| Label v Label |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 01458 [70 AD3d 898] |
| February 16, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Joanne Anselmo Label, Respondent, v Stuart Label,Appellant. |
—[*1] The Sallah Law Firm, P.C., Holtsville, N.Y. (Dean J. Sallah of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the defendant husband appeals from an orderof the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (MacKenzie, J.), dated July 18, 2008, which granted theplaintiff wife's motion to vacate so much of the parties' stipulation of settlement as provided thatthe wife waived equitable distribution of the husband's ownership interest in a business.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion is denied.
In 2004, the plaintiff wife commenced the instant action for a divorce and ancillary reliefagainst the defendant husband, and she retained an expert evaluator to value the husband'sbusiness. On January 12, 2007, the expert issued a "preliminary appraisal" estimating the valueof the business as of 2004 to be $1,042,890. The expert acknowledged that since discovery wasincomplete, he had not been able to evaluate the "intangible value or goodwill" of the business.In August 2007, the parties entered into an oral stipulation of settlement on the record, which,inter alia, settled the custody and visitation issues between the parties, awarded the wife themarital residence, durational maintenance, child support, and a cash distributive award of$120,000, and provided that the wife waived equitable distribution of the husband's ownershipinterest in his business.
In April 2008, after the wife surreptitiously discovered a 2007 offer by the husband'sbusiness partner to purchase the husband's share of the business for the sum of $1,820,000, theexpert completed a second appraisal of the business at the wife's request, whereupon he assigneda value of $3,640,000 to the business as of 2004. Based on this new information, the wife movedto vacate so much of the stipulation of settlement as provided that she waived equitabledistribution of the husband's ownership interest in the business as having been induced by fraud.The Supreme Court granted the motion, and we reverse.
An agreement between spouses which is fair on its face will be enforced according to itsterms unless there is proof of fraud, duress, overreaching, or unconscionability (see Christian[*2]v Christian, 42 NY2d 63, 73 [1977]; Schultz vSchultz, 58 AD3d 616 [2009]; Abrams v Abrams, 240 AD2d 445 [1997]). "Anunconscionable bargain is one which no person in his or her senses and not under delusion wouldmake on the one hand, and no honest and fair person would accept on the other, the inequalitybeing so strong and manifest as to shock the conscience and confound the judgment of anyperson of common sense" (Morad v Morad, 27 AD3d 626, 627 [2006]; see Christianv Christian, 42 NY2d at 71; Cosh v Cosh, 45 AD3d 798, 799 [2007]). However, anagreement is not unconscionable "merely because, in retrospect, some of its provisions wereimprovident or one-sided" (O'Lear v O'Lear, 235 AD2d 466 [1997]; see Etzion vEtzion, 62 AD3d 646, 653-654 [2009]; Cosh v Cosh, 45 AD3d at 799;Brennan-Duffy v Duffy, 22 AD3d 699, 700 [2005]; Cruciata v Cruciata, 10AD3d 349 [2004]).
Applying these principles to the matter at bar, the Supreme Court erred in partially vacatingthe stipulation of settlement. The wife was represented by independent counsel and receivedmeaningful and bargained-for benefits under the agreement, including generous maintenance andequitable distribution, "based on the financial information made available to the [wife's]independent accountant and legal counsel, who negotiated on [her] behalf over the course ofseveral months" (Rubin v Rubin, 33 AD3d 983, 984 [2006]; see McFarland vMcFarland, 70 NY2d 916, 918 [1987]; Morad v Morad, 27 AD3d at 627; Kerr vKerr, 8 AD3d 626 [2004]; Kavanagh v Kavanagh, 2 AD3d 688 [2003]). Althoughthe husband retained business property which is apparently now substantially more valuable thanit was appraised for at the time of the agreement, " 'courts will not set aside an agreement on theground of unconscionability simply because it might have been improvident' " or one-sided(Etzion v Etzion, 62 AD3d at 654, quoting Golfinopoulos v Golfinopoulos, 144AD2d 537, 538 [1988]; see Weinstein v Weinstein, 36 AD3d 797, 798 [2007];Morand v Morand, 2 AD3d 913, 915 [2003]; Kazimierski v Weiss, 252 AD2d481, 482 [1998]; Warren v Rabinowitz, 228 AD2d 492, 493 [1996]).
The wife also failed to demonstrate that the agreement, which was fair on its face, was theresult of fraud. She was fully aware of the parties' assets, cognizant that the expert evaluation ofthe business was preliminary and had not assessed goodwill, and she waived further discoveryupon entering into a stipulation of settlement without a final independent evaluation. Under thesecircumstances, the husband's failure to disclose the 2007 offer did not render the stipulation ofsettlement so patently unfair as to require its vacatur (see McFarland v McFarland, 70NY2d at 918; Weinstein v Weinstein, 36 AD3d at 798; Kojovic v Goldman, 35AD3d 65, 71 [2006]; Stoerchle v Stoerchle, 101 AD2d 831 [1984]). Accordingly, thecourt should have denied the wife's motion to vacate so much of the stipulation of settlement asprovided that she waived equitable distribution of the husband's ownership interest in hisbusiness. Skelos, J.P., Covello, Balkin and Austin, JJ., concur.