| Wilcox v Newark Val. Cent. School Dist. |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 04916 [74 AD3d 1558] |
| June 10, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| Lyndsey Wilcox, Respondent, v Newark Valley Central SchoolDistrict et al., Appellants. |
—[*1] Law Office of Ronald R. Benjamin, Binghamton (Ronald R. Benjamin of counsel), forrespondent.
Peters, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Tait, J.), entered April 27, 2009 inTioga County, which, among other things, partially granted defendants' motion to dismiss thecomplaint.
Plaintiff was employed as a probationary physical education teacher and coached the girlsfield hockey teams at defendant Newark Valley Central School District (hereinafter NVCSD)commencing in the 2006-2007 school year. At that time, she was involved in a romanticrelationship with Todd Broxmeyer, a well-known field hockey expert who ran a number ofclinics in Broome County and acted as a volunteer coach to the NVCSD field hockey teams. InDecember 2007, Broxmeyer was arrested and charged with raping a female field hockey playerhe coached at a different school district. As part of a continuing investigation, the Tioga CountySheriff's Department interviewed NVCSD students and field hockey team members regardingany inappropriate conduct on the part of Broxmeyer and plaintiff's involvement in or awarenessof any such conduct.
On January 11, 2008, plaintiff was summoned to a meeting at the school during the course ofwhich defendant Diane Arbes, the NVCSD's high school principal, allegedly stated in [*2]front of other school officials that plaintiff should take a leave ofabsence "for the safety of the students in the district." Days later, on January 14, 2008, plaintiffreceived a letter from Arbes—which was allegedly copied to defendant Mary Ellen Grant,the superintendent of the NVCSD, and Jill Keeler, the president of plaintiff's union and a teacherand field hockey coach at the NVCSD—advising her to "refrain from any one-on-oneconversations with students." During a meeting in the school auditorium the following month,Arbes purportedly informed all players on the NVCSD varsity and junior varsity girls fieldhockey teams, as well as several parents that were present, that the NVCSD has no recourse butto terminate plaintiff and that plaintiff had "acquiesced in or was not protesting her termination."Around that same time, plaintiff was notified by Grant that her termination was beingrecommended to the NVCSD Board of Education. Upon plaintiff's request for a writtenstatement of reasons, Grant sent a letter to her stating that, based upon information from lawenforcement officials, plaintiff was aware of conduct by "a school volunteer coach" that violatedthe NVCSD's sexual harassment policy and failed to report that conduct to NVCSD officials.Plaintiff was formally terminated from her employment in March 2008.
Plaintiff then commenced this action alleging a host of claims, including causes of action forlibel and slander as well as violations of her state and federal due process rights, including thefailure to provide her with a name clearing hearing. Prior to joinder of issue, defendants movedto dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 or, alternatively, for summary judgment.Supreme Court denied defendants' summary judgment motion as premature, but partially grantedtheir motion by dismissing the first, second, fourth and seventh causes of action, and partiallydismissing the sixth cause of action. Defendants appeal.
Defendants contend that Supreme Court should have dismissed plaintiff's sixth (libel per se)cause of action in its entirety and the eighth (slander per se) cause of action because the allegedlibelous and slanderous statements were neither sufficiently pleaded nor of a defamatory natureand, in any event, were protected by a qualified privilege. "The allegations of the complaint mustat this stage of the litigation be deemed true and construed in plaintiff['s] favor, affording [her]the benefit of every reasonable inference, the very limited object being to ascertain whether anycognizable claim for relief is made out" (Hurrell-Harring v State of New York, 15 NY3d8, 20 [2010] [citation omitted]; see Clearmont Prop., LLC v Eisner, 58 AD3d 1052, 1054[2009]).
