| Martino v Stolzman |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 05071 [74 AD3d 1764] |
| June 11, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| Jennifer D. Martino, Respondent, v Michael A. Stolzman,Respondent, and Michael Oliver et al., Appellants. (Action No. 1.) Judith A. Rost,Respondent v Michael A. Stolzman et al., Respondents, and Michael Oliver et al.,Appellants. (Action No. 2.) |
—[*1] Barth Sullivan Behr, Buffalo (Sarah Rera of counsel), for defendants-respondents Jennifer D.Martino and Gina L. Avino. Chiacchia & Fleming LLP, Hamburg (Lisa A. Ball of counsel), for plaintiff-respondentJennifer D. Martino. Kenney Shelton Liptak Nowak LLP, Buffalo (Amanda L. Machacek of counsel), fordefendant-respondent Michael A. Stolzman. Lipsitz Green Scime Cambria LLP, Buffalo (John A. Collins of counsel), forplaintiff-respondent Judith A. Rost.
Appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Niagara County (Ralph A. Boniello, III, J.),entered March 18, 2009 in personal injury actions. The order denied the motion of defendantsMichael Oliver and Susan Oliver seeking, inter alia, dismissal of the claim in action No. 1 andthe cause of action against them in action No. 2 asserting a violation of General Obligations Law§ 11-101.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is modified on the law by granting themotion in part and dismissing the claim in action No. 1 and the cause of action [*2]against defendants Michael Oliver and Susan Oliver in action No. 2asserting the violation of General Obligations Law § 11-101 and as modified the order isaffirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Action No. 1 was commenced by plaintiff Jennifer D. Martino, who is also adefendant in action No. 2, and action No. 2 was commenced by plaintiff Judith A. Rost. Theplaintiff in each action seeks damages for injuries sustained as the result of an automobileaccident that occurred shortly after midnight on January 1, 2007. Michael A. Stolzman, adefendant in each action, was leaving a party hosted by defendants Michael Oliver and SusanOliver, also defendants in each action. It is undisputed that Stolzman backed his automobile, inwhich Rost was a passenger, out of the Olivers' driveway and into the path of an oncomingautomobile operated by Martino and owned by Gina L. Avino, a defendant only in action No. 2.We conclude that Supreme Court erred in denying those parts of the Olivers' motion seekingdismissal of the claim in action No. 1 and the cause of action against the Olivers in action No. 2asserting a violation of General Obligations Law § 11-101 for failure to state a cause ofaction (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). We therefore modify the order accordingly.
In determining a motion under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), "a court may freely consider affidavitssubmitted by the plaintiff to remedy any defects in the complaint . . . and thecriterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he [or she]has stated one . . . Affidavits and other evidentiary material may also be consideredto establish conclusively that plaintiff has no cause of action . . . Any facts in thecomplaint and submissions in opposition to the motion to dismiss are accepted as true, and thebenefit of every possible favorable inference is afforded to the plaintiff" (Gibraltar Steel Corp. v Gibraltar MetalProcessing, 19 AD3d 1141, 1142 [2005] [internal quotation marks omitted]). GeneralObligations Law § 11-101 requires as a predicate for liability the commercial sale ofalcohol for profit (see D'Amico v Christie, 71 NY2d 76, 84 [1987]) and, in applying theappropriate standard of review with respect to the Olivers' motion, we conclude that the Oliversestablished as a matter of law that they did not sell alcohol at the party hosted by them and thushad no expectation of pecuniary gain (see generally id.; Casselberry v Dominick,143 AD2d 528, 529 [1988], lv denied 73 NY2d 706 [1989]).
We further conclude, however, that the court properly denied those parts of the Olivers'motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the claim in action No. 1 and the cause of actionin action No. 2 asserting that the Olivers were negligent. "[I]t is fundamental that a duty ofreasonable care owed by the tort-feasor . . . is elemental to any recovery innegligence . . . , and that foreseeability of injury does not determine the existenceof duty. Whether a duty of care exists is a question of law to be determined by the courts, whichhave the responsibility, in fixing the orbit of duty, of limiting the legal consequences of wrongsto a controllable degree" (Badou v New Jersey Tr. Rail Operations, 221 AD2d 303, 304[1995] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Clementoni v Consolidated Rail Corp., 30 AD3d 986, 987[2006], affd 8 NY3d 963 [2007]).
