| Matter of Northern Pines MHP, LLC v Board of Assessment Review ofthe Town of Milton |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 03020 [72 AD3d 1314] |
| April 15, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Northern Pines MHP, LLC, Respondents, v Boardof Assessment Review of the Town of Milton et al., Appellants. |
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Kavanagh, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Ferradino, J.), entered April 2,2009 in Saratoga County, which granted petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant toRPTL article 7, to challenge the tax assessments on certain real property owned by petitioner.
Petitioner is the owner of two mobile home parks located in the Town of Milton, SaratogaCounty. The mobile home parks, known as Northern Pines and Milton Knolls (hereinaftercollectively referred to as the property), total over 106 acres and consist of 241 mobile units. In2006, respondent Assessor of the Town of Milton assessed both sites at a combined full marketvalue of $8,278,100. Petitioner commenced this RPTL article 7 proceeding challenging thatvaluation claiming that it was excessive and not an accurate reflection of the property's fairmarket value as of the July 1, 2005 tax status date. After a nonjury trial, during which each sideintroduced competing expert appraisals of the property's fair market value, Supreme Courtgranted petitioner's application and adopted its appraisal, which placed the property's fair marketvalue at $5,950,000.[FN1]The court ordered respondents to refund [*2]any excess taxespaid on the property along with costs and disbursements incurred by petitioner in initiating thisproceeding. Respondents now appeal.
A value placed on a property by a tax assessor is presumed to be valid (see Matter of Corvetti v Winchell, 51AD3d 47, 49 [2008]; Matter of State of New York v Town of Hardenburgh, 273AD2d 769, 771-772 [2000]) and that presumption can only be overcome if substantial evidenceis presented establishing that the assessment is, in fact, in error (see Matter of FMC Corp.[Peroxygen Chems. Div.] v Unmack, 92 NY2d 179, 189 [1998]; Matter of Ace Hardware Corp. vLittle, 63 AD3d 1345, 1346 [2009]). This presumption can be overcome by the"submission of a detailed, competent appraisal based on standard, accepted appraisal techniquesand prepared by a qualified appraiser" (Matter of Eckerd Corp. v Semon, 35 AD3d 931, 933 [2006][internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Corvetti v Winchell, 51AD3d at 49). Here, the expert appraisal submitted by petitioner served to rebut this presumptionand establish that a credible dispute existed between the parties regarding the fair market valueof this property (see Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v Assessor of Town ofGeddes, 92 NY2d 192, 199 [1998]; Matter of Gibson v Gleason, 20 AD3d 623, 625 [2005], lvdenied 5 NY3d 713 [2005]).
Having rebutted this presumption, petitioner was required to demonstrate—andSupreme Court found that it had—by a preponderance of the credible evidence introducedat trial that the "subject property has been overvalued" (Matter of Gordon v Town of Esopus, 59 AD3d 896, 897 [2009],appeal dismissed 12 NY3d 848 [2009], lv granted 13 NY3d 703 [2009]; see Matter of General Elec. Co. v Assessorof Town of Rotterdam, 54 AD3d 469, 471 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 711[2008]). In arriving at this determination, the court was required to " 'weigh the entire record,including evidence of claimed deficiencies in the assessment, to determine whether petitionerhad established by a preponderance of the evidence that its property had been overvalued' "(Matter of City of Troy v Town of Pittstown, 306 AD2d 718, 720 [2003], lvdenied 1 NY3d 505 [2003], quoting Matter of FMC Corp. [Peroxygen Chems. Div.] vUnmack, 92 NY2d at 188). Our review of such a determination must necessarily defer toSupreme Court in its resolution of any credibility issues that have been generated by theconflicting expert opinions (see Matterof Brooks Drugs, Inc. v Board of Assessors of City of Schenectady, 51 AD3d 1094,1096 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 710 [2008]; Matter of Eckerd Corp. v Gilchrist, 44 AD3d 1239, 1240-1241[2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 707 [2008]) and is limited to whether the court'sdetermination of the fair market value of the subject property is " 'supported by or against theweight of the evidence' " (Matter of Ace Hardware Corp. v Little, 63 AD3d at 1347,quoting Matter of Rite Aid of N.Y. No. 4928 v Assessor of Town of Colonie, 58 AD3d963, 964 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 709 [2009]).
Supreme Court, in adopting petitioner's appraisal to determine the property's fair marketvalue, focused on the extensive experience of petitioner's appraiser in the mobile home industry,his detailed documentation of the character and configuration of each mobile home located onthe property, his use of four mobile home parks that were similar in size to the property in hismarket comparison analysis, his reliance on figures in his income analysis that were based on theincome actually generated by the property and his use of a capitalization rate (13.59%) that wassupported by documentary evidence introduced at trial. These factors, coupled with the court'sfinding that there was no support in the record for respondents' position that the property hadtripled in value since it was purchased four years earlier, provide ample support for the court'sdecision adopting petitioner's appraisal as the more accurate assessment of the property's fairmarket value.[*3]
In that regard, it should be noted that Supreme Courtrejected respondents' appraisal as not being a credible assessment of the property's fair marketvalue because it did not include an individual appraisal of each mobile home located on this sitebut, instead, resorted to "limited spot measurements" to determine their value. The court alsonoted that respondents' appraiser, by his own admission, had little prior experience in preparingappraisals regarding the value of mobile home parks and had not actually visited the property inconnection with the preparation of this appraisal.[FN2]It also found that respondents' appraiser used dated comparable sales in his market comparisonanalysis and failed to present any evidence that the sale of the property in August 2001 for$3,000,000 was not an arm's length transaction between a willing buyer and a willing seller (see Matter of CCM Assoc. of Clifton Park,LLC v Board of Assessment Review of Town of Clifton Park, 49 AD3d 941, 942-943[2008]; Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v Town of Moreau Assessor, 307 AD2d669, 670 [2003]).
On these facts, and giving due deference to Supreme Court's authority to resolve credibilitydisputes that exist between experts that appear before it, we cannot conclude that it abused itsdiscretion in adopting as credible the findings and conclusions as set forth in petitioner'sappraisal (see Matter of General Elec. Co. v Assessor of Town of Rotterdam, 54 AD3d at475-476; Matter of City of Troy v Town of Pittstown, 306 AD2d at 721). Respondents'remaining claims regarding Supreme Court's evidentiary rulings have been reviewed and foundto be lacking in merit.
Spain, J.P., Rose, Stein and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, withcosts.
Footnote 1: Respondents' appraisal placedthe property's fair market value at $9,055,300.
Footnote 2: Respondents' appraiser had anassistant visit the property and sign the appraisal, but this assistant was not called to testify attrial.