| People v Lawal |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 04069 [73 AD3d 1287] |
| May 13, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Aziza T.Lawal, Also Known as T, Also Known as Tina, Appellant. |
—[*1] Louise K. Sira, District Attorney, Johnstown (James P. Riley of counsel), forrespondent.
Garry, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Fulton County (Hoye, J.), renderedOctober 9, 2008, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of criminal sale of acontrolled substance in the third degree (two counts) and criminal possession of a controlledsubstance in the third degree (two counts).
In March 2007, a confidential informant (hereinafter CI) contacted the Gloversville PoliceDepartment with information about a person named "T" or "Tina" who allegedly sold crackcocaine. Thereafter, the CI made two controlled buys of crack cocaine several hours apart at alaundromat in the City of Gloversville, Fulton County. After the CI identified defendant'sphotograph in a six-picture photo array as the person who sold him the crack cocaine, defendantwas charged by a six-count indictment. Her motion to suppress the identification as undulysuggestive was denied after a Wade hearing. Following a jury trial, defendant wasconvicted of two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree andtwo counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, and sentenced toconcurrent prison terms of two years on each count, to be followed by two years of postreleasesupervision. Defendant now appeals.
Defendant contends that her suppression motion should have been granted because the [*2]pretrial identification procedure used by the police was undulysuggestive. We find that the People met their initial burden to establish that the police conductwas reasonable and their procedure was not unduly suggestive, and that defendant did not meether ultimate burden "to establish that the identification was infected by impropriety or unduesuggestiveness" (People vChatham, 55 AD3d 1045, 1046 [2008]; see People v Chipp, 75 NY2d 327, 335[1990], cert denied 498 US 833 [1990]; People v Coleman, 2 AD3d 1045, 1046 [2003]). The officer whoprepared the photo array testified that he selected five photographs of women in defendant's agerange with similar hairstyles and ethnic backgrounds from an internal police database.Defendant's photograph was not in the database and had to be obtained from a different source;as a result, its background was blank, while the other pictures had lines in the backgrounds. " 'Aphoto array is unduly suggestive if some characteristic of one picture draws the viewer'sattention in such a way as to indicate that the police have made a particular selection' " (People v Davis, 18 AD3d 1016,1018 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 805 [2005], quoting People v Yousef, 8 AD3d 820, 821 [2004], lv denied 3NY3d 743 [2004]). County Court correctly found that the minor background differences in thisarray were not sufficient to draw particular attention to defendant's picture, in light of varioussimilar and dissimilar factors; as the court noted, the other pictures also did not have perfectlyidentical backgrounds (see People v Hunter, 273 AD2d 500, 502 [2000], lvdenied 95 NY2d 935 [2000]; People v Brown, 169 AD2d 934, 935 [1991], lvdenied 77 NY2d 958 [1991]). It further bears noting that before viewing the photographs,the CI was instructed to ignore markings or numbers or other differences in type or style.
The fact that the CI was initially told that the array would include a photograph of a personwhom police believed to be the suspect was insufficient to contaminate the identification (seePeople v Rodriguez, 64 NY2d 738, 740 [1984]; see also People v Buxton, 189 AD2d996, 997 [1993], lv denied 81 NY2d 1011 [1993]), particularly since he was instructedjust before he viewed the array that the suspect's photograph might or might not be included.Finally, although the People bore no burden to produce evidence of an independent source for anin-court identification in these circumstances (see People v Gragnano, 63 AD3d 1437, 1439 [2009], lvdenied 13 NY3d 939 [2010]), we note that the CI testified that he had met defendant on atleast 10 previous occasions (see Peoplev Richardson, 9 AD3d 783, 786-787 [2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 680 [2004];People v Jones, 301 AD2d 678, 679-680 [2003], lv denied 99 NY2d 616 [2003]).Thus, defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied.
Defendant further contends that the evidence identifying her as the person who sold crackcocaine to the CI was legally insufficient to support her convictions and that the convictionswere against the weight of the evidence. The proof at trial established that a police officer whoobserved the controlled buys saw, in each transaction, the CI enter the laundromat, leave it witha woman, and sit with her briefly in a tan car parked nearby, after which the CI turned over crackcocaine to police. Although the observing officer was too far away to identify the woman'sfeatures, he testified that in both transactions the woman and the car appeared to be the same.Police traced the car's license plate number and determined that it was the same as on a vehiclerented to defendant. On the next day, a different police officer watched a woman arrive at theCI's residence in a tan car, enter the residence, and leave it again. During the trial, this officeridentified defendant as the woman he saw at the CI's residence, and the CI identified her as thewoman from whom he purchased drugs.
As to the CI's credibility, although he had admittedly used drugs in the past and was workingwith police in an attempt to reduce charges against another individual in an unrelated matter, theproof established that police had worked with him on previous occasions and had [*3]found him to be reliable. It is the province of the jury to resolvesuch credibility issues, and its opportunity to hear testimony and observe witness demeanor is tobe accorded great deference (see Peoplev Burroughs, 64 AD3d 894, 897 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 794 [2009]).Further, although defendant points to certain minor inconsistencies in the CI's testimony,adequate corroboration was provided by the officers who observed the transactions andidentified the vehicle (see People vGolden, 24 AD3d 806, 807 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 812 [2006]; People vColeman, 2 AD3d at 1047).[FN*]Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, we find "a valid line ofreasoning and permissible inferences that could lead a rational person to the conclusion reachedby the jury" (People v Marshall, 65AD3d 710, 711 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 940 [2010]; see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d342, 349 [2007]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Moreover, viewingthe evidence in a neutral light, we conclude that the convictions are not against the weight of theevidence (see People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495; People v Carter, 57 AD3d 1017, 1018 [2008], lv denied 12NY3d 781 [2009]).
Finally, we decline to disturb defendant's sentence on the ground that it is harsh or excessive." 'Absent a clear abuse of discretion or the existence of extraordinary circumstances, a trialcourt's exercise of discretion in imposing what it considers to be an appropriate sentence will notbe disturbed' " (People v Elliot, 57AD3d 1095, 1097 [2008], lv denied 12 NY3d 783 [2009], quoting People vMay, 301 AD2d 784, 786 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 564 [2003]). No such abuseof discretion or extraordinary circumstances have been shown.
Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Spain and Kavanagh, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.
Footnote *: There is no merit to defendant'sclaim that proof of the location of the crimes was inadequate. The CI's testimony that thecontrolled buys took place on South Main Street in Gloversville was sufficient to permit the juryto conclude that the crimes occurred in Fulton County (see People v Peterson, 194 AD2d124, 127 [1993], lv denied 83 NY2d 856 [1994]).