We reject defendants' assertion that plaintiff failed to comply with the pleading requirementsof CPLR 3016 (a). Our review of the complaint discloses that plaintiff set forth "the particularwords complained of" (CPLR 3016 [a]), as well as the "time, manner and persons to whom thealleged defamatory statements were made" (Rabushka v Marks, 229 AD2d 899, 900[1996]; see Saha v Record, 177 AD2d 763, 766 [1991]; Pappalardo v WestchesterRockland Newspapers, 101 AD2d 830 [1984], affd 64 NY2d 862 [1985];compare Dobies v Brefka, 273 AD2d 776, 777 [2000], lv dismissed 95 NY2d931 [2000]).
Addressing the sufficiency of plaintiff's allegations, whether the statements complained ofare "reasonably susceptible of a defamatory connotation" is a determination to be made by thecourt in the first instance (James v Gannett Co., 40 NY2d 415, 419 [1976]; seeSilsdorf v Levine, 59 NY2d 8, 12 [1983], cert denied 464 US 831 [1983]). "Thealleged defamatory words should be considered 'in the context of the entire statement orpublication as a whole, tested against the understanding of the average [listener]' " (Allen vCH Energy Group, Inc., 58 AD3d 1102, 1103 [2009], quoting Aronson v Wiersma,65 NY2d 592, 594 [1985]; see Rossi v Attanasio, 48 AD3d [*3]1025, 1027 [2008]; Versaci v Richie, 30 AD3d 648, 648-649 [2006], lv denied7 NY3d 710 [2006]). Although "a statement of opinion accompanied by a full recitation of thefacts on which it is based will be deemed a pure opinion, . . . a statement of opinionthat implies a basis in undisclosed facts is actionable 'mixed opinion' " (Clark v Schuylerville Cent. SchoolDist., 24 AD3d 1162, 1163 [2005]; see Rossi v Attanasio, 48 AD3d at 1027;Ferris v Loyal Order of Moose Oneonta Lodge No. 465, 259 AD2d 914, 915 [1999],lvs dismissed 94 NY2d 838 [1999], 94 NY2d 873 [2000]).
Plaintiff's sixth cause of action, which is grounded on Arbes' January 2008 letter directingplaintiff to "refrain from any one-on-one conversations with students," should have beendismissed in its entirety. This utterance was not a statement of fact or opinion about plaintiff, butrather a directive issued to plaintiff by her superior, and nothing therein impugns her abilities asa teacher. Despite plaintiff's assertions to the contrary, these words are not reasonablysusceptible of the defamatory connotation that she engaged in misconduct, since to do so wouldstrain the words beyond their fair meaning (see Clark v Schuylerville Cent. School Dist.,24 AD3d at 1163; Bigman v Dime Sav. Bank of N.Y., FSB, 144 AD2d 318, 319 [1988];see generally James v Gannett Co., 40 NY2d at 419). As such, this statement cannotsupport a claim of libel.
As to the alleged defamatory statements asserted in plaintiff's eighth cause of action, weagree with Supreme Court that they are actionable. Unlike the directive issued by Arbes in theJanuary 11, 2008 letter, her statement that plaintiff should take a leave of absence "for the safetyof the students in the district" is subject to a defamatory interpretation that plaintiff presents arisk of harm to the students in her care. Considering the statement in the context of the highlypublicized scandal within the NVCSD community and the ongoing investigation involvingBroxmeyer, a reasonable listener could interpret the statement as implying plaintiff's possibleparticipation in or awareness of the crimes against the students, or as linking her to immoral andreprehensible conduct (see generally Mencher v Chesley, 297 NY 94, 99 [1947]). Thesame can fairly be said of the statement allegedly uttered by Arbes to the field hockeyplayers—as well as several parents—that plaintiff had acquiesced in hertermination. As plaintiff asserts, Arbes' statement in that regard "has a precise meaning that iscapable of being proven true or false" (Rabushka v Marks, 229 AD2d at 902; see 600W. 115th St. Corp. v Von Gutfeld, 80 NY2d 130, 142 [1992], cert denied 508 US910 [1993]). Furthermore, inasmuch as each statement was unaccompanied by a full recitation ofthe facts and implied a basis in those undisclosed facts, they constitute an actionable mixedopinion (see Gross v New York Times Co., 82 NY2d 146, 153-154 [1993]; Clark vSchuylerville Cent. School Dist., 24 AD3d at 1164; Brown v Albany Citizens Council onAlcoholism, 199 AD2d 904, 905 [1993]). Thus, plaintiff sufficiently stated a cause of actionfor slander per se based on these statements.
