| People v Malcolm |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 04882 [74 AD3d 1483] |
| June 10, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v RogerMalcolm, Appellant. |
—[*1] Holley Carnright, District Attorney (Joan Gudesblatt Lamb of counsel), forrespondent.
Peters, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Ulster County (Bruhn, J.),rendered October 2, 2008, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of attemptedmurder in the second degree, attempted assault in the first degree, reckless endangerment in thefirst degree and menacing in the second degree.
Unhappy with the repairs the victim made to his automobile, defendant entered the victim'srepair shop armed with a loaded semi-automatic rifle, took aim at the victim and pulled thetrigger. When the rifle misfired, the victim rushed defendant and attempted to wrestle the rifleaway. Upon hearing the victim's shouts and observing the two struggling with one another on theground, the victim's employee called the police and secured the weapon until the police arrivedminutes later. Defendant was indicted for attempted murder in the second degree, attemptedassault in the first degree, assault in the second degree, reckless endangerment in the first degreeand menacing in the second degree and, following a jury trial, was acquitted of the charge ofassault in the second degree and found guilty on the remaining counts. Sentenced to an aggregateprison term of 10 years to be followed by five years of postrelease supervision, he appeals.
Defendant first contends that his convictions for attempted murder and attempted [*2]assault were against the weight of the evidence, specificallyattacking the element of intent.[FN*]
We disagree. A defendant's intent may be inferred from his actions and the surroundingcircumstances (see People vBonney, 69 AD3d 1116, 1118 [2010], lv denied 14 NY3d 838 [2010]; People v Nash, 64 AD3d 878, 881[2009]; People v Booker, 53 AD3d697, 703 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 853 [2008]).
At trial, evidence was presented regarding the ongoing dispute between defendant and thevictim regarding the work performed on defendant's car. Defendant admitted that, following hisconversation with the victim earlier in the day, he was an "emotional mess" and made a suddendecision to do something as he had a "deep-seeded hatred" for the victim. He drove to thevictim's garage armed with a loaded rifle, a bayonet strapped to his bare chest and five loadedmagazines holding over 100 rounds of ammunition. As he approached, he drove slowly past thevictim's garage to ensure that the victim was alone, parked his van approximately 350 feet fromthe garage, left the engine running and secreted the gun by his side. According to the victim,defendant then entered the premises and, from a distance of approximately six feet away,squatted down, pointed the rifle at the victim's chest and pulled the trigger. The victim furthertestified that, while he and defendant struggled following the gun's misfire, defendantunsuccessfully attempted to reach for the bayonet while repeatedly stating "you ruined my life."Upon their arrival, police discovered a round in the chamber of the rifle, over 60 rounds ofammunition at the scene of the confrontation and additional ammunition and weaponry indefendant's vehicle. In light of the background of the dispute, the sheer quantity of ammunitionwith which defendant armed himself, his surreptitious conduct prior to arriving at the victim'sgarage and his actions upon confronting the victim, the jury could readily infer that defendantharbored the requisite intent (see Peoplev Baker, 27 AD3d 1006, 1009 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 785 [2006]; People v Mullings, 23 AD3d 756,758 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 756 [2005]; People v Rivers, 17 AD3d 934, 936 [2005], lv denied 5NY3d 768 [2005]). Although defendant testified that he brought the gun to the victim's repairshop merely to "scare the hell out of [the victim] who put [him] through . . . hell,"that his finger was not on the trigger and that the safety was on the entire time, the jury was freeto reject this version of events (see People v Baker, 27 AD3d at 1009; People v Hargett, 11 AD3d 812,814 [2004], lv denied 4 NY3d 744 [2004]). According due deference to the jury'scredibility determinations (see People vRomero, 7 NY3d 633, 645 [2006]), we are satisfied that the verdict on these counts wassupported by the weight of the evidence (see People v Stewart, 68 AD3d 1438, 1439 [2009], lvdenied 14 NY3d 773 [2010]; People v Baker, 27 AD3d at 1009).
We are similarly unpersuaded by defendant's assertion that the guilty verdict on the recklessendangerment count was against the weight of the evidence. Relying on People v Davis(72 NY2d 32, 35-37 [1988]), defendant contends that the evidence that the safety was on, which[*3]prevented the weapon from being fired, precluded a findingthat his conduct created a grave risk of death. Unlike Davis, however, the operability ofthe gun here was not a factual impossibility. Quite to the contrary, a firearms expert testified thatthe rifle was fully operable and explained that, even if the safety had been engaged, as defendantclaimed, it could be easily disengaged simply by moving one finger forward from the trigger.Considering the ease by which the safety could be disengaged, the victim's testimony thatdefendant reloaded the weapon and ejected a round—while still pointing the weapon athim—as he rushed to subdue defendant, and the uncontradicted proof that the twothereafter struggled for control of the loaded rifle, there was ample support for a finding thatdefendant recklessly created a grave risk of death "by creating a situation where any suddenmovement by the [victim] or defendant could readily have resulted in the accidental discharge ofthe weapon" (People v Chrysler, 85 NY2d 413, 416 [1995]; see People v Graham, 14 AD3d887, 889 [2005], lv denied 4 NY3d 853 [2005]; compare People v Davis, 72NY2d at 35-37). Evaluating the evidence in a neutral light and weighing the conflictinginferences that can be drawn therefrom (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348 [2007]; People vBleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]), we cannot conclude that the verdict on this count wasagainst the weight of the evidence.
