| Keepin v Worman |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 02753 [71 AD3d 1093] |
| March 30, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Mavis Keepin, Appellant, v Charles Worman,Respondent. |
—[*1] Harold, Salant, Strassfield & Spielberg, White Plains, N.Y. (Jerold C. Rotbard of counsel),for respondent.
In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment entered December19, 2007, upon the plaintiff's default in answering the defendant's counterclaim, the plaintiffappeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Lubell, J.), dated December 8,2008, which denied her motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1).
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, with costs,the plaintiff's motion to vacate the judgment entered December 19, 2007, is granted, and thejudgment is vacated.
The plaintiff wife commenced this action for divorce, and the defendant husband submittedan answer asserting a counterclaim also seeking a divorce. After the plaintiff defaulted insubmitting a reply to the counterclaim and appearing at a status conference, the Supreme Courtgranted the defendant's motion for leave to enter a default judgment on his counterclaim fordivorce, and scheduled an inquest on all ancillary issues. At the inquest, the defendant testifiedthat the plaintiff suffered from schizophrenia, and had abandoned him in 2004 after 10 years ofmarriage. In a judgment entered December 19, 2007, the Supreme Court dissolved the marriageand awarded to the defendant all of the property identified by him, including stock accounts thatwere in both parties' names, and a condominium that was in both parties' names and wasacquired during the marriage. The judgment further provided that neither party shall have anyright to alimony, maintenance, or support.
The plaintiff subsequently moved pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) to vacate the judgment.The plaintiff demonstrated a reasonable excuse for her default and a potentially meritoriousdefense (see Zaidi v New York Bldg. Contrs., Ltd., 61 AD3d 747, 748 [2009]), and, inlight of the liberal policy of this Court with respect to vacating defaults in matrimonial actions,the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the motion (see Russo vCamarasana, 26 AD3d 367, 368 [2006]; Trim v Trim, 21 AD3d 1203, 1204 [2005];Payne v Payne, 4 AD3d 512, 513 [2004]).
The parties' remaining contentions are without merit or need not be considered in light of ourdetermination. Skelos, J.P., Santucci, Lott and Sgroi, JJ., concur.