| Carter v Isabella Geriatric Ctr., Inc. |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 01745 [71 AD3d 443] |
| March 4, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| Regina Carter, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate ofClover Carter, Deceased, Respondent, v Isabella Geriatric Center, Inc.,Appellant. |
—[*1] Shayne, Dachs, Corker, Sauer & Dachs, LLP, Mineola (Jonathan A. Dachs of counsel), forrespondent.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Joan B. Lobis, J.), entered on or about August 26,2009, which, in an action by an estate against a nursing home arising out of defendant's care ofplaintiff's decedent, granted plaintiff's motion to vacate a prior conference order precludingplaintiff's experts from testifying at trial and dismissing the action, unanimously reversed, on thelaw, without costs, and plaintiff's motion to vacate the prior order denied. The Clerk is directedto enter judgment dismissing the complaint.
The challenged expert disclosure statements do not "disclose in reasonable detail. . . the substance of the facts and opinions on which each expert is expected totestify" (CPLR 3101 [d] [1] [i]). As the pretrial conference court aptly put it in dismissing thecomplaint, the "sea of generalities" contained in these statements largely duplicate the similarlyverbose generalities contained in the complaint and bill of particulars and "essentially tell thedefendants nothing about what they are supposed to be defending," although they do reveal "thatthere was no real attempt to consult with an expert" (see Chapman v State of New York,189 AD2d 1075, 1075 [1993]). No particular standards of care are particularly associated withany of the many acts of medical and nursing malpractice about which plaintiff's experts willsupposedly testify (see Pauling vOrentreich Med. Group, 14 AD3d 357, 358 [2005], lv denied 4 NY3d 710[2005]), which, best we can tell from plaintiff's pleadings and these statements, were continuallycommitted by the many doctors, nurses and caregivers involved with the decedent's care over thecourse of her four-year residency in the nursing home. Nor do the many statutes and regulationsserially cited in plaintiff's pleadings without reference to subsections provide any usefuldisclosure regarding standards of care and defendant's departures therefrom. Plaintiff has beengiven ample opportunity to provide useful expert disclosure, and her prolonged and repeatedfailure to do so permits an inference of willfulness warranting dismissal of her medicalmalpractice claims (see id.; McCarthy v Handel, 297 AD2d 444, 448 [2002]).
Nor did plaintiff make any attempt to particularize the facts that supposedly cast some of herclaims in ordinary negligence rather than malpractice, as we suggested in dismissing her appealfrom the conference order (60 AD3d 520, 521 [2009]). Our own unaided review of plaintiff'sclaims, variously denominated as negligence, gross negligence, breach of contract, [*2]breach of warranty, inadequate hiring, failure to abide bymandatory rules, and failure to communicate significant medical findings, reveals that they all"bear[ ] a substantial relationship to the rendition of medical treatment" to plaintiff's decedent(Weiner v Lenox Hill Hosp., 88 NY2d 784, 788 [1996] [internal quotation marksomitted]; see Scalisi v New York Univ.Med. Ctr., 24 AD3d 145 [2005]). Accordingly, there appears to be no possibility thatplaintiff can prove any part of her case without expert testimony, and the entire complaint mustbe dismissed. Concur—Andrias, J.P., Nardelli, Catterson, DeGrasse andManzanet-Daniels, JJ. [Prior Case History: 2009 NY Slip Op 31919(U).]