People v Pratts
2010 NY Slip Op 04928 [74 AD3d 536]
June 10, 2010
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 25, 2010


The People of the State of New York, Respondent,
v
JesusPratts, Appellant.

[*1]Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Mark W. Zeno of counsel),for appellant.

Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx (Maureen L. Grosdidier of counsel), forrespondent.

Judith Whiting, New York (Lily Goetz of counsel), for amicus curiae.

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (John P. Collins, J.), rendered December 1, 2009,which denied defendant's CPL 440.46 motion for resentencing, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant, a reincarcerated parole violator, is not eligible to be resentenced under the 2009Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA) (L 2009, ch 56). We conclude that the 2009 DLRA, like itspredecessors, "was not intended to apply to those offenders who have served their term ofimprisonment, have been released from prison to parole supervision, and whose parole is thenviolated, with a resulting period of incarceration" (People v Bagby, 11 Misc 3d 882, 887 [2006]). The purpose of theDLRA resentencing provisions is to relieve prison inmates of onerous sentences of incarceration.This defendant was relieved of his sentence of incarceration when he was paroled, and he couldhave remained at liberty by adhering to his parole conditions. Moreover, had he done so for twoyears, he could have also been relieved of his entire sentence, including parole, pursuant toExecutive Law § 259-j (3-a). "If defendant had not violated his parole conditions, hewould not have been in the custody of the Department of Correctional Services when he movedto be resentenced, and he would therefore have been ineligible for resentencing" (People v Rodriguez, 68 AD3d 676[2009]). There is no reason to believe that the Legislature intended parole violations to triggerresentencing opportunities (see People vMills, 11 NY3d 527, 537 [2008]; Bagby, 11 Misc 3d at 887). A statutoryinterpretation that is "contrary to the dictates of reason or leads to unreasonable results ispresumed to be against the legislative intent" (McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes§ 143, Comment, at 288).

We have considered and rejected defendant's remaining arguments, including thoseaddressed to the alleged distinctions between the 2009 DRLA and its predecessors.Concur—Tom, J.P., Andrias, Catterson, Moskowitz and Acosta, JJ.

Motion seeking leave to appear and file brief as amicus curiae granted.


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