115-117 Nassau St., LLC v Nassau Beekman, LLC
2010 NY Slip Op 04929 [74 AD3d 537]
June 10, 2010
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 25, 2010


115-117 Nassau St., LLC, et al.,Respondents-Appellants,
v
Nassau Beekman, LLC, et al.,Appellants-Respondents.

—[*1]Claude Castro & Associates, PLLC, New York (Claude Castro of counsel), forappellants-respondents.

Brill & Meisel, New York (Allen H. Brill of counsel), for respondents-appellants.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Richard B. Lowe, III, J.), entered February 23,2009, which, inter alia, granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment to the extent ofdeclaring that defendants had defaulted on their obligation to close under an agreement for thesale of a premises, thereby terminating the agreement and forfeiting the down payment madethereunder, denied plaintiffs' motion to the extent that it sought a similar declaration thatdefendants had defaulted on their obligation to close under a related agreement for the sale of airspace rights, denied defendants' cross motion for summary judgment and dismissed theircounterclaims related to the premises transaction, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendants defaulted under a real estate purchase and sale agreement when they failed toproceed with the closing, the time of which plaintiffs properly made "of the essence" afterhaving consented to defendants' previous request for two adjournments of the closing (seeFriedman v O'Brien, 287 AD2d 311 [2001]). Plaintiffs acted within their rights by refusingto consent to an additional adjournment, and once the closing was aborted, were under noobligation to entertain further proposals from defendants, "for if defendant[s] had failed to satisfya material element of the contract, [they were] already in default" (Grace v Nappa, 46NY2d 560, 566 [1979]). Defendants' default entitled plaintiffs to declare the agreementterminated and to retain the down payment (see Friedman, 287 AD2d 311; Zahl vGreenfield, 162 AD2d 449 [1990], lv denied 76 NY2d 709 [1990]).

Defendants also defaulted under a separate agreement to purchase appurtenant air spacerights from plaintiffs when they failed to proceed with closing on that transaction, the time ofwhich had also been made "of the essence." However, having reviewed the record, we agree withthe Supreme Court that summary judgment on that issue was precluded by a triable issue ofmaterial fact as to whether the parties entered the agreement to purchase air space rights under a[*2]mutual mistaken belief that such rights were available(see Matter of Gould v Board of Educ. of Sewanhaka Cent. High School Dist., 81 NY2d446, 453 [1993]). Concur—Tom, J.P., Andrias, Catterson, Moskowitz and Acosta, JJ.


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