| People v Burdick |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 03498 [72 AD3d 1399] |
| April 29, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Malinda K.Burdick, Appellant. |
—[*1] John M. Muehl, District Attorney, Cooperstown (Michael F. Getman of counsel), forrespondent.
Peters, J.P. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Otsego County (Burns, J.),rendered December 7, 2007, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of grand larceny inthe third degree.
Defendant was charged in a one-count indictment with grand larceny in the third degreebased on allegations that she stole $22,245 in lottery tickets from the Taylors Mini Mart in theVillage of Richfield Springs, Otsego County between January 2004 and February 2006. At theensuing jury trial, Andrea Baker, the general manager of Taylors Mini Marts, testified thatdefendant was employed as the manager of the Richfield Springs store and was responsible forsecuring its lottery ticket inventory and verifying the accuracy of the lottery ticket sales records.She explained that, before scratch-off tickets are put out for sale, it is the store manager'sresponsibility to scan the activation slip into the lottery machine in order to activate the tickets.According to Baker, a book of lottery tickets can be activated only by or with the assistance of amanager and only the store's manager has a key to the top safe where the books are kept. Shefurther explained that store employees are required to record in the daily store shift sheets thenumber of lottery tickets that are sold each day and that it was normal practice for an activatedbook to be documented on the daily store shift sheet by or at the direction of the store's manager.[*2]
Through Baker's testimony and a considerable amount ofdocumentary evidence, consisting mainly of the Taylors' business records, it was established thatseven scratch-off lottery books, each valued at $500, were received by the Richfield Springsmini mart and activated on specified dates between January 2004 and February 2006. Using twoNew York State Lottery activation and winners reports, the People were able to establish that,within a short period of time of being activated, winning tickets from each of the seven books atissue were redeemed; however, no sales from any of those books were inventoried on the store'sdaily store shift sheets between the time each book was activated and the time the winningtickets were redeemed. Significantly, Taylors' records revealed that defendant was workingeither alone or with one other employee, her daughter, at the store at the time when each of theseven books was activated and the never-been-sold winning tickets were redeemed.[FN*]Baker testified that, upon confronting defendant, she had no explanation for the discrepancy andstated that she had thrown out potentially relevant lottery logs believing that they were no longerneeded.
Defendant testified on her behalf and disclaimed any knowledge about the missing lotterytickets. She stated that she had never worked alone at the Richfield Springs store, does not playthe lottery and has never cashed a ticket at her store. She explained that she kept the lotterytickets in the bottom safe, that all employees had access to its key and that trained employeeswould be permitted to order, receive and activate lottery books. Defendant also presented certainalibi evidence relating to her whereabouts on one of the dates at issue.
Following the trial, defendant was convicted as charged, sentenced to six months in jailfollowed by five years of probation, and ordered to pay $22,245 in restitution. She now appeals.
Defendant first argues that the verdict is not supported by legally sufficient evidence and isagainst the weight of the evidence. Her sufficiency claim is unpreserved for our review since hermotion to dismiss was not grounded on any of the specific deficiencies in the evidence she nowclaims (see People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 19 [1995]; People v Bynum, 70 NY2d858, 859 [1987]; People vGonzalez, 64 AD3d 1038, 1039-1040 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 796 [2009]).As to the weight of the evidence issue, while a different result would not have beenunreasonable, after evaluating the evidence in a neutral light and according appropriatedeference to the jury's credibility determinations, we conclude that the verdict was not againstthe weight of the evidence (see People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]; People v Barringer, 54 AD3d 442,443 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 830 [2008]).
We do, however, agree with defendant's assertion that County Court erred in admitting intoevidence the two New York State Lottery activation and winners reports under the businessrecords exception to the hearsay rule. As these hearsay reports were admitted, over objection, forthe truth of their contents—that specific lottery tickets were redeemed at specific timesand places—they were admissible only if the foundational requirements of CPLR 4518 (a)were met (see People v Cratsley, 86 NY2d 81, 88-89 [1995]; People v Kennedy,68 NY2d 569, 578 [1986]; see also CPL 60.10). To admit a document offered as abusiness record under CPLR 4518, it must be established that the record was made in the regularcourse of business, that it was the regular course of business to make such record and that therecord was made contemporaneously or within a reasonable time after the act, transaction,occurrence or event [*3]being recorded (see CPLR 4518[a]; People v Brown, 13 NY3d332, 341 [2009]; People v Cratsley, 86 NY2d at 89).
Here, Baker provided the only foundational testimony for the admission of the two NewYork State Lottery reports. Although she testified that she requested, received and filed thesetwo reports in the normal course of Taylors' business, "the mere filing of papers received fromother entities, even if they are retained in the regular course of business, is insufficient to qualifythe documents as business records," because "[s]uch papers simply are not made in the regularcourse of business of the recipient, who is in no position to provide the necessary foundationtestimony" (People v Cratsley, 86 NY2d at 90 [citations omitted]; see People v Rogers, 8 AD3d 888,891 [2004]; People v Surdis, 275 AD2d 553, 554-555 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d908 [2000]; see also Lodato vGreyhawk N. Am., LLC, 39 AD3d 494, 495 [2007]). Notably, Baker did not purport tohave knowledge of the business practices and record-keeping procedures of the New York StateLottery, the entity that produced the records. As such, no testimony was presented that therecords were made in the regular course of the New York State Lottery's business, that it was inthe regular course of the New York State Lottery's business to make the records, or as to whenthe records were made (see People v Brown, 13 NY3d at 341; People v Surdis,275 AD2d at 554-555; compare People v Cratsley, 86 NY2d at 90-91). Thus, CountyCourt erred in admitting the reports without proper foundation.
Nor can the error be deemed harmless under the circumstances of this case. The twoactivation and winners reports were a vital component to the People's case, which was groundedsolely upon circumstantial evidence. They had significant evidentiary value, in that theyprovided the only evidence establishing that winning lottery tickets were being redeemed fromlottery books that had been activated, but from which no sales had been recorded. These reportsalso provided the sole evidence of the time and date when the winning tickets were redeemedwhich, when considered in connection with other records establishing when the books wereactivated and defendant's work schedule, was critical to the People's theory that the lottery bookswere not merely lost or misplaced but, rather, were taken and redeemed by defendant. For thesereasons, we cannot conclude that there was "no reasonable possibility that the erroneouslyadmitted evidence contributed to the conviction" (People v Hamlin, 71 NY2d 750, 756[1988]; see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237 [1975]; People v Roberts, 66 AD3d 1135,1137 [2009]).
In light of our determination, we need not address defendant's remaining contentions.
Lahtinen, Malone Jr., Stein and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is reversed, onthe law, and matter remitted to the County Court of Otsego County for a new trial.
Footnote *: The only exception is tworedemptions in November 2004, which occurred at a time when defendant was not working.