| Matter of Dagvadorj v DeFleur |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 01561 [70 AD3d 1275] |
| February 25, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Batdorj Dagvadorj, Appellant, v LoisDeFleur, as Administrator at the State University of New York at Binghamton, et al.,Respondents. |
—[*1] Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General, Albany (Andrew B. Ayers of counsel), forrespondents.
Kavanagh, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Garry, J.), entered September24, 2008 in Madison County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuantto CPLR article 78, to review respondents' determination finding that petitioner had violated theconditions of his F-1 nonimmigrant visa and was no longer in valid F-1 status.
In the fall of 2005, petitioner, a citizen of Mongolia, was residing in the United Statespursuant to a student visa that allowed him to pursue a Master's degree in electrical engineeringwhile enrolled at respondent State University of New York at Binghamton (hereinafter SUNYBinghamton).[FN1]The F-1 visa permitted petitioner, in addition to his studies, to engage in "employment as hasbeen authorized" pursuant to applicable federal regulations (8 CFR 214.1 [e]; see 8 CFR214.2 [f] [9]). During intermittent periods beginning in March 2006, petitioner, [*2]while a student at SUNY Binghamton, was employed as amathematics and physics tutor at the Academic Support Center of the State University of NewYork at Morrisville (hereinafter SUNY Morrisville). Sometime later, in March 2007, petitionerwas notified by a representative of SUNY Binghamton's Office of International Student andScholar Services (hereinafter ISSS) that his employment as a tutor at SUNY Morrisvilleconstituted off-campus work and, since he had not received prior authorization to accept thisposition, he was in violation of his visa status. Respondent Ellen Badger, director of SUNYBinghamton's ISSS office and the official charged with insuring that nonimmigrant studentsattending SUNY Binghamton fully complied with the terms of their visas, met with petitionerand his attorney regarding his employment at SUNY Morrisville and, after the meeting,concluded that petitioner, by accepting this position without prior authorization, had violated theterms of his visa. Badger also found that she was obligated by federal regulations to report thismatter to the Department of Homeland Security (see 8 CFR 214.3 [g] [2] [ii]).[FN2]Petitioner thereafter commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the determinationthat he was in violation of his F-1 visa status as being arbitrary, capricious and in violation of hisright to due process under both the federal and state constitutions. Supreme Court dismissed thepetition, prompting this appeal.
Petitioner essentially makes three claims in this proceeding. First, he argues that his work atSUNY Morrisville did not constitute off-campus work that required prior authorization byBadger, SUNY Binghamton's designated school official (hereinafter DSO) (see 8 CFR214.3 [a] [1] [ii]; 214.2 [f] [9] [ii]). Second, he claims that even if such authorization wererequired, he was deprived of due process by the method employed by Badger in determining thathe had violated the terms of his visa and, third, he only accepted this position after receivingassurances from his academic advisors that led him to conclude that he could do so withoutcompromising his nonimmigrant student status or violating the terms of his F-1 visa.
An alien may be granted a visa to enter the United States if he or she "is a bona fide studentqualified to pursue a full course of study and who seeks to enter the United States temporarilyand solely for the purpose of pursuing such a course of study consistent with [8 USC §1184 (l)] at an established college, university, . . . or other academicinstitution" (8 USC § 1101 [a] [15] [F] [i]; see 8 CFR 214.1 [a] [2]). Schools thatseek to admit such students must participate in the Student and Exchange Visitor Program andagree to maintain detailed records on each student that are transmitted electronically through theStudent and Exchange Visitor Information System (hereinafter SEVIS) to the Department ofHomeland Security (see 8 CFR 214.3 [g]; see also 8 CFR 214.2 [f] [1] [iii]). Aschool's DSO is responsible for monitoring each student's progress in the program and forreporting to the Department of Homeland Security any violation by a student of their visa statuswithin 21 days (see 8 CFR 214.3 [g] [2] [ii]). Failure to fully comply with theseregulations puts at risk the school's eligibility to participate in this program (see 8 CFR214.3 [h] [2]), as well as its ability to obtain certain federal funding and grants (see 15USC § 7410 [c]).
