| People v McPherson |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 01135 [70 AD3d 1353] |
| February 11, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v JohnMcPherson, Appellant. |
—[*1] John C. Tunney, District Attorney, Bath, for respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Steuben County Court (Marianne Furfure, J.), renderedAugust 6, 2007. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of criminal possessionof a forged instrument in the second degree and grand larceny in the fourth degree.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict ofcriminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree (Penal Law § 170.25) andgrand larceny in the fourth degree (§ 155.30 [1]). Contrary to defendant's contention,County Court properly admitted in evidence an audiotape of a conversation between defendantand a prosecution witness. The People laid a proper foundation for the admission in evidence ofthe audiotape through the testimony of that witness (see People v Morrice, 61 AD3d 1390, 1390-1391 [2009]; seegenerally People v Ely, 68 NY2d 520, 527 [1986]). Contrary to defendant's furthercontention, the court properly determined as a matter of law that the same prosecution witnesswas not an accomplice and thus properly refused to submit to the jury the issue whether thatwitness was an accomplice. "An 'accomplice' means a witness in a criminal action who,according to evidence adduced in such action, may reasonably be considered to have participatedin: (a) [t]he offense charged; or (b) [a]n offense based upon the same or some of the same factsor conduct which constitute the offense charged" (CPL 60.22 [2]; see People v Berger,52 NY2d 214, 219 [1981]). "If the undisputed evidence establishes that a witness is anaccomplice, the jury must be so instructed but, if different inferences may reasonably be drawnfrom the proof regarding complicity, according to the statutory definition, the question should beleft to the jury for its determination" (People v Basch, 36 NY2d 154, 157 [1975]; seePeople v Adams, 307 AD2d 475, 475-476 [2003], lv denied 1 NY3d 566 [2003]).
Here, the court properly concluded that the witness in question may not reasonably beconsidered to have participated in the offenses charged or offenses based upon the same or someof the same facts or conduct that constitute the offenses charged (see CPL 60.22 [2]).She thus "was not an accomplice as a matter of law and there was an insufficient basis uponwhich to submit her accomplice status to the jury" (People v Freeman, 305 AD2d 331,331 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 594 [2003]; see People v Jones, 73 NY2d 902,903 [1989], rearg denied 74 NY2d 651 [1989]; People v Brazeau, 162 AD2d 979[1990], lv [*2]denied 76 NY2d 891 [1990]). Because thewitness was not an accomplice, the People were not required to corroborate her testimony(see generally CPL 60.22 [1]). We therefore conclude that defendant's contention that theevidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction because the testimony of that witnesswas not corroborated is without merit (see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490,495 [1987]). Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes as charged to the jury(see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d342, 349 [2007]), we reject defendant's contention that the verdict is against the weight ofthe evidence (see generally Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495). We have considered defendant'sremaining contention and conclude that it is without merit. Present—Centra, J.P.,Peradotto, Lindley, Pine and Gorski, JJ.