People v Nieves
2010 NY Slip Op 04418 [73 AD3d 1087]
May 18, 2010
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 30, 2010


The People of the State of New York, Respondent,
v
EfrenNieves, Appellant.

—[*1]John De Chiaro, Larchmont, N.Y., for appellant.

Janet DiFiore, District Attorney, White Plains, N.Y. (Valerie A. Livingston and Anthony J.Servino of counsel; Justin L. Tolbert on the brief), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Westchester County(Alessandro, J.), rendered June 14, 2004, convicting him of attempted assault in the seconddegree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, the plea is vacated, superior courtinformation No. 04-0141 is dismissed, and the matter is remitted to the County Court,Westchester County, for further proceedings on the felony complaint.

The defendant was charged, by felony complaint, with one count of attempted assault in thefirst degree under Penal Law § 120.10 (3), one count of criminal use of a firearm in thesecond degree, and one count of reckless endangerment in the first degree. He waived indictmentby a grand jury and pleaded guilty under a superior court information to one count of attemptedassault in the second degree under Penal Law §§ 110.00 and 120.05 (4).

As the People correctly concede, the judgment of conviction must be reversed because thesuperior court information was jurisdictionally defective, since the single count contained thereincharged the defendant with a nonexistent crime (see People v Roe, 191 AD2d 844, 845[1993]). An attempt requires an intent to commit a specific crime (see Penal Law §110.00; People v Terry, 104 AD2d 572, 573 [1984]; People v Williams, 40AD2d 1023, 1024 [1972]). "One cannot attempt to commit an act which one does not intend tocommit" (People v Terry, 104 AD2d at 573). Assault in the second degree as defined insubdivision (4) of section 120.05 of the Penal Law involves no intent, only a culpable mentalstate of recklessness. Accordingly, one cannot legally be found guilty of attempted assault in thesecond degree by reckless conduct (see People v Williams, 40 AD2d at 1024; seealso People v Terry, 104 AD2d at 573). Thus, the superior court information wasjurisdictionally defective (see People v Roe, 191 AD2d at 845), and this defect survivesthe defendant's failure to raise this claim in the County Court, his plea of guilty, and his waiverof the right to appeal (see People v Zanghi, 79 NY2d 815, 817 [1991]; People v Edwards, 39 AD3d 875,876 [2007]). Covello, J.P., Dickerson, Eng and Austin, JJ., concur.


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