| Chery v Souffrant |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 01909 [71 AD3d 715] |
| March 9, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Marie Carmen Chery, Respondent, v Lavaud Souffrant etal., Appellants. |
—[*1] Harmon, Linder & Rogowsky, New York, N.Y. (Mitchell Dranow of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from a judgmentof the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Garvey, J.), entered January 28, 2009, which, upon ajury verdict on the issue of damages, and upon the denial of their motion pursuant to CPLR 4404to set aside the verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence and for a new trial or, in effect,to set aside the verdict and for judgment as a matter of law, or to set aside the damages award asexcessive, is in favor of the plaintiff and against them in the principal sum of $50,000.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
This action arises from a two-car collision, occurring on July 24, 2006, in which a motorvehicle operated by the plaintiff was struck in the rear by a motor vehicle operated by thedefendant Lavaud Souffrant and owned by the defendant Jean Ricot. At trial, the jury determinedthat, as a result of the subject motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff sustained amedically-determined injury or impairment of a nonpermanent nature which prevented her fromperforming substantially all of her usual and customary activities for not less than 90 days duringthe first 180 days immediately following the accident (see Insurance Law § 5102[d]). The jury awarded the plaintiff the principal sum of $50,000 for pain and suffering.Thereafter, the defendants moved to set aside the verdict as contrary to the weight of theevidence or, in effect, for judgment as a matter of law, or to set aside the damages award asexcessive. The Supreme Court denied the motion.
For a court to determine that a jury verdict is not supported by legally sufficient evidence, itmust conclude that there is "no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which couldpossibly lead rational [people] to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidencepresented at trial" (Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493, 499 [1978]). The standardfor determining whether a jury verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence is whether theevidence so preponderated in favor of the movant that the verdict could not have been reachedon any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d744, 746 [1995]; Tapia v Dattco,Inc., 32 AD3d 842, 845 [2006]). "Where the verdict can be reconciled with a reasonableview of the evidence, the successful party is entitled to the presumption that the jury adopted thatview" (Torres [*2]v Esaian, 5 AD3d 670, 671 [2004]). Here, the evidencewas legally sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that, based on the evidence before it, theplaintiff sustained a medically determined injury or impairment of a nonpermanent nature whichprevented her from performing substantially all of her usual and customary activities for not lessthan 90 days during the 180 days immediately following the subject motor vehicle accident(see Insurance Law § 5102 [d]). Additionally, the jury's finding in that regard wasbased on a fair interpretation of the evidence and, thus, was not contrary to the weight of theevidence (see Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744 [1995]).
The amount of damages to be awarded to a plaintiff for personal injuries is a question for thejury, and its determination will not be disturbed unless the award deviates materially from whatwould be reasonable compensation (see CPLR 5501 [c]; Keaney v City of New York, 63 AD3d794, 795 [2009]). Under the circumstances presented herein, the award did not deviatematerially from what would be reasonable compensation.
The defendants' remaining contention is without merit. Rivera, J.P., Santucci, Eng andChambers, JJ., concur.