The Olivers correctly concede that they had a common-law duty as social hosts to controland supervise intoxicated guests on their property or in an area under their control (seeD'Amico, 71 NY2d at 85; Aquino vHiggins, 68 AD3d 1650, 1651 [2009]), but they contend that they had no duty toprevent Stolzman from leaving their property prior to the accident because they were unawarethat he was intoxicated. Nevertheless, the record establishes that Stolzman had a blood alcoholcontent of .14% following the accident, which is nearly twice the legal limit (see Vehicleand Traffic Law § 1192 [2]). We thus conclude on the record before us that there is anissue of fact whether the Olivers knew or should have known that Stolzman left the party in adangerous state of intoxication. We also reject the contentions of the Olivers that the allegedlyunsafe condition giving rise to the accident was not on property owned or maintained by them(cf. Haymon v Pettit, 9 NY3d324, 328 [2007], rearg denied 10 NY3d 745 [2008]; Galindo v Town of Clarkstown, 2NY3d 633, 636-637 [2004]), and that they had no duty to direct traffic from their driveway,from which the [*3]view of oncoming traffic was obstructed(cf. Lasek v Miller, 306 AD2d 835 [2003]). The Olivers both had an opportunity tocontrol or at least to guide Stolzman as he exited their driveway in his automobile andacknowledged that sightlines near the end of their driveway were limited at the time of theaccident. Indeed, they acknowledged that they had in the past guided visitors through adangerous portion of their driveway. Finally, we conclude that the remaining contention of theOlivers is without merit.
All concur except Smith and Peradotto, JJ., who dissent in part and vote to reverse inaccordance with the following memorandum.
Smith and Peradotto, JJ. (dissenting in part). We respectfully dissent in part because wedisagree with the majority's conclusion that there is an issue of fact with respect to thenegligence of homeowners Michael Oliver and Susan Oliver, defendants in both actions. In ourview, the Olivers established their entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law withrespect to negligence, inasmuch as they had no duty to prevent their guest, Michael A. Stolzman,a defendant in both actions, from leaving their house or to assist him in pulling out of theirdriveway in his vehicle. We therefore would reverse the order, grant the motion of the Olivers inits entirety and dismiss the complaint in action No. 1 against them and the amended complaint inaction No. 2 against them.
"It is well established that before a defendant may be held liable for negligence it must beshown that the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff . . . In the absence of duty,there is no breach and without a breach there is no liability" (Pulka v Edelman, 40 NY2d781, 782 [1976], rearg denied 41 NY2d 901 [1977]). The majority relies on D'Amicov Christie (71 NY2d 76, 85 [1987]) for the proposition that the Olivers had a common-lawduty as social hosts to control and supervise intoxicated guests on their property or in an areaunder their control. In this case, however, the accident occurred on a public highway, not on theOlivers' property (see id. at 86). Although the majority implies that the Olivers had aduty to prevent Stolzman from leaving their property if they were aware or should have beenaware that he was intoxicated, the majority cites no authority for that novel proposition. In ourview, requiring social hosts to prevent intoxicated guests from leaving their property wouldinappropriately expand the concept of duty. Indeed, as the Court of Appeals wrote inD'Amico, "[w]hile recognizing the moral desirability that drinking be controlled andsupervised, we cannot create a new legal duty that would require [social hosts] to respond indamages, as an insurer, for . . . injuries" sustained as a result of such drinking(id.).
We also cannot agree with the majority that the Olivers had a duty to warn Stolzman of theallegedly unsafe condition giving rise to the accident, i.e., the presence of vehicles parked on theroadway, or to guide or direct Stolzman out of their driveway. "An owner or occupier of landgenerally owes no duty to warn or protect others from a dangerous condition on adjacentproperty unless the owner created or contributed to such a condition" (Haymon v Pettit, 9 NY3d 324,328 [2007], rearg denied 10 NY3d 745 [2008]). "The reason for such a rule isobvious—a person who lacks ownership or control of property cannot fairly be heldaccountable for injuries resulting from a hazard on the property" (Galindo v Town of Clarkstown, 2NY3d 633, 636 [2004]). In this case, Stolzman's view of the roadway was allegedlyobstructed by the presence of vehicles parked on the side of the roadway itself, and the Olivershad no ownership of or control over that property (see id.). As the Court of Appealsreasoned in Galindo (2 NY3d at 637), "it would create an 'unreasonably onerous' burdento require a landowner to evaluate and warn others about a danger caused by a condition existingon neighboring land."
The majority likewise cites no authority for its conclusion that, because Stolzman's view ofoncoming traffic was allegedly obstructed, the Olivers had a duty to direct Stolzman as he exitedtheir driveway. The fact that the Olivers were aware of the potential obstruction and had the"opportunity" to guide Stolzman as he exited their driveway does not create a duty on the part ofthe Olivers to do so. It is well established that "[f]orseeability should not be confused with [*4]duty" (Pulka, 40 NY2d at 785; see also D'Amico,71 NY2d at 87). In Pulka, the Court of Appeals held that the operators of a parkinggarage were not liable in negligence for an injury to a pedestrian struck by a car being driven outof the garage and across an adjacent sidewalk by a garage patron (40 NY2d at 781-782).Specifically, the Court concluded that evidence that garage patrons often drove their cars out ofthe garage and across the sidewalk without stopping did not impose a duty on the part of thegarage to take measures to control the conduct of its patrons "for the protection of off-premisespedestrians" (id. at 783). As the Court wrote, "it must be stressed that not allrelationships give rise to a duty. One should not be held legally responsible for the conduct ofothers merely because they are within our sight or environs. Neither should one be answerablemerely because there are others whose activities are such as to cause one to envision damages orinjuries as a consequence of those activities" (id. at 785-786). Present—Martoche,J.P., Smith, Fahey, Peradotto and Green, JJ.