| Matter of Kemar G. |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 03330 [72 AD3d 965] |
| April 20, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Kemar G., Appellant. |
—[*1] Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Pamela Seider Dolgow andSuzanne K. Colt of counsel), for respondent.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal isfrom an order of disposition of the Family Court, Queens County (Bogacz, J.), dated September10, 2008, which, after a hearing, and upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated June 2,2008, finding that the appellant had committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would haveconstituted the crimes of rape in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree, andsexual abuse in the first degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent, and, upon his consent,placed him on probation for a period of 18 months. The appeal brings up for review thefact-finding order dated June 2, 2008.
Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order of disposition as, upon the appellant'sconsent, placed the appellant on probation for a period of 18 months is dismissed, without costsor disbursements; and it is further,
Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs ordisbursements.
Contrary to the appellant's contention, the order of removal to the Family Court, whichspecified that removal was pursuant to CPL article 725, did not lack the specificity required byFamily Court Act § 311.1 (3) (see Family Ct Act § 311.1 [7]; see generally Matter of Michael M., 3NY3d 441, 445 [2004]). Likewise, although the Family Court did not specify under whichsubsections of the statutes the presentment agency had proved the appellant's delinquency, thatfailure did not deprive him of the right to effective appellate review (see Penal Law§ 130.35 [1], [3]; § 130.50 [1], [3]; § 130.65 [1], [3]).
The appellant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence is not preserved forappellate review (see Matter of MelissaN., 62 AD3d 884 [2009]; Matter of Charles S., 41 AD3d 484, 485 [2007]). In any event,viewing the evidence at the fact-finding hearing in the light most favorable to the presentmentagency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legallysufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, ifcommitted by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of rape in the first degree, criminalsexual act in the first degree, and sexual abuse in the first degree (cf. People v Patterelli, 68 AD3d1151, 1152-1153 [2009]; People vScott, 61 AD3d 1348, 1349 [2009]; People v Greene, 13 AD3d 991, 992 [2004]; Matter of DakotaEE., 209 AD2d 782, 783 [1994]).[*2]
In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independentreview of the weight of the evidence (see Matter of Hasan C., 59 AD3d 617 [2009]; cf. CPL470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9NY3d 342, 348 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the factfinder'sopportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see Matter of Daniel R., 51 AD3d933, 933-934 [2008]; cf. People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004], certdenied 542 US 946 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Uponreviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the findings of fact were not against the weight ofthe evidence (see Family Ct Act § 342.2 [2]; cf. People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).
The appellant contends that the Family Court improperly excluded certain handwritingevidence. While the Family Court applied an incorrect standard for the admission of handwritingevidence (see Matter of Collins v Wyman, 38 AD2d 600, 601 [1971]), the error wasinconsequential, because the appellant failed to lay the proper foundation under the correctstandard (id. at 601).
Since the disposition was entered on consent, the appellant is not aggrieved thereby (see Matter of Latiyanna M., 62 AD3d710, 711 [2009]; Matter of ShaheenP.J., 29 AD3d 996, 997 [2006]; Matter of Yarras F., 5 AD3d 481, 481-482 [2004]). In any event,the period of probation has expired.
The appellant's remaining contentions are without merit. Santucci, J.P., Angiolillo,Leventhal and Lott, JJ., concur.