| People v Benston |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 01353 [70 AD3d 479] |
| February 16, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Maurice Benston, Appellant. |
—[*1] Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx (Robert R. Sandusky, III of counsel), forrespondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Darcel D. Clark, J.), rendered June 28, 2006,convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of assault in the second degree, attempted assault in thesecond degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, criminal contempt in thefirst degree (four counts), criminal contempt in the second degree (two counts), intimidating avictim or witness in the third degree, aggravated harassment in the second degree andharassment in the second degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to anaggregate term of 5½ years, unanimously affirmed.
The court properly exercised its discretion in admitting limited references, in medicalrecords and testimony, to the fact that the victim was diagnosed as having been subjected todomestic violence involving a former boyfriend. These circumstances, including the identity ofthe perpetrator, directly affected the prescribed treatment, which included having the victimtreated by a social worker, providing her with literature about domestic violence, andformulating a safety plan (see People vRogers, 8 AD3d 888, 892 [2004]). In any event, any error in the receipt of this evidencewas harmless. Defendant's remaining evidentiary arguments are unpreserved and without merit.
The court's reasonable limitations on defendant's impeachment of the victim did not violatedefendant's right of confrontation (see Delaware v Van Arsdall, 475 US 673, 678-679[1986]). During re-cross-examination, the court properly directed defense counsel to go on toanother subject after he had thoroughly explored the issue of when the victim first reported adeath threat made by defendant. Although defendant asserts that the court incorrectly ruled thisline of questioning to be improper re-cross-examination, the record reveals that the courtpermitted extensive questioning on this subject and only terminated it when it became repetitive.The court also properly exercised its discretion in ruling that, if the defense wished to play arecording of a 911 call in order to impeach the victim's account of the precise information shegave the 911 operator, the recording could not be redacted to excise references to defendant'sstatus as a parolee. In light of the victim's testimony that her attempts to relay information to theoperator were repeatedly interrupted, the court providently determined that playing a redactedrecording of the call could be misleading to the jury. Concur—Gonzalez, P.J., Saxe,Moskowitz, Abdus-Salaam and RomÁn, JJ.