People v Nelson
2010 NY Slip Op 03964 [73 AD3d 811]
May 4, 2010
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 30, 2010


The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Nakwan Nelson, Appellant.

[*1]Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (William Kastin of counsel), for appellant, andappellant pro se. Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove andAnne C. Feigus of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Firetog, J.),rendered March 7, 2008, convicting him of murder in the second degree, robbery in the firstdegree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and attempted assault in the firstdegree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial,after a hearing (J. Goldberg, J.), of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was tosuppress his statements to law enforcement officials.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Prior to being advised of his Miranda rights (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US436 [1966]), the defendant made a brief oral statement to a detective indicating that he was"with" the perpetrators at the time of the subject robbery and homicide, but was standing acrossthe street. The hearing court suppressed this statement upon the ground that it was the product ofcustodial interrogation conducted before the administration of Miranda warnings.However, the hearing court found that the inculpatory statements the defendant made to lawenforcement officials after waiving his Miranda rights were voluntary and admissible.

On appeal, the defendant contends that his post-Miranda statements should havebeen suppressed because they were tainted by the prior statement. We disagree. Under thesecircumstances, the pre-Miranda statement was not so incriminating in nature that it canbe said to have committed the defendant to confessing to the crime (see People vHolmes, 145 AD2d 908, 909 [1988]), and there is no evidence that the defendant felt socommitted by the pre-Miranda statement that he believed himself bound to confess(see People v Duncan, 295 AD2d 533, 535 [2002]; People v Morgan, 277 AD2d331 [2000]; People v James, 253 AD2d 438, 440 [1998]). In any event, the defendant'spost-Miranda statements followed a pronounced break in the interrogation, which wouldhave attenuated any potential taint from his earlier statements (see People v Paulman, 5 NY3d122, 130 [2005]; People v Bethea, 67 NY2d 364 [1986]; People v Chapple,38 NY2d 112, 114 [1975]; People v Jamison, 307 AD2d 368 [2003]).[*2]

The contention raised in the defendant's supplemental prose brief is unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, without merit. Dillon, J.P., Balkin,Lott and Sgroi, JJ., concur.


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