| Kocourek v Booz Allen Hamilton Inc. |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 02019 [71 AD3d 511] |
| March 16, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| Paul Kocourek, Appellant, v Booz Allen Hamilton Inc. etal., Respondents. |
—[*1] Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington, DC (Everett C. Johnson, Jr. of the Bar of the State ofMaryland, admitted pro hac vice, of counsel), for respondents.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Richard B. Lowe, III, J.), entered July 2, 2009,which, to the extent appealed from, granted so much of defendants' motion to dismiss the firstand second causes of action of the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Plaintiff, an officer employed by the corporate defendants, alleged that the latter promisedthat the "shadow stock" he received would provide him with benefits equivalent to thoseprovided by the common stock he also received as a corporate officer. According to plaintiff,defendants allegedly "forced" him to redeem the shadow stock shortly after his retirement, andhe thereby was injured because he otherwise would have held the shadow stock and profitedgreatly when, 16 months after his retirement, the company sold a portion of its business to theCarlyle Group for $2.54 billion. It is undisputed, however, that the common stock could not beredeemed for two years after retirement, and thus plaintiff necessarily is contending thatdefendants breached an agreement not to redeem his shadow stock until he had been retired fortwo years. That agreement, however, is one which by its very terms has no possibility of beingperformed within one year (Huebener v Kenyon & Eckhardt, 142 AD2d 185 [1988]).Accordingly, the absence of a writing violates the statute of frauds, rendering the alleged oralpromise as to stock redemption unenforceable.
The unjust enrichment claim was also properly dismissed, as litigants may not use such aclaim to evade New York's statute of frauds (see J.E. Capital v Karp Family Assoc., 285AD2d 361, 362 [2001]).
Plaintiff's request for leave to replead, made for the first time on appeal, is unsupported byfacts that would correct deficiencies in the pleadings and thereby render his claims actionable(see e.g. Ceres v Shearson Lehman Bros., 227 AD2d 222 [1996]) in light of the statute offrauds.[*2]
We have considered plaintiff's remaining arguments onappeal and find them unavailing. Concur—Friedman, J.P., Catterson, McGuire, Acostaand Renwick, JJ.