Notwithstanding defendants' assertion to the contrary, dismissal of plaintiff's slander claimon the basis of qualified privilege is not appropriate at this juncture. A claim of qualifiedprivilege is an affirmative defense to be raised in defendants' answer and "does not lend itself toa preanswer motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a)" (Demas v Levitsky, 291AD2d 653, 661 [2002], lv dismissed 98 NY2d 728 [2002]). Rather, defendants mustplead the privilege as an affirmative defense and thereafter move for summary judgment on thatdefense, supporting the motion with competent evidence establishing a prima facie showing ofqualified privilege (see id.). In the event that defendants make such a showing, theburden would then shift to plaintiff to demonstrate that Arbes' statements were uttered withmalice, either under the common-law or constitutional standard (see id. at 661-662). Byasserting that the allegations of [*4]the complaint establish aqualified privilege as a matter of law, defendants attempted to "short-circuit that procedure" by"improperly placing the burden on plaintiff to make competent allegations of malice inanticipation of the affirmative defense" (id. at 662; see Garcia v Puccio, 17 AD3d 199, 201 [2005]). For these reasons,defendants' motion to dismiss the eighth cause of action was properly denied.
Defendants also assert that Supreme Court erred in denying their motion to dismiss the thirdand fifth causes of action, which allege that plaintiff's discharge deprived her of liberty withoutdue process of law guaranteed by the NY and US Constitutions. A liberty interest claim of thissort—commonly referred to as a "stigma plus" claim—requires a plaintiff to allege"(1) the utterance of a statement sufficiently derogatory to injure his or her reputation, that iscapable of being proved false, and that he or she claims is false, and (2) a material state-imposedburden or state-imposed alteration of the plaintiff's status or rights" (Sadallah v City ofUtica, 383 F3d 34, 38 [2d Cir 2004] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; seeSegal v City of New York, 459 F3d 207, 212 [2d Cir 2006]; Velez v Levy, 401 F3d75, 87-88 [2d Cir 2005]). Because a defamatory statement, standing alone, does not amount to aconstitutional deprivation, "the 'plus' imposed by the defendant[s] must be a specific and adverseaction clearly restricting the plaintiff's liberty—for example, the loss of employment"(Velez v Levy, 401 F3d at 87-88; see Patterson v City of Utica, 370 F3d 322,330 [2d Cir 2004]; Donato v Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. School Dist., 96 F3d 623,630 [2d Cir 1996], cert denied 519 US 1150 [1997]). "[W]hen the state fires an employeeand publicly charges that she [or he] acted dishonestly or immorally, due process guarantees theemployee an opportunity to defend her [or his] 'good name, reputation, honor or integrity' "(Donato v Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. School Dist., 96 F3d at 630, quoting Boardof Regents of State Colleges v Roth, 408 US 564, 573 [1972]; see Wisconsin vConstantineau, 400 US 433, 437 [1971]).
