| Matter of 194 Main, Inc. v Board of Zoning Appeals for Town of N.Hempstead |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 02566 [71 AD3d 1028] |
| March 23, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of 194 Main, Inc., Appellant, v Board ofZoning Appeals for Town of North Hempstead, Respondent. |
—[*1] Richard S. Finkel, Town Attorney, Manhasset, N.Y. (Linda B. Zuech of counsel), forrespondent.
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the respondentBoard of Zoning Appeals for the Town of North Hempstead dated April 16, 2008, which, after ahearing, denied the petitioner's application, inter alia, for a use variance, the petitioner appealsfrom a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Spinola, J.), entered January 5, 2009,which, in effect, denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The petitioner purchased property located at 194 Main Street in Port Washington(hereinafter the property) on September 20, 2005. The property had been zoned "Residence C" in1966. Before the petitioner purchased the property, an antique furniture store was operated onthe property pursuant to a use variance granted to a prior owner in 2002. After the petitionerpurchased the property, it used the property for the sale, storage and display of motorcycles untilthe Town of North Hempstead sent it a notice of violation based on its nonpermitted use at theproperty. The Board of Zoning Appeals for the Town of North Hempstead (hereinafter theZoning Board) denied the petitioner's subsequent application for, inter alia, a use variance topermit it to operate a motorcycle sales, storage and display store on the property.
"To qualify for a use variance premised upon unnecessary hardship there must be a showingthat (1) the property cannot yield a reasonable return if used only for permitted purposes ascurrently zoned, (2) the hardship resulted from unique characteristics of the property, (3) theproposed use would not alter the character of the neighborhood, and (4) the alleged hardship wasnot self-created" (Matter of Miller Family Ltd. Partnership v Trotta, 23 AD3d 389,389-390 [2005]; see Town Law § 267-b [2] [b]; Matter of Village Bd. of Vil.of Fayetteville v Jarrold, 53 NY2d 254, 257 [1981]).
The evidence adduced during the hearing before the Zoning Board established that thepetitioner created the hardship by purchasing the land with knowledge that it was not zoned forcommercial use (see Matter of Clark v Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of Hempstead,301 NY 86, 89 [1950], cert denied 340 US 933 [1951]; Matter of Miller Family Ltd.Partnership v Trotta, 23 AD3d at 390; Matter of [*2]Friends of Lake Mahopac v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town ofCarmel, 15 AD3d 401, 402-403 [2005]). Contrary to the petitioner's position, the fact that ause variance was granted to the prior owner for the use of an antique furniture store could nothave led to a reasonable expectation by the petitioner that it could operate a motorcycle sales,storage and display store under the prior use variance (see Matter of P.M.S. Assets v ZoningBd. of Appeals of Vil. of Pleasantville, 98 NY2d 683, 685 [2002]; Matter of McDonald vZoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Islip, 31 AD3d 642, 642-643 [2006]; Matter of Dianav City of Amsterdam Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 243 AD2d 939, 940 [1997]).
Furthermore, although "a [determination] of an administrative agency which neither adheresto its . . . prior precedent nor [sets forth] its reasons for reaching a different resulton essentially the same facts is arbitrary and capricious" (Matter of London v Zoning Bd. ofAppeals of Town of Huntington, 49 AD3d 739, 740 [2008], quoting Matter of Tall TreesConstr. Corp. v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Huntington, 97 NY2d 86, 93 [2001][internal quotation marks omitted]), the evidence at the hearing established that thecircumstances of the prior variance granted by the Zoning Board were distinguishable from thepetitioner's application, and, therefore, the Zoning Board was not bound by its earlierdetermination (see Matter of Arata v Morelli, 40 AD3d 991, 993 [2007]; Matter ofConversions for Real Estate, LLC v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Inc. Vil. of Roslyn, 31 AD3d635, 636 [2006]).
The petitioner's remaining contentions are without merit.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly found that the Zoning Board did not act arbitrarilyor capriciously when it denied the petitioner's application (see Matter of WestburyLaundromat, Inc. v Mammina, 62 AD3d 888, 891 [2009]; Matter of Miller Family Ltd.Partnership v Trotta, 23 AD3d at 390). Dillon, J.P., Florio, Miller and Austin, JJ., concur.