A nonimmigrant student participating in this program can seek employment "on-[*3]campus" without prior approval of the school's DSO (see 8CFR 214.2 [f] [9] [i]), but that employment must be performed on the school's campus or at anoff-campus location that is "educationally affiliated with the school" (8 CFR 214.2 [f] [9] [i]).Apart from an exception not relevant here (see 8 CFR 214.2 [f] [9] [ii] [C]), a studentwho seeks employment that is not considered "on-campus" employment, may only do so if theposition involves "[c]urricular practical training" that is "an integral part of an establishedcurriculum" and has been authorized by the school's DSO (8 CFR 214.2 [f] [10] [i]).[FN3]
Initially, we reject petitioner's contention that the determination that his tutoring position atSUNY Morrisville did not constitute "on-campus" employment—and, therefore, requiredprior approval from SUNY Binghamton's DSO—was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse ofdiscretion or "affected by an error of law" (CPLR 7803 [3]; see Hughes Vil. Rest., Inc. vVillage of Castleton-on-Hudson, 46 AD3d 1044, 1046-1047 [2007]; Matter of Martinezv State Univ. of N.Y.-Coll. at Oswego, 13 AD3d 749, 750 [2004]; Matter of RensselaerSocy. of Engrs. v Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 260 AD2d 992, 993 [1999]). The tutorposition could not have been on-campus employment as SUNY Morrisville—the placewhere petitioner was employed—is located almost 70 miles from the SUNY Binghamtoncampus. Further, the position that petitioner accepted does not appear to have any educationalaffiliation with SUNY Binghamton's curriculum in a manner contemplated by these regulations(see 8 CFR 214.2 [f] [9] [i]). While it is true, as petitioner contends, that both SUNYBinghamton and SUNY Morrisville are part of the SUNY system, they are, in fact, separate anddistinct educational institutions with "differentiated and designated missions" (Education Law§ 351). Given this reality, we cannot say that the determination regarding the off-campusnature of this employment was without a rational basis in the record.
Petitioner also claims that respondents deprived him of due process by the method itemployed in determining that he had violated the terms of his visa status. In that regard,petitioner argues that he has a constitutionally protected interest in his visa status and that hisright to due process was violated because he was not given adequate notice of the need for priorauthorization or a meaningful opportunity to be heard before this determination regarding hisvisa status was actually made. Petitioner also challenges the dual role played by Badger ininvestigating his employment and then making a determination based upon findings of thatinvestigation that he had violated his visa status.
Initially, we note that prior to bringing this proceeding, petitioner commenced an action infederal court based upon the same facts that are at issue in this proceeding. After that action wasdismissed, an appeal was taken in which the District Court's determination that petitioner hadreceived due process was affirmed (see Dagvadorj v Badger, 2009 WL 2171314, *1,2009 US App LEXIS 15983, *2-3 [2d Cir 2009]). Given that petitioner's claims in thisproceeding regarding his federal due process rights are identical to those made in the federallitigation, he is bound by the result reached in that action and is estopped from raising thoseclaims in this proceeding (see Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 93 NY2d 343,349-350 [1999]; see [*4]generally Murray v City of NewYork, 51 AD3d 502, 503-504 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 703 [2008]).
We do not arrive at the same conclusion as to petitioner's state due process claims, whichwere dismissed in the federal action but clearly not addressed. However, in regard to thoseclaims, we note that petitioner does not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in hisF-1 visa status or an "inherent property right" in his visa (see Azizi v Thornburgh, 908F2d 1130, 1134 [2d Cir 1990]). Even if petitioner had such an interest, his claim that Badger"effectively took" it away ignores the fact that Badger is a state official who does not have thepower to revoke a visa. Her position involves monitoring the activities of nonimmigrant studentsunder her charge and requires her to notify federal authorities if such a student has violated his orher visa status (see 8 CFR 214.3 [g] [2] [ii]). She has no choice but to make thisnotification and has no role as to what impact, if any, such a notification will have on thestudent's visa status.
Petitioner's claim that he was not on notice of the need for such prior authorization is beliedby the record. Before accepting this position, petitioner received a series of e-mails from Badgerduring the relevant time period that indicated that he needed prior authorization from herdepartment. In one e-mail, petitioner was informed that "you cannot work at Morrisville unlessyour SEVIS record is updated by the Help Desk, AND you obtain work authorization for thetutorial work through our office" (emphasis added). One month later, petitioner was againadvised that he was not "eligible to work anywhere else without meeting the eligibilityrequirements and obtaining appropriate work authorization from our office" (emphasisadded).
