, N.Y. (Daniela Conti Maiorana of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal by the People from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County(Rienzi, J.), dated January 22, 2009, as granted that branch of the defendant's omnibus motionwhich was to dismiss the indictment to the extent of reducing the charge of robbery in the firstdegree to the charge of robbery in the third degree.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from.
Contrary to the People's contention, the evidence before the grand jury was legallyinsufficient to establish the charge of robbery in the first degree (see CPL 210.20 [1] [b];Penal Law § 160.15 [3]; People v Pena, 50 NY2d 400, 405-408 [1980], certdenied 449 US 1087 [1981]). The People failed to present competent evidence which, ifaccepted as true, established every element of the crime charged (see People v Bello, 92NY2d 523, 525-526 [1998]; People v Moore, 185 AD2d 825, 826 [1992]; People vO'Leary, 137 AD2d 631, 631-632 [1988]; People v Lemon, 124 AD2d 679 [1986];Penal Law § 160.15 [3]; seegenerally People v Ford, 11 NY3d 875, 877 [2008]).
Here, the People presented insufficient circumstantial evidence from which a grand jurycould properly infer the "[u]se . . . or threaten[ed] immediate use of a dangerousinstrument" in the course of committing the robbery (Penal Law § 160.15 [3]; §10.00 [13]; People v Bello, 92 NY2d at 525-526; see People v Peralta, 3 AD3d 353, 354-355 [2004]). Under thecircumstances of this case, the defendant's written threat, without more, was insufficient toestablish that the defendant used or threatened the use of a dangerous instrument in his actualpossession and readily capable of causing death or other serious physical injury (seePenal Law § 160.15 [3]; § 10.00 [13]; People v Pena, 50 NY2d at405-408; People v Moore, 185 AD2d at 826; People v O'Leary, 137 AD2d at631-632; People v Lemon, 124 AD2d 679 [1986]). Accordingly, the Supreme Courtproperly reduced the charge of robbery in the first degree to the charge of robbery in the thirddegree (see Penal Law § 160.15 [1]). Balkin, Hall and Austin, JJ., concur.
Fisher, J.P., dissents and votes to reverse the order insofar as appealed from and deny thatbranch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to dismiss the indictment, with thefollowing memorandum:
The People presented evidence to the grand jury sufficient to establish that, on May 22,2008, the defendant entered a branch of the Commerce Bank on Hugenot Avenue in RichmondCounty, walked up to a teller's station, and handed her a handwritten note that said, "I have agun, Fill the bag. Don't say anything or I'll shoot." The teller filled the bag with the $1,810 shehad at her station, and the defendant took it and walked out. As the teller never saw a gun, and asthe defendant was not apprehended until months later, there was no evidence, other than thenote, that the defendant had, in fact, been in possession of a gun at the time of the robbery.
The grand jury returned an indictment charging the defendant with robbery in the firstdegree as defined in Penal Law § 160.15 (3) and grand larceny in the fourth degree asdefined in Penal Law § 155.30 (1). The robbery count alleged that, "while in thecommission of [the] crime and in immediate flight therefrom, the . . . defendantused and threatened a bank teller with the immediate use of a dangerous instrument, namely, aloaded gun." The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment or reduce its counts on the groundthat the evidence presented to the grand jury was legally insufficient to support the indictment asreturned. Upon inspecting the minutes of the grand jury proceeding, the Supreme Court upheldthe grand larceny count but reduced the count charging robbery in the first degree to robbery inthe third degree. The Supreme Court relied on the line of authority holding that, where thedefendant is charged with robbery in the first degree for having threatened the use of a dangerousinstrument in the course of the crime (see Penal Law § 160.15 [3]), theprosecution must prove, as an element of the crime, that the defendant was in actual possessionof a dangerous instrument. The People appeal from so much of the order as reduced thefirst-degree robbery count. I would reverse the order insofar as appealed from.
As relevant here, the Penal Law raises the level of a forcible stealing (Penal Law §160.00) from robbery in the third degree (Penal Law § 160.05) to robbery in the firstdegree if, in the course of the commission of the crime, or the immediate flight therefrom, thedefendant "[i]s armed with a deadly weapon" (Penal Law § 160.15 [2]), "[u]ses orthreatens the immediate use of a dangerous instrument" (Penal Law § 160.15 [3]), or"[d]isplays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm"(Penal Law § 160.15 [4]). It is settled that a defendant may be convicted of robbery in thefirst degree for having displayed what appears to be a firearm in the course of the crime withoutactually having possessed a firearm. All that is required is evidence that the defendantconsciously displayed or manifested the presence of something that could reasonably beperceived as a firearm, and that the person being robbed perceived it as such (see People vLopez, 73 NY2d 214, 220 [1989]; People v Baskerville, 60 NY2d 374, 381 [1983]).By contrast, to support a conviction of robbery in the first degree for having been "armed with adeadly weapon" in the course of the crime, the evidence must show that, at the time of thecommission of the crime, the defendant was actually in possession of a deadly weapon(see Penal Law § 160.15 [2]). This conclusion flows directly from the language ofthe statute because a person cannot be "armed" with a weapon without possessing it (seePenal Law § 160.15 [2]).
