| People v Meyers |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 03809 [73 AD3d 1231] |
| May 6, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Alvin Meyers,Also Known as Germaine Meyers, Appellant. |
—[*1] Robert M. Carney, District Attorney, Schenectady (Gerald A. Dwyer of counsel), forrespondent.
Garry, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Schenectady County (Giardino, J.),rendered September 10, 2007, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime ofattempted criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree.
Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance in the thirddegree in full satisfaction of a four-count indictment. Pursuant to the plea agreement, defendantwas to be sentenced, as a second felony drug offender, to a prison term of 3½ years to befollowed by an undisclosed period of postrelease supervision. Following his plea, defendantfailed to appear at sentencing and County Court issued a bench warrant. Thereafter, defendantwas apprehended and sentenced to a prison term of seven years to be followed by three years ofpostrelease supervision. Defendant now appeals.
We reverse. "[A] defendant pleading guilty to a determinate sentence must be aware of thepostrelease supervision component of that sentence in order to knowingly, voluntarily andintelligently choose among alternative courses of action" (People v Catu, 4 NY3d 242, 245 [2005]). Further, "[i]n order tosatisfy the demands of due process, a defendant must be aware of not only the existence of thepostrelease supervision component to a sentence, but also the promised or potential duration ofthat component if a negotiated sentence is a part of the plea [*2]agreement" (People v Grimm, 69 AD3d 1231, 1232 [2010]; see People v Miller, 62 AD3d1047, 1048 [2009]). Here, defendant contends and the People concede that, although anegotiated sentence was a part of the plea agreement, defendant was not properly advised of thespecific duration of mandatory postrelease supervision prior to his sentencing. Accordingly, theplea must be vacated and the judgment of conviction must be reversed (see People vMiller, 62 AD3d at 1048; People vRivera, 51 AD3d 1267, 1270 [2008]).
In light of our holding, defendant's remaining argument has been rendered academic.
Spain, J.P., Rose, Lahtinen and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is reversed,on the law, plea vacated, and matter remitted to the County Court of Schenectady County forfurther proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision.