| Szekely v Szekely |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 04574 [73 AD3d 1158] |
| May 25, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Lauraine Szekely, Respondent, v Adam M. Szekely,Appellant. |
—[*1]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, in which the plaintiff moved to vacate anincome execution pursuant to CPLR 5241 (a) (8), the defendant appeals, as limited by his brief,from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Scarpino, Jr., J.), enteredSeptember 24, 2009, as denied that branch of his cross motion which was for an award of anattorney's fee for the prosecution of this enforcement matter against the plaintiff.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, thatbranch of the defendant's cross motion which was for an award of an attorney's fee is granted,and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, to determine the amount ofthe attorney's fee to be awarded to the defendant.
The parties to this action were divorced by a judgment entered August 23, 2004, whichincorporated by reference, but did not merge with, a so-Ordered stipulation and certainsettlement agreements, which provided, inter alia, for joint custody of their two children and theplaintiff's payment of child support to the defendant. When the plaintiff failed to timely pay childsupport and arrears in accordance with the judgment, the defendant served an income executionfor support enforcement on the plaintiff and her employer pursuant to CPLR 5241.
The plaintiff moved to vacate the income execution pursuant to CPLR 5241 (a) (8), claimingthat she was not in default and that the arrears were incorrectly calculated. The defendantcross-moved for the approval of the income execution and for an award of an attorney's fee inprosecuting this matter. The Supreme Court denied the motion, granted that branch of the crossmotion which was for the approval of the income execution, and denied that branch of the crossmotion which was for an award of an attorney's fee. The defendant appeals. We reverse the orderinsofar as appealed from.
Contrary to the determination of the Supreme Court, the defendant is entitled to bereimbursed for "necessary and reasonable" attorney's fees in connection with this proceedingpursuant to the default provision in the parties' settlement agreements (see Matter of Milark vMeigher, 56 AD3d 1018 [2008]; Parnes v Parnes, 41 AD3d 934, 936-937 [2007];Choy v Choy, 137 AD2d 784, 785 [1988]; Canick v Canick, 122 AD2d 767, 769[1986]). Therefore, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, to determinethe amount of the attorney's fee to be awarded to the defendant (see Famoso v [*2]Famoso, 267 AD2d 274, 275 [1999]; Morris v Morris,251 AD2d 638 [1998]; Zeitlin v Zeitlin, 250 AD2d 607, 609 [1998]; Santora vNicolini, 237 AD2d 504 [1997]; Bonelli v Bonelli, 189 AD2d 794, 795 [1993]).Dillon, J.P., Balkin, Lott and Sgroi, JJ., concur.