Cabrera v Rodriguez
2010 NY Slip Op 03240 [72 AD3d 553]
April 22, 2010
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 9, 2010


Glorya F. Cabrera, Appellant,
v
Ramon F. Rodriguez,Defendant, and Cerda Corp., Respondent.

[*1]Ginsberg & Broome, P.C., New York (Robert M. Ginsberg of counsel), for appellant.Baker, McEvoy, Morrissey & Moskovits, P.C., New York (Stacy R. Seldin of counsel), forrespondent.

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Geoffrey D. Wright, J.), entered December 11, 2008,which denied plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability,unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted. It is well settled that arear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligenceon the part of the driver of the rear vehicle, and imposes a duty on the part of the operator of themoving vehicle to come forward with an adequate nonnegligent explanation for the accident (see Tutrani v County of Suffolk, 10NY3d 906, 908 [2008]; Agramonte v City of New York, 288 AD2d 75, 76 [2001]).

A claim that the driver of the lead vehicle made a sudden stop, standing alone, is insufficientto rebut the presumption of negligence (see id.; Farrington v New York City Tr. Auth., 33 AD3d 332 [2006][defendant first saw stopped vehicle three or four seconds before impact; even if brake lights notfunctioning, such failure would not adequately rebut inference of defendant's negligence]; Francisco v Schoepfer, 30 AD3d275 [2006]; Mullen v Rigor, 8AD3d 104 [2004] [claim that codefendant's car stopped suddenly not enough to rebut thepresumption of negligence where there was no testimony as to why a safe distance could not bemaintained]).

Once such a prima facie showing has been made, the burden shifts to the party opposing themotion to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to raise material issues of factwhich require a trial of the action (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324[1986]). Mere conclusions, expressions of hope or unsubstantiated allegations or assertions areinsufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Alvord & Swift v Muller Constr. Co., 46NY2d 276, 281-282 [1978]).

The motion court erred in finding that "right-of-way issues" are raised by defendant driver'sdeposition testimony that plaintiff was "moving and perhaps changing lanes at the time of theaccident." Defendant driver did not dispute that plaintiff's vehicle was stopped when defendanthit it. The most that can be said in defendant's favor is that plaintiff was attempting to [*2]move out of, not into, defendant driver's lane of traffic to getaround a double-parked car. There is no allegation that plaintiff suddenly moved into defendant'slane. Concur—Andrias, J.P., Saxe, Catterson, Freedman and Abdus-Salaam, JJ.


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