| People v Rutledge |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 01154 [70 AD3d 1368] |
| February 11, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Antonio D.Rutledge, Appellant. |
—[*1] Michael C. Green, District Attorney, Rochester (Leslie E. Swift of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Joseph D. Valentino, J.),rendered June 6, 2008. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of manslaughterin the first degree.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict ofmanslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.20 [1]). We reject defendant'scontention that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction (see generallyPeople v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Defendant was charged as an accessory, and"[a]ccessorial liability requires only that defendant, acting with the mental culpability requiredfor the commission of the crime, intentionally aid another in the conduct constituting theoffense" (People v Chapman, 30AD3d 1000, 1001 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 811 [2006] [internal quotation marksomitted]). The People presented evidence establishing that defendant shared his codefendants'intent to cause serious physical injury to the victim and intentionally aided the codefendants byfighting with the victim while the victim was being stabbed and by kicking the victim after hefell to the ground. Thus, the People presented legally sufficient evidence establishing that thestabbing was the " 'culmination of a continuum of events in which [defendant] participated andcontinued to participate' " (People v Little, 186 AD2d 1072 [1992], lv denied 81NY2d 1075 [1993]). Furthermore, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime ascharged to the jury (see People vDanielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), we conclude that the verdict is not against theweight of the evidence (see generally Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495).
Contrary to the further contention of defendant, Supreme Court's Sandoval rulingdoes not constitute an abuse of discretion. The court properly determined that, in the event thatdefendant testified, the People would be entitled to cross-examine him with respect to his priorconviction of prostitution (see People v Civitello, 152 AD2d 812, 814 [1989], lvdenied 74 NY2d 947 [1989]; People v Rhodes, 96 AD2d 565, 567 [1983], lvdenied 60 NY2d 970 [1983]), and his history of arrests arising from bench warrants (seePeople v Taylor, 253 AD2d 471 [1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 952 [1998]). Finally, thesentence is not unduly harsh or severe. Present—Scudder, P.J., Smith, Fahey and Lindley,JJ.