| People v Haque |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 01508 [70 AD3d 967] |
| February 16, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Anwar Haque, Appellant. |
—[*1] Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (Gary Fidel and Edward D. Saslawof counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Dunlop,J.), rendered July 21, 2004, convicting him of money laundering in the first degree, grandlarceny in the second degree (five counts), grand larceny in the third degree, falsifying businessrecords in the first degree (three counts), conspiracy in the fourth degree, and scheme to defraudin the first degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings upfor review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion whichwas to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion whichwas to suppress his statements made after arrest. The totality of the circumstances indicates thatthe statements were voluntarily made and not a product of coercion (see CPL 60.45;People v Farrell, 13 AD3d 644 [2004]). The defendant failed to preserve for appellatereview his contention that the Supreme Court should have charged the jury with respect to thevoluntariness of these post-arrest statements. In any event, since the defendant failed to elicit anyevidence of coercion, the Supreme Court properly did not charge the jury with regard to thevoluntariness of his statements to the police following his arrest (see CPL 60.45).
Since the defendant's money laundering continued and was completed after the effective dateof the 2000 amendment to Penal Law § 470.20 (L 2000, ch 489, § 5), his convictionof money laundering in the first degree did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the UnitedStates Constitution (see US Const, art I, § 10 [1]; People v Shack, 86NY2d 529, 540 [1995]; People v Blair, 45 AD3d 486 [2007]; People vCarrington, 178 AD2d 648 [1991]; People v Rosich, 170 AD2d 703 [1991]).
The testimony of the People's witness who summarized the voluminous records was properlyadmitted (see People v Potter, 255 AD2d 763 [1998]; People v Weinberg, 183AD2d 932 [1992]). The bank investigators did not improperly testify to the ultimate issue beforethe jury (see People v A.S. Goldmen, Inc., 9 AD3d 283 [2004]). The Supreme Court didnot remove an element of falsifying business records in the first degree from the consideration ofthe jury (cf. People v Martin, 36 AD3d 717 [2007]).[*2]
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to theprosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legallysufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, including his accessoryliability for the aggregated value of money stolen and laundered (see Penal Law §20.00; People v Russell, 91 NY2d 280, 288 [1998]; People v Cabey, 85 NY2d417 [1995]; People v Allah, 71 NY2d 830, 832 [1988]). Moreover, upon our independentreview pursuant to CPL 470.15 (5), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against theweight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).
The defendant's trial counsel provided meaningful representation and, thus, the defendantwas not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel (see People v Benevento, 91NY2d 708, 712 [1998]).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]).We note that, pursuant to Penal Law § 70.30 (1) (e) (i), the aggregate maximum term ofimprisonment for the consecutive grand larceny sentences must be deemed to be 20 years(see People v Moore, 61 NY2d 575 [1984]; People v Johnson, 33 AD3d 939[2006]; People v Rose, 297 AD2d 646 [2002]).
The defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental pro sebrief, are unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]). In any event, they arewithout merit (see People v Ortiz, 92 NY2d 955 [1998] [properly sworn jury]; Peoplev Cabey, 85 NY2d 417 [1995] [circumstantial evidence charge]; People v Calbud,Inc., 49 NY2d 389 [1980] [grand jury instructions]; People v Cox, 286 NY 137, 145[1941]; People v Tighe, 2 AD3d 1364 [2003] [duplicitous counts]; People vHoughtaling, 14 AD3d 879, 882 [2005] [larceny charge]; People v Cradle, 176AD2d 212 [1991] [accessory liability charge]), or do not require reversal (see People vCrimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237 [1975] [use of codefendant's statement; conspiracy charge]).Dillon, J.P., Florio, Leventhal and Roman, JJ., concur.