| Matter of HSBC Bank USA, NA (Makowski) |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 03550 [72 AD3d 1515] |
| April 30, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| In the Matter of the Judicial Settlement of the Account of HSBCBank USA, NA, as Successor Executor of Edward Makowski, Deceased, Respondent. In theMatter of the Judicial Settlement of the Accounts of David Dale, as Executor of EdwardMakowski, Deceased, Appellant. In the Matter of the Application for Removal of the Executorof Edward Makowski, Deceased. In the Matter to Compel the Fiduciary to Account in the Estateof Edward Makowski, Deceased. |
—[*1] Michael J. Ryan, Buffalo, for respondent HSBC Bank USA, NA. O'Brien and O'Brien, Amherst (James F. O'Brien of counsel), for respondent beneficiaries ofthe estate of Edward Makowski, deceased.
Appeal from an order of the Surrogate's Court, Erie County (Barbara Howe, S.), enteredSeptember 23, 2008. The order, inter alia, denied the request of David Dale, as executor of theestate of Edward Makowski, deceased, for a decree exonerating him with respect to a prior orderremoving him as executor.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed with costs.
Memorandum: David Dale, the executor of decedent's estate before HSBC Bank USA, NA(HSBC) became the successor executor, appeals from an order denying his request for theissuance of a proposed decree that would, inter alia, "exonerate[ ]" him in connection with aprior order removing him as executor based on "his failure to provide an adequate interimaccounting" (Matter of Makowski,13 AD3d 1210, 1211 [2004]). We previously determined that Surrogate's Court did notviolate Dale's due process rights when it permanently removed Dale as executor "because hisinterim accounting did not meet the minimal legal requirements for an accounting (seeSCPA 719 [1]), nor did his interim accounting comply with the terms specified by the court withrespect thereto" (id. at 1212). We reject the contention of Dale that the stipulation ofdiscontinuance [*2]executed by him, as well as the attorney ofrecord for HSBC and the beneficiaries of the estate, restored him to the position of executor ofthe estate and nullified only those prior orders that were adverse to him. Pursuant to the terms ofthe stipulation of discontinuance, the actions referenced therein were "discontinued on themerits." By discontinuing an action, "the action is as if it never had been" (Loeb v Willis,100 NY 231, 235 [1885]; see Hotel Prince George Affiliates v Grimbilas, 241 AD2d302, 303 [1997], lv dismissed 91 NY2d 887 [1998], rearg denied 91 NY2d 957[1998]). Thus, there was no pending action in which the Surrogate could issue Dale's proposeddecree (see Herald Sq. Foot Care Assoc. v Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 257 AD2d 551[1999]; D'Amico v Nuzzo, 194 AD2d 761 [1993]).
Dale's contentions with respect to an order entered in March 2009 are not properly before usbecause Dale did not file a notice of appeal with respect to that order (see CPLR 5513[a]; DiSanto v DiSanto, 29 AD3d935 [2006]). In any event, to the extent that it appears on the record before us that Dalecontends with respect to that order that the Surrogate erred in refusing to recuse herself, we notethat the request for recusal was made in a "responding affidavit" rather than by way of a motionon notice pursuant to CPLR 2211, and no appeal as of right would lie from that order (seeCPLR 5701 [a] [2]; New YorkState Div. of Human Rights v Oceanside Cove II Apt. Corp., 39 AD3d 608, 609[2007]). We note in addition that we are unable to conduct meaningful appellate review of anycontentions with respect to that order because there is no proper record on appeal concerning theorder (see 22 NYCRR 1000.4 [a] [2]; Mergl v Mergl, 19 AD3d 1146 [2005]). Finally, the contention ofDale that this Court should recuse itself is made for the first time in his appellate brief rather thanby way of a motion pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1000.13 and thus is not properly before us.Present—Smith, J.P., Fahey, Carni, Sconiers and Pine, JJ.