We iterate the circumstances leading up to plaintiff's termination, as they are significant. Itwas widely known that Broxmeyer had been arrested and charged with criminal sexual conductinvolving members of the girls field hockey team of a different school district. The NVCSD'sfield hockey players were aware that plaintiff had a dating and live-in relationship withBroxmeyer at the time, and had been questioned regarding any inappropriate conduct byBroxmeyer and plaintiff's involvement and whereabouts during any such conduct. Against thisbackdrop, we find that Arbes' statement to the field hockey players—the only students inthe NVCSD exposed to Broxmeyer and the investigation—as well as several parents thatplaintiff had acquiesced in her termination was sufficiently stigmatizing and damaging to herreputation as a school teacher (see Segal v City of New York, 459 F3d at 213).Furthermore, this statement, alleged by plaintiff to be false, was capable of being proven falseand was accompanied by a sufficiently proximate "plus"—her termination fromemployment with the NVCSD (see Velez v Levy, 401 F3d at 88-89; Donato vPlainview-Old Bethpage Cent. School Dist., 96 F3d at 631).
Moreover, the charges lodged against plaintiff in Grant's letter setting forth the reasons forher termination—that plaintiff was aware of and failed to report conduct on the part of a"school volunteer coach" that violated the NVCSD's sexual harassment policy—providesan additional, independent basis for her stigma plus claim. Stigmatizing statements about agovernment employee upon his or her discharge implicate a liberty interest where " 'thestigmatizing charges are placed in the discharged employee's personnel file and are likely to bedisclosed to prospective employers' " (Donato v Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. SchoolDist., 96 F3d at 631, quoting Brandt v Board of Coop. Educ. Servs., Third SupervisoryDist., Suffolk County, N.Y., 820 F2d 41, 44 [2d Cir 1987]; see Velger v Cawley,525 F2d 334, 336-337 [2d Cir 1975], revd on other grounds sub nom. Codd [*5]v Velger, 429 US 624 [1977]). Although Grant submitted anaffidavit in support of defendants' motion averring that the letter was a private communicationbetween her and plaintiff and that it is "not [her] intention" to have this letter included inplaintiff's personnel file, plaintiff alleges otherwise and asserts the likelihood of disclosure.Further, the Board of Education did not stipulate that it would never disclose the charges toplaintiff's prospective employers. Mindful that the case is before us on a motion to dismiss, itwould be inappropriate at this juncture to resolve this factual issue regarding the likelihood ofdisclosure to plaintiff's prospective employers (see Brandt v Board of Coop. Educ.Servs., 820 F2d at 44).
As to the final prong of plaintiff's due process claims, defendants allege that since plaintiffdid not request a name clearing hearing and was provided with a sufficient opportunity to clearher name, there can be no due process violation. We disagree. Due process requires apostdeprivation name-clearing hearing where a nontenured employee has been stigmatized in thecourse of a decision to terminate his or her employment (see Segal v City of New York,459 F3d at 214; Patterson v City of Utica, 370 F3d at 335-336). "This hearing gives theplaintiff an opportunity to hear and answer first-hand any stigmatizing charges, clearing his [orher] name of any false statements made about him [or her], and curing the injury to his [or her]reputation" (Patterson v City of Utica, 370 F3d at 335; accord Segal v City of NewYork, 459 F3d at 215). Here, plaintiff requested such a hearing in a February 2008 letter tothe members of the NVCSD's Board of Education, but was never given an opportunity to addressthe Board (see Di Orio v Utica City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 305 AD2d 1114, 1115[2003]; Garcia v Board of Educ. of Socorro Consol. School Dist., 777 F2d 1403, 1418[10th Cir 1985], cert denied 479 US 814 [1986]). Furthermore, we cannot conclude thatthe Board of Education's receipt and purported consideration of the February 2008 letter,wherein plaintiff's attorney responded to Grant's letter recommending her termination, wassufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process (see Patterson v City of Utica, 370F3d at 336-337). Accordingly, plaintiff has stated a cause of action for deprivation of a libertyinterest without due process under both the US and NY Constitutions, and Supreme Courttherefore correctly denied defendants' motion to dismiss her third and fifth causes of action.
Mercure, J.P., Spain, Rose and Kavanagh, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is modified, onthe law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as denied defendants' motion to dismiss thesixth cause of action; motion granted to that extent and said cause of action dismissed in itsentirety; and, as so modified, affirmed.