| Fallon v Flach Dev. & Realty, Inc. |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 01864 [71 AD3d 1258] |
| March 11, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| Sean Fallon et al., Appellants, v Flach Development & Realty, Inc.,Respondent. |
—[*1] Law Offices of Laurie G. Ogden, Albany (Norah M. Murphy of counsel), forrespondent.
Malone Jr., J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Teresi, J.), entered March 2, 2009in Greene County, which granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaint.
Plaintiff Sean Fallon (hereinafter plaintiff), a volunteer firefighter for the Town of CoxsackieHose 3 Fire Company, was injured while making improvements at a warehouse owned bydefendant in which the fire company was temporarily housing some of its vehicles. Specifically,the fire company had put out a notice to its members requesting volunteers to install plasticsheeting and heaters in the warehouse to prevent the vehicles stored there from freezing. Plaintiffresponded to this call for volunteers and, while he was ascending an extension ladder, itapparently collapsed, causing him to fall. Plaintiff and his wife, derivatively, then commencedthis action to recover damages for his injuries, asserting causes of action pursuant to Labor Law§§ 200, 240 and 241. Following joinder of issue, defendant moved for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint. Supreme Court granted the motion and this appeal byplaintiffs ensued.
"The primary purpose of [the Labor Law] is to extend special protections to 'employees' or'workers' " who are hired by someone—either an owner, contractor or anagent—to perform work on a building or structure (Stringer v Musacchia, 11 NY3d 212, 215 [2008] [citations [*2]omitted]; see Abbatiello v Lancaster Studio Assoc., 3 NY3d 46, 50-51[2004]; see also Labor Law § 2 [5]; Benamati v McSkimming, 8 AD3d 815, 816 [2004]). The Court ofAppeals has made it clear that the Labor Law "does not apply to a volunteer who performs aservice gratuitously" (Stringer v Musacchia, 11 NY3d at 215; see Abbatiello vLancaster Studio Assoc., 3 NY3d at 50-51). Evidence that a person is a hired employee,rather than a volunteer, includes the existence of a "voluntary undertaking of a mutualobligation," which is usually in the form of an agreement between the parties by which theemployee will perform an assigned task in exchange for compensation from the employer(Stringer v Musacchia, 11 NY3d at 215).
Here, there is no evidence that defendant contracted for the work at thewarehouse—which, incidentally, did not benefit defendant in any way—orotherwise agreed to compensate plaintiff for his services. Defendant did not request plaintiff tobe at the warehouse and did not know that plaintiff was there until after the accident (see Personius v Mann, 20 AD3d616, 617 [2005]). Absent the necessary "mutual duties or obligations between" the parties,the situation here "bears none of the traditional hallmarks of an employment relationship"(Stringer v Musacchia, 11 NY3d at 216-217). As such, we find that plaintiff was not anemployee hired by defendant. Nor is there evidence of an employment relationship betweendefendant and the fire company such that the fire company could be considered an agent orcontractor of defendant.[FN*]
Finally, plaintiffs contend that defendant's ownership of the warehouse alone is sufficient toimpose strict liability under the Labor Law, despite the fact that defendant did not contract for, orhave knowledge of, the work performed there. However, "[i]n cases imposing liability on aproperty owner who did not contract for the work performed on the property . . .'some nexus between the owner and the worker, whether by lease agreement or grant of aneasement, or other property interest' [is required]" (Scaparo v Village of Ilion, 13 NY3d 864, 866 [2009], quotingAbbatiello v Lancaster Studio Assoc., 3 NY3d at 51). As there is no evidence on thisrecord of any such nexus between defendant and plaintiff, this argument is unpersuasive. To theextent not specifically addressed, herein, plaintiffs' remaining claims have been considered andfound to be unavailing. Accordingly, defendant was properly granted summary judgmentdismissing the complaint.
Mercure, J.P., Spain, Stein and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, withcosts.
Footnote *: We note that defendant'sliability in that situation would further depend on a finding that, at the time of the accident,plaintiff was an employee, not a volunteer, of the fire company. Although plaintiffs advocate forsuch finding, it need not be made here as plaintiff's employment status with the fire company atthe time of the accident is irrelevant under the circumstances presented.