Petitioner also argues that he was entitled to a hearing before Badger decided that he was inviolation of his visa status. However, petitioner and his counsel were given an opportunity tomeet with Badger to present evidence as to why employment at SUNY Morrisville did notrequire prior written authorization and why, by accepting this position, he had not violated theterms of his visa. Only after this meeting had taken place did Badger reach a final determinationon this issue and notify the Department of Homeland Security that petitioner was, in fact, inviolation of the terms of his visa.
As for Badger's role in this process, we note that merely because she investigated and thenmade a judgment based upon the findings of this investigation regarding petitioner's visa statusdoes not, in and of itself, violate petitioner's right to due process (see Withrow v Larkin,421 US 35, 58 [1975]; Karpova v Snow, 497 F3d 262, 271 [2d Cir 2007], certdenied sub nom. Karpova v Paulson, 553 US —, 128 S Ct 2483 [2008]). There is no indication that the regulatoryscheme outlining the DSO's responsibilities and functions in this regard created a conflict thatwas " 'inherently incompatible with procedural due process' " (Matter of Vinci vCorbisiero, 174 AD2d 893, 895 [1991], quoting Matter of Washington County Cease vPersico, 99 AD2d 321, 329 [1984], affd 64 NY2d 923 [1985]).
Finally, petitioner claims that prior to accepting this position, he received assurances fromhis academic advisors at SUNY Binghamton and SUNY Morrisville that he could accept thisposition as a tutor, and that respondents, given the existence of these assurances, should beestopped from determining that he was in violation of his visa status. Equitable estoppel "is notavailable against a governmental agency in the exercise of its governmental functions"(Matter of Daleview Nursing Home v Axelrod, 62 NY2d 30, 33 [1984]) unless thefactual situation, as presented, requires the invocation of estoppel to "prevent injustice"(Matter of E.F.S. Ventures Corp. v Foster, 71 NY2d 359, 369 [1988]; see DelawareCounty Dept. of Social Servs. v Pontonero, 31 AD3d 999, 1001 [2006]; Town ofOneonta v City of Oneonta, 191 AD2d 891, 892[*5][1993]).While there is no doubt that petitioner relied on assurances he received from his supervisor atSUNY Morrisville that he could accept this position if it was approved by his academic advisorat SUNY Binghamton, he was never specifically told that he did not need prior authorizationfrom SUNY Binghamton's DSO. In fact, petitioner has never denied being aware that anyemployment off the SUNY Binghamton campus presented special problems in regard to his visastatus, all of which had to be addressed before he could accept such employment. Equallyimportant, he has failed to establish that respondents ever misled him regarding the need forprior approval by the DSO or that his reliance on these communications with his academicadvisors was, under all of the circumstances, reasonable (see Matter of Shondel J. v MarkD., 7 NY3d 320, 326-327 [2006]). Moreover, regardless of what petitioner may have beentold by these SUNY officials, respondents were obligated by federal regulation to inform theDepartment of Homeland Security that a nonimmigrant student had engaged in off-campus workwithout authorization in violation of his visa status (8 CFR 214.3 [g] [2] [ii]).
To the extent not specifically addressed herein, petitioner's remaining claims have beenreviewed and found to be lacking in merit.
Cardona, P.J., Peters, Rose and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed, without costs.
Footnote 1: Petitioner entered the UnitedStates in 2000 as a high school exchange student and has since earned Associate's, Bachelor'sand Master's degrees in the state educational system.
Footnote 2: Badger also determined thatpetitioner was no longer eligible to engage in optional practical training that allowed anonimmigrant student to remain in the United States for a period of time after graduation to workin his or her field (see 8 CFR 214.2 [f] [10] [ii]).
Footnote 3: Curricular practical training hasbeen defined as "alternative work/study, internship, cooperative education, or any other type ofrequired internship or practicum that is offered by sponsoring employers through cooperativeagreements with the school" (8 CFR 214.2 [f] [10] [i]).