As pertinent to the crime charged here, the law defines "dangerous instrument" as "anyinstrument [or] article . . . which, under the circumstances in which it is. . . threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or other seriousphysical injury" (Penal Law § 10.00 [13]). Although the perpetrator of a robbery cancertainly "threaten[ ] the immediate use of a dangerous instrument" (Penal Law § 160.15[3]) without actually possessing a dangerous instrument, the Court of Appeals has engrafted ontothe statute an additional element, requiring proof that the defendant was actually in possession ofthe dangerous instrument he or she threatened to use. Thus, in People v Pena (50 NY2d400, 407 [1980]), the Court wrote: "[d]ecisional law tells us that, though the statutory groundupon which the first degree robbery count was brought is not explicit in that regard (Penal Law,§ 160.15, subd 3), the jury was required to find that [the defendant] actually possessed adangerous instrument at the time of the crime." And, most recently, in People v Ford (11 NY3d 875, 877n 1 [2008]), the Court reaffirmed that, "[i]n People v Pena, we indicated that the 'use orthreatened use' language requires proof of actual possession." The Court of [*2]Appeals has not yet had the occasion to clarify whether its use ofthe term "actual possession" means that the dangerous instrument must be in the defendant'sactual, as opposed to constructive, possession.
Here, the defendant handed the teller a note that said: "I have a gun, Fill the bag. Don't sayanything or I'll shoot." This was an unambiguous statement that the defendant was in possessionof a gun that was capable of being fired, and therefore was in possession of a dangerousinstrument, and that he would use it if the teller revealed the robbery. The majority, however,finds the statement legally insufficient to establish the defendant's actual possession of adangerous instrument, reasoning in effect that a defendant's own words uttered in the course ofthe robbery cannot constitute legally sufficient evidence of actual possession. The majority findssupport for this view principally in three Appellate Division cases (see People v Moore,185 AD2d 825, 826 [1992] ["The defendant's threats alone were insufficient to support aconviction for attempted robbery in the first degree"]; People v O'Leary, 137 AD2d 631,631 [1988] ["(O)ther than the threats of physical harm and demands for money made by thedefendant, there is no evidence that the defendant brandished the billy club or displayed thatobject so that the jury could infer the use or threatened use of a dangerous instrument, to wit, thebilly club"]; People v Lemon, 124 AD2d 679 [1986] ["The victim testified that she didnot actually observe a weapon at the time of the commission of the robbery or immediatelythereafter; moreover, no circumstantial evidence was offered from which the jury could properlyinfer the use or threatened immediate use of a dangerous instrument"]). To the contrary, I findnothing in these cases to support a blanket proposition that a defendant's own words in thecourse of a robbery can never establish his or her actual possession of an unseen dangerousinstrument.
Of course, as an element of the crime, the defendant's possession of the dangerousinstrument must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, for example, where thedefendant is apprehended at the scene immediately after the crime, the failure to recover adangerous instrument from the defendant's person or from the premises undercuts the evidentiaryvalue of any statement the defendant may have made during the crime and would ordinarilyrender the evidence of possession legally insufficient (see People v Peralta, 3 AD3d 353, 355 [2004]). In the absence ofsuch evidence, however, I see no principled reason that a statement uttered by the defendant inthe course of a crime—"I have a gun . . . Don't say anything or I'llshoot"—cannot be admitted for its truth and be accepted by the jury as legally sufficientevidence that the defendant was actually in possession of a dangerous instrument, any less than ifthe defendant had later admitted such possession to the police following his or her arrest (cf.United States v Marshall, 427 F2d 434, 437 [2d Cir 1970]). And I find no case from theCourt of Appeals holding that such evidence can never be legally sufficient. Notably, in People v Ford (11 NY3d 875[2008]), where the defendant stated in the course of the robbery, "I got a knife," and moved hishand toward his pants pocket, the Court of Appeals stated specifically that it was expressing noopinion as to whether the proof was sufficient to establish actual possession of the knife(People v Ford, 11 NY3d at 878 n 2; see also People v Lopez, 73 NY2d at 221 n1).
Because I conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the defendant's note waslegally sufficient evidence, not only of a threat to use a dangerous instrument against the bankteller, but also of the defendant's actual possession of the dangerous instrument, I respectfullydissent.