| Matter of Shuttle Contr. Corp. v Planning Bd. of the Inc. Vil. of GreatNeck |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 03942 [73 AD3d 789] |
| May 4, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Shuttle Contracting Corp.,Appellant, v Planning Board of the Incorporated Village of Great Neck et al.,Respondents. |
—[*1] Ackerman, Levine, Cullen, Brickman & Limmer, LLP, Great Neck, N.Y. (Andrew J. Luskinand Stephen G. Limmer of counsel), for respondents Planning Board of the Incorporated Villageof Great Neck, Charles W. Segal, Bart Sobel, Raymond Irymai, Robin Gordon, and BruceRothstein, as Members of the Planning Board. Forchelli, Curto, Crowe, Deegan, Schwartz, Mineo & Cohn, LLP, Mineola, N.Y. (Peter R.Mineo and Andrea Tsoukalas of counsel; Dana Marie Vassallo on the brief), for respondentsBehzad Peikarian and Fariba Peikarian.
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Planning Boardof the Incorporated Village of Great Neck, dated June 21, 2007, which, after a hearing, grantedthe application of the respondents Behzad Peikarian and Fariba Peikarian for preliminarysubdivision approval, the petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, NassauCounty (Winslow, J.), dated June 30, 2008, which denied the petition and dismissed theproceeding.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearingseparately and filing separate briefs.
A local planning board has broad discretion in reaching its determination on applications forsubdividing property, and judicial review is limited to determining whether the action taken bythe board was illegal, arbitrary, or an abuse of discretion (see Matter of Kearney v Kita, 62 AD3d 1000, 1001 [2009]; Matter of Davies Farm, LLC, v PlanningBd. of Town of Clarkstown, 54 AD3d 757, 758 [2008]; see generally Matter of Ifrahv Utschig, 98 NY2d 304, 308 [2002]). Here, contrary to the petitioner's contention, thedetermination of the Planning Board of the Incorporated Village of Great Neck (hereinafter thePlanning Board) to grant the application of the respondents Behzad Peikarian and FaribaPeikarian (hereinafter together the respondents) for preliminary subdivision approval had arational basis, was not arbitrary or capricious, and was not illegal (see Matter of Kearney vKita, 62 AD3d at 1001-1002).
The petitioner contends that its private property rights were adversely affected by the [*2]Planning Board's determination. Whatever property rights thepetitioner possesses must be enforced through a private action against the individuals or entitiesallegedly violating those rights (seeChambers v Old Stone Hill Rd. Assoc., 1 NY3d 424, 432 [2004]; Matter of Friendsof Shawangunks v Knowlton, 64 NY2d 387, 392 [1985]; Matter of Gersten vCullen, 203 AD2d 744, 747 [1994]). However, the petitioner's private property rights werenot before the Supreme Court, and are not before this Court, for adjudication in this proceedingpursuant to CPLR article 78 (seeLeBaron v DPL & B, LLC, 35 AD3d 391, 392 [2006]; Welsh v Okolie, 22 AD3d 572,572-573 [2005]). We note that our determination does not preclude the petitioner fromcommencing a private enforcement action, and we take no position on the merits of such anaction.
The petitioner's remaining contentions either are an improper attempt to challenge adetermination of the nonparty Zoning Board of Appeals of the Incorporated Village of GreatNeck granting the respondents' application for a street frontage variance after having failed tocommence a CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging that determination (see VillageLaw § 7-712-c; Matter of Ip vVillage of N. Hills, 61 AD3d 688 [2009]), or are without merit. Skelos, J.P., Santucci,Balkin and Austin, JJ., concur.