Defendant's claim that the jury verdict finding him guilty of both attempted murder in thesecond degree and reckless endangerment in the first degree is inconsistent was not preserved forour review by appropriate objection before the jury was discharged, at a time when the allegederror could have been cured (see People v Alfaro, 66 NY2d 985, 987 [1985]; People v Pearson, 69 AD3d 1226,1227 [2010]; People v Young, 296 AD2d 588, 589 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d541 [2002]). In any event, since these counts were premised on separate and distinct acts bydefendant, we would nonetheless find that the jury's verdict was not inconsistent (see People v Lewis, 46 AD3d943, 946-947 [2007]; People vRouse, 4 AD3d 553, 557 [2004], lv denied 2 NY3d 805 [2004]; comparePeople v Slater, 270 AD2d 925, 925 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 858 [2000]).
Nor are we persuaded by defendant's contention that County Court improperly denied hisapplication, made less than one week prior to trial, for substitute assigned counsel. An indigentcriminal defendant must demonstrate "good cause" for the appointment of substitute counsel,such as a conflict of interest or other irreconcilable conflict, and is not entitled to theappointment of successive lawyers at his or her option (see People v Sides, 75 NY2d822, 824 [1990]; People v Manley,70 AD3d 1125, 1125-1126 [2010]; People v Smith, 231 AD2d 815, 815-816[1996]). "In determining whether good cause exists, a trial court must consider the timing of thedefendant's request, its effect on the progress of the case and whether present counsel will likelyprovide the defendant with meaningful assistance" (People v Linares, 2 NY3d 507, 510 [2004]; see People vMedina, 44 NY2d 199, 208 [1978]).
In his written request, defendant claimed that his assigned counsel was not adequatelyprepared, failed to review relevant documents pertinent to his defense and did not have his"interests at heart." At the next court appearance, defendant was given an opportunity toarticulate his concerns about counsel, and County Court adequately evaluated the reasons for hiseve of trial request. Contrary to defendant's contention, further inquiry was not required becausehis conclusory and unsubstantiated assertions did not "raise a serious possibility of irreconcilableconflict" (People v Tenace, 256 AD2d 928, 930 [1998] [internal quotation marksomitted], lv denied 93 NY2d 902 [1999], cert denied 530 US 1217 [2000]; see People v Breedlove, 61 AD3d1120, 1121 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 913 [2009]; People v Dunton, 19 AD3d 808,809 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 805 [2005]). Moreover, in denying defendant's [*4]request, County Court noted that defendant had succeeded indismissing his prior assigned counsel on the eve of trial some three months earlier based onsimilar complaints, and found that defendant's request was yet another attempt to delay theproceedings. Given the timing of the motion and absent a compelling reason for the substitution,we will not disturb County Court's determination made pursuant to its sound discretion (see People v Nelson, 7 NY3d 883,884 [2006]; People v Wright, 5AD3d 873, 875 [2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 651 [2004]; People v Nelson, 1 AD3d 796,797-798 [2003], lv denied 1 NY3d 631 [2004]).
Finally, to the extent that defendant's pro se supplemental brief advances a claim ofineffective assistance of counsel, we find it to be without merit. Most of defendant's assertionspertain to matters outside the record on appeal and the proper recourse is a CPL article 440motion (see People v Smith, 63AD3d 1301, 1304 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 862 [2009]; People v Echavarria, 53 AD3d859, 863-864 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 832 [2008]). Notwithstanding theremaining claimed deficiencies, counsel's vigorous representation of defendant is reflected by hisappropriate motion practice, effective evidentiary objections, thorough cross-examination of thePeople's witnesses, coherent theory in defense of the charges and ability to secure an acquittal onone count of the indictment (see Peoplev Conklin, 63 AD3d 1276, 1277 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 859 [2009]; People v Scanlon, 52 AD3d 1035,1040 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 741 [2008]; People v Lewis, 46 AD3d at 947).Taken as a whole, the record reveals that defendant was afforded meaningful representation(see People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]; People v Black, 65 AD3d 811, 815 [2009], lv denied 13NY3d 905 [2009]).
Defendant's remaining contentions raised in his pro se supplemental brief have beenreviewed and found to be lacking in merit.
Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Kavanagh and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.
Footnote *: Although defendant also arguesthat the verdict on these counts, as well as the reckless endangerment count, were not supportedby legally sufficient evidence, he failed to properly preserve that claim for our review by makinga particularized motion to dismiss at trial directed at the specific deficiencies in the evidencenow challenged (see People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 19 [1995]; People v Gonzalez, 64 AD3d1038, 1039 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 796 [2009]; People v Portee, 56 AD3d 947,948-949 [2008], lv denied 12 NY3d 820 [2009]).