| Sprint Equities (NY), Inc. v Sylvester |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 01783 [71 AD3d 664] |
| March 2, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Sprint Equities (NY), Inc., Appellant, v Angela Sylvester,Also Known as Angela M. Sylverster, et al., Respondents, et al.,Defendants. |
—[*1] Alison R. Lam, New York, N.Y., for respondent Cambridge Home Capital, LLC.
In an action for a judgment declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiff is the sole owner of certainreal property, the plaintiff appeals from an order and judgment (one paper) of the SupremeCourt, Queens County (Elliot, J.), entered July 23, 2008, which, among other things, denied itsmotion for summary judgment on the complaint, granted the respective cross motions of thedefendant Cambridge Home Capital, LLC, the defendants Charles H. Appolon, also known asCharles Appolon, Jr., Nataki Appolon, and Warkin Realty Corp., and the defendant AngelaSylvester, also known as Angela M. Sylvester, for summary judgment, and declared, inter alia,that a certain deed dated September 8, 2000, is null and void and, in effect, that it is not the soleowner of the property.
Ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed, with costs to the respondent CambridgeHome Capital, LLC.
"The New York Recording Act (Real Property Law § 290 et seq.) protects agood faith purchaser for value from a prior unrecorded interest in real property provided, interalia, that the subsequent purchaser's interest is the first to be duly recorded" (Transland Assets, Inc. v Davis, 29AD3d 679, 679 [2006]; see Real Property Law § 291; Jenkins-Watson v Golabi Holdings,LLC, 26 AD3d 467, 468 [2006]; Rivas v McDonnell, 308 AD2d 572, 572-573[2003]; Yen-Te Hsueh Chen v Geranium Dev. Corp., 243 AD2d 708, 709 [1997]). "Thestatus of good faith purchaser for value cannot be maintained by a purchaser with either notice orknowledge of a prior interest or equity in the property, or one with knowledge of facts that wouldlead a reasonably prudent purchaser to make inquiries concerning such" (Yen-Te HsuehChen v Geranium Dev. Corp., 243 AD2d at 709).
Here, it is undisputed that the defendant Household Finance Realty Corporation of NewYork (hereinafter Household Finance) held a mortgage on the subject property, with thedefendants Angela Sylvester, also known as Angela M. Sylvester, and George Sylvester(hereinafter together the Sylvesters) as mortgagors, prior to the plaintiff's alleged acquisition ofthe property from the Sylvesters. Additionally, it [*2]is notdisputed that Household Finance recorded the mortgage before the plaintiff recorded its deed. EliMaor, the plaintiff's principal, acknowledged at his deposition that the plaintiff was aware of theexistence of this mortgage, and the fact that the mortgagee had commenced a foreclosure actionin connection with the subject property. Maor also asserted that the plaintiff paid the sum of$1,000 to the Sylvesters in consideration for the subject property, and that, in addition, theplaintiff assumed the mortgage on the property. However, Maor conceded that the plaintiff didnot inform Household Finance that it had a deed from the Sylvesters transferring title to it; thatthe plaintiff did not ask the Sylvesters to assign the mortgage to it; that the plaintiff, despite itspurported assumption of the mortgage, did not sign any agreement stating that it would beresponsible for the mortgage; that the plaintiff knew that the Sylvesters' names were still on themortgage; and that, despite the plaintiff's purported assumption of the mortgage, the Sylvestersremained responsible for the mortgage at all relevant times. Maor admitted that the plaintiff didnot make any mortgage payments with respect to the property, nor did it pay any real propertytaxes in connection with it.
As the Supreme Court correctly determined, the plaintiff was not a good faith purchaser forvalue. Moreover, as acknowledged by Maor, Household Finance acquired and recorded itsmortgage interest in the subject property before the plaintiff recorded the disputed deed. Wenote, in this regard, that the Household Finance mortgage was a "conveyance," as that term isdefined in Real Property Law § 290 (3) and used in Real Property Law § 291. SinceHousehold Finance acquired its mortgage interest on the property before the plaintiff acquired itspurported interest therein, and recorded it before the plaintiff recorded the deed, and since theevidence established that the plaintiff was not a good faith purchaser for value, the plaintiff couldnot avail itself of the protection of the recording statute. Accordingly, the Supreme Courtproperly denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the complaint, granted therespective cross motions of the defendant Cambridge Home Capital, LLC, the defendantsCharles H. Appolon, also known as Charles Appollon, Jr., Nataki Appolon, and Warkin RealtyCorp., and the defendant Angela Sylvester, also known as Angela M. Sylvester for summaryjudgment, and declared, inter alia, that the plaintiff's deed is null and void and, in effect, that theplaintiff is not the sole owner of the subject property (see HSBC Mtge. Servs., Inc. v Alphonso, 58 AD3d 598 [2009]).
The plaintiff's remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be reached in lightof our determination. Rivera, J.P., Dickerson, Hall and Lott, JJ., concur.