| Matter of Mera v Rodriguez |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 04396 [73 AD3d 1069] |
| May 18, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Moises Mera, Appellant, v GloriaRodriguez, Respondent. |
—[*1]
In a visitation proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the father appeals, aslimited by his brief, from so much of a corrected order of the Family Court, Westchester County(Edlitz, J.), entered June 3, 2009, as denied, without a hearing, his petition to modify a priororder of the same court dated March 6, 2008, which, inter alia, permitted him to have onlytherapeutic supervised visitation with the subject child once it was deemed therapeuticallyappropriate, and suspended all visitation between him and the subject child.
Ordered that the corrected order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs ordisbursements.
"A court must determine the best interests of the child when adjudicating . . .visitation issues. The determination of visitation issues is entrusted to the sound discretion of thetrial court, and should not be disturbed on appeal unless it lacks a substantial evidentiary basis inthe record" (Matter of Thompson vYu-Thompson, 41 AD3d 487, 488 [2007]; see Jordan v Jordan, 8 AD3d 444 [2004]). "[A] noncustodial parentshould have reasonable rights of visitation, and the denial of those rights to a natural parent is adrastic remedy which should only be invoked when there is substantial evidence that visitationwould be detrimental to the child" (Matter of Grisanti v Grisanti, 4 AD3d 471, 473 [2004] [internalquotation marks and citation omitted]).
The Family Court's determination that therapeutic supervised visitation would bepsychologically detrimental to, and not in the best interests of, the subject child has a sound andsubstantial basis in the record and should not be disturbed (see Matter of Thompson v Yu-Thompson, 41 AD3d 487 [2007]).To the extent that the Family Court relied upon the in camera interview of the then-12-year-oldchild, it was entitled to place great weight on the wishes of the child, who was mature enough toexpress his wishes (see Matter ofO'Connor v Dyer, 18 AD3d 757 [2005]; Koppenhoefer v Koppenhoefer, 159AD2d 113 [1990]).[*2]
Further, the Family Court did not improvidently exerciseits discretion in declining to proceed with psychological evaluations of the parties beforesuspending visitation (see Matter ofRhodie v Nathan, 67 AD3d 687 [2009]; Matter of Johnson v Williams, 59 AD3d 445 [2009]; Matter of Potente v Wasilewski, 51AD3d 675 [2008]). The Family Court had the benefit of the reports of the director of therelevant supervised visitation program at the YMCA and the child's therapist, which evaluatedand discussed the child's psychological status and feelings regarding engaging in therapeuticsupervised visitation with the father, a letter from the father's therapist, which evaluated anddiscussed the father's parenting skills, the in camera interview of the child wherein the FamilyCourt was able to assess firsthand the child's feelings towards the father and the prospect ofhaving to engage in therapeutic supervised visitation with him, and the position advocated by theattorney for the child. Rivera, J.P., Florio, Angiolillo and Lott, JJ., concur.