| Matter of Kaur v Singh |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 04589 [73 AD3d 1178] |
| May 25, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Aurshpunit Kaur,Respondent, v Aurwindur Singh, Appellant. |
—[*1] Amy L. Colvin, Huntington, N.Y., for respondent.
In a family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, Aurwindur Singhappeals from an order of fact-finding and disposition of the Family Court, Nassau County (St.George, J.), dated March 27, 2009, which, after a hearing, inter alia, found that he had committedthe family offenses of harassment in the second degree and menacing, and directed the issuanceof an order of protection in favor of the petitioner and against him.
Ordered that the order of fact-finding and disposition is affirmed, without costs ordisbursements.
"The determination of whether a family offense was committed is a factual issue to beresolved by the hearing court" (Matter of Creighton v Whitmore, 71 AD3d 1141 [2010];see Family Ct Act §§ 812, 832; Matter of Halper v Halper, 61 AD3d687 [2009]; Matter of Lallmohamed v Lallmohamed, 23 AD3d 562 [2005]), whose"determination regarding the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight on appeal unlessclearly unsupported by the record" (Matter of Creighton v Whitmore, 71 AD3d at 1141;see Matter of Robbins v Robbins, 48 AD3d 822 [2008]; Matter of Phillips vLaland, 4 AD3d 529, 530 [2004]). Here, a fair preponderance of the credible evidencesupported the Family Court's determination that, on November 27, 2008, the appellantcommitted acts which constituted the family offenses of harassment in the second degree andmenacing, warranting the issuance of an order of protection (see Family Ct Act §832; Penal Law § 240.26 [1]; § 120.15; Matter of Czop v Czop, 21 AD3d958, 959 [2005]; Matter of Jessica C. v Esteban B., 13 AD3d 183 [2004]; Yvette H. vMichael G., 270 AD2d 123 [2000]).
Contrary to the appellant's contention, it was not incumbent upon the Family Court tospecify the particular family offense, i.e., what degree of menacing his acts constituted, where itwas clear from the record that his acts constituted menacing in the third degree (see Matter ofAbbott v Burnes, 27 AD3d 555 [2006]; Matter of Topper v Topper, 271 AD2d 613,613-614 [2000]).
The appellant's remaining contentions are without merit. Skelos, J.P., Covello, Hall andSgroi, JJ., concur.