| Hargob Realty Assoc., Inc. v Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 04143 [73 AD3d 856] |
| May 11, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Hargob Realty Associates, Inc., Appellant, v Fireman'sFund Insurance Company, Doing Business as Interstate Fire & Casualty Company,Respondent. |
—[*1] Rivkin Radler, LLP, Uniondale, N.Y. (Evan H. Krinick, Gary D. Centola, and Harris J.Zakarin of counsel), for respondent.
In an action, inter alia, for a judgment declaring that the defendant is obligated to defend andindemnify the plaintiff in an underlying action entitled Bonilla v Hargob Realty Assoc.,pending in the Supreme Court, Kings County, under index No. 9854/05, the plaintiff appealsfrom an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Phelan, J.), entered April 2, 2009, whichgranted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, in effect, declaring that it is not soobligated.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the SupremeCourt, Nassau County, for the entry of a judgment declaring that the defendant is not obligated todefend and indemnify the plaintiff in an underlying action entitled Bonilla v Hargob RealtyAssoc., pending in the Supreme Court, Kings County, under index No. 9854/05.
The plaintiff entered into a construction contract with nonparty U.S.A. Interior, LLC(hereinafter USAI), pursuant to which USAI was to perform demolition work (hereinafter theproject) at certain premises owned by the plaintiff. The only written agreements between USAIand the plaintiff pertaining to the project were a one-page proposal from USAI specifying the bidprice and work to be performed (hereinafter the proposal) and a hold harmless agreement.Pursuant to the hold harmless agreement, USAI, as the subcontractor, agreed to indemnify andhold harmless the plaintiff, as the owner, "from and against any and all claims, suits, liens,judgment, damages, losses and expenses arising in whole or in part . . . from theacts, omissions, breach or default of [USAI] in connection with the performance of any work byor for [USAI]," except for claims arising from Hargob's own negligence.
The defendant Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, doing business as Interstate Fire &Casualty Company (hereinafter the defendant insurer), issued a policy of commercial generalliability insurance to USAI that contained an additional insured endorsement. Pursuant to thatendorsement, added to the insured persons covered under the subject policy was "any entity theNamed Insured is required in a written contract to name as an insured (hereinafter calledAdditional Insured) . . . but only with respect to liability arising out of workperformed by or on behalf of the Named Insured for the Additional [*2]Insured [emphasis added]."
"The four corners of an insurance agreement govern who is covered and the extent ofcoverage" (Sixty Sutton Corp. v IllinoisUnion Ins. Co., 34 AD3d 386, 388 [2006]; see Stainless, Inc. v Employers Fire Ins.Co., 69 AD2d 27, 33 [1979], affd 49 NY2d 924 [1980]). Where a third party seeksthe benefit of coverage, the terms of the policy must clearly evince such intent (see Stainless,Inc. v Employers Fire Ins. Co., 69 AD2d at 33). Thus, when determining whether a thirdparty is an additional insured under an insurance policy, a court must ascertain the intention ofthe parties to the policy, as determined from within the four corners of the policy itself (seeBinasco v Break-Away Demolition Corp., 256 AD2d 291, 292 [1998]; I.S.A. In N.J. vEffective Sec. Sys., 138 AD2d 681, 682 [1988]).
Here, as noted, the additional insured endorsement of the subject policy added to section II,which defines the persons insured, afforded bodily injury liability coverage under section I of thepolicy to any entity that the named insured "is required in a written contract to name as aninsured." Thus, notwithstanding USAI's written agreement to indemnify the plaintiff, the holdharmless agreement did not contain any requirement that USAI name the plaintiff as anadditional insured under the subject policy (cf. Superior Ice Rink, Inc. v Nescon Contr. Corp., 52 AD3d 688[2008]). Therefore, the defendant insurer demonstrated its entitlement to judgment as a matter oflaw based upon its submission, inter alia, of the subject policy, the hold harmless agreement, andan excerpt of the deposition of one of the plaintiff's principals, who averred that the proposal andhold harmless agreements were the only written contracts between the plaintiff and USAIpertaining to the project.
In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The USAI certificate ofinsurance proffered in opposition, listing the plaintiff as an additional insured under the subjectpolicy, was insufficient to alter the language of the policy itself, especially since the certificaterecited that it was for informational purposes only, that it conferred no rights upon the holder,and that it did not amend, alter, or extend the coverage afforded by the policy (see School Constr. Consultants, Inc. vARA Plumbing & Heating Corp., 63 AD3d 1029 [2009]; Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v National Fire& Mar. Ins. Co., 55 AD3d 671, 673 [2008]; Metropolitan Heat & Power Co., Inc. vAIG Claims Servs., Inc., 47 AD3d 621 [2008]).
In addition, and contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the denial of coverage under theadditional insured endorsement constituted a denial based upon a "lack of inclusion" rather than"by reason of exclusion" and, thus, the defendant insurer was not required to deny coveragewhere none existed (Zappone v Home Ins. Co., 55 NY2d 131, 137 [1982]). Therefore, tothe extent that the defendant insurer's denial of coverage was based upon lack of coverage as anadditional insured pursuant to the additional insured endorsement, a timely disclaimer wasunnecessary (see Markevics v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 97 NY2d 646, 648 [2001];Matter of Worcester Ins. Co. v Bettenhauser, 95 NY2d 185, 188 [2000]; see e.g. KMAPS Corp. v Nova Cas.Co., 53 AD3d 1043 [2008]; Perkins v Allstate Ins. Co., 51 AD3d 647 [2008]; cf. Rael Automatic Sprinkler Co., Inc. vSchaefer Agency, 52 AD3d 670 [2008]).
Further, the supplementary payments provision of the policy, which obligates the defendantinsurer to defend an indemnitee of the named insured when certain specified conditions are met,does not also afford liability coverage. Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the supplementarypayments provision did not demonstrate an intent by the defendant insurer to afford the plaintiffcoverage solely on the basis that it is an indemnitee of the named insured, in the absence of theplaintiff's addition as "an insured" under section II of the subject policy pursuant to theadditional insured endorsement (see Stainless, Inc. v Employers Fire Ins. Co., 69 AD2dat 33). Liability coverage under the policy is afforded by Section I, not the supplementarypayments provision. Therefore, Hargob's status as an indemnitee does not operate to confer uponit status as an additional insured, and it is, thus, not entitled to liability coverage under thesubject policy pursuant to the supplementary payments provision.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant insurer's motion forsummary judgment, in effect, declaring that it is not obligated to defend and indemnify theplaintiff in the underlying action.
Since the complaint asserts a cause of action for a declaratory judgment, we remit the matterto the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for the entry of a judgment declaring that the defendant[*3]insurer is not obligated to defend and indemnify the plaintiffin the underlying personal injury action pursuant to the subject insurance policy (see Lanza vWagner, 11 NY2d 317, 334 [1962], appeal dismissed 371 US 74 [1962], certdenied 371 US 901 [1962]). Skelos, J.P., Santucci, Leventhal and Hall, JJ., concur.