| Giokas v Giokas |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 03867 [73 AD3d 688] |
| May 4, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| George Giokas, Respondent, v Eugenia Giokas,Appellant. |
—[*1] Castrovinci & Mady, Smithtown, N.Y. (Philip J. Castrovinci and Ruth Sovronsky ofcounsel), for respondent.
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the defendant appeals, as limited by her brief,from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (MacKenzie, J.), enteredOctober 3, 2008, as, upon a decision dated April 17, 2008, and upon a supplemental decisiondated May 29, 2008, both made after a nonjury trial, directed the plaintiff to pay her maintenancein the sum of only $500 per week, nontaxable to her, only from April 24, 2008, and continuinguntil the earliest of her remarriage, whether valid or invalid, her attainment of age 62, or thedeath of either party, and awarded her only 10% of the value of the plaintiff's business interests.
Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, on the facts, and in the exercise ofdiscretion, by deleting the provision thereof awarding the plaintiff maintenance in the sum of$500 per week, nontaxable to her, from April 24, 2008, and continuing until the earliest of herremarriage, whether valid or invalid, her attainment of age 62, or the death of either party, andsubstituting therefor a provision awarding her maintenance in the sum of $500 per week,nontaxable to her, from April 24, 2008, and continuing until the earliest of her remarriage,whether valid or invalid, her attainment of age 66, or the death of either party; as so modified,the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs to the defendant.
"[T]he amount and duration of maintenance is a matter committed to the sound discretion ofthe trial court, and every case must be determined on its own unique facts" (Wortman v Wortman, 11 AD3d604, 606 [2004]; see Grumet vGrumet, 37 AD3d 534, 535 [2007]). The Supreme Court must consider the factorsenumerated in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (6) (a), which include the predivorcestandard of living of the parties, the income and property of the parties, the equitable distributionof marital property, the duration of the marriage, the present and future earning capacity of theparties, the ability of the party seeking maintenance to be self-supporting, and the reduced or lostearning capacity of the party seeking maintenance (see Baron v Baron, 71 AD3d 807 [2010]; Meccariello v Meccariello, 46 AD3d640, 641-642 [2007]; Griggs vGriggs, 44 AD3d 710, 711-712 [2007]). The main purpose of a maintenance award is togive the nonmonied spouse economic independence (see Griggs v Griggs, 44 AD3d at711-712).[*2]
Contrary to the wife's contentions, the amount ofmaintenance awarded by the Supreme Court was consistent with the purpose and function ofmaintenance in light of her education, ability to be self-supporting, good health, lack ofchild-rearing responsibilities, and separate assets. However, in light of the parties' ages as well astheir respective financial circumstances, the Supreme Court should have awarded the wifemaintenance until the earliest of her eligibility for full Social Security benefits at the age of 66,her remarriage, or the death of either party (see Hamroff v Hamroff, 35 AD3d 365, 366 [2006]; Penna v Penna, 29 AD3d 970,971-972 [2006]; Taylor v Taylor, 300 AD2d 298, 299 [2002]).
While the distribution of marital property must be equitable, there is no requirement that theassets be split evenly (see Arvantides v Arvantides, 64 NY2d 1033, 1034 [1985]).Furthermore, "[t]rial courts are granted substantial discretion in determining what distribution ofmarital property will be equitable under all the circumstances" (Farrell v Cleary-Farrell,306 AD2d 597, 599 [2003] [internal quotation marks omitted]; Owens v Owens, 288AD2d 782, 783 [2001]).
Here, notwithstanding the length of the parties' 33-year marriage, the husband did notcommence his involvement in the first of the two businesses subject to equitable distributionuntil 21 years after the parties were married, which was at a time when their two sons werealready teenagers. The husband's involvement with the second of those businesses began sixyears after the commencement of his involvement in the first business, and only six years beforehe commenced this action. Further, during a substantial portion of the time in which the husbandwas involved in the two businesses, the wife was employed outside the home, and the parties'then-teenage children became emancipated.
The Supreme Court properly determined that the wife made no direct contributions to thehusband's businesses and, in light of its finding that she made only a modest, indirectcontribution to them, properly awarded her only 10% of their value (see Chalif v Chalif,298 AD2d 348, 348 [2002]). Contrary to the wife's contentions, her circumstances are thusdistinguishable from those of an untitled, full-time homemaker in a long-term marriage, whosespouse was involved in a business or practice for the entire duration of the marriage, duringwhich time children were born and raised primarily by the untitled spouse (see Ciampa v Ciampa, 47 AD3d745 [2008]). Thus, under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providentlyexercised its discretion in fashioning an award which limited the distributed amount of the valueof the husband's businesses, while taking into account the wife's limited indirect contributions tothem (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5] [d] [6]; Price v Price, 69NY2d 8, 11, 14 [1986]; Griggs v Griggs, 44 AD3d at 713; cf. Schwartz v Schwartz, 67 AD3d989, 991 [2009]). Skelos, J.P., Covello, Balkin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.