Matter of Prestige Towing & Recovery, Inc. v State of NewYork
2010 NY Slip Op 05312 [74 AD3d 1606]
June 17, 2010
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 25, 2010


In the Matter of Prestige Towing & Recovery, Inc.,Appellant-Respondent, v State of New York et al., Respondents-Appellants. (Proceeding No. 1.)In the Matter of Marty's Service, Inc., Appellant-Respondent,
v
State of New York etal., Respondents-Appellants. (Proceeding No. 2.)

—[*1]Kalter, Kaplan, Zeiger & Forman, Woodbourne (Terry S. Forman of counsel), forappellants-respondents.

Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General, New York City (Diana R.H. Winters of counsel), forrespondents-appellants.

Mercure, J.P. Cross appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Ledina, J.), enteredFebruary 23, 2009 in Sullivan County, which, in two proceedings pursuant to CPLR article 78,dismissed petitioner's application in proceeding No. 1 and partially granted petitioner'sapplication in [*2]proceeding No. 2 to annul a determination ofrespondent Division of the State Police removing petitioner from the Zone 1, Troop F tow list.

Zone 1, Troop F of respondent Division of the State Police maintains a list identifyingauthorized towing companies to be contacted on a rotating basis to tow disabled and impoundedvehicles unless, among other things, the vehicle owners request a specific towing company. TheTroop F tow policy is uniform, zone-wide and provides both detailed operating guidelines and anadministrative procedure for removal of towing companies from the list, but the policy isinformal in the sense that it is not governed by statute or regulation. Petitioners, licensed towingoperators, were removed from the list after petitioner in proceeding No. 1, Prestige Towing &Recovery, Inc., allegedly obstructed police operations by employing deceptive measures tosolicit tows from vehicle owners, thereby compromising officer safety. Petitioner in proceedingNo. 2, Marty's Service, Inc., was removed because Sean Brooks, the sole owner of Prestige, andhis wife each own 25% of Marty's.

Petitioners then commenced these separate proceedings pursuant to CPLR article 78challenging the determination to remove them from the tow list as arbitrary and capricious, andseeking, among other things, reinstatement to the list. Supreme Court partially granted thepetition in proceeding No. 2 and dismissed the petition in proceeding No. 1. Petitioners appeal,and respondents cross-appeal.

It is well settled that "when the issue concerns the exercise of discretion by theadministrative [agency,] [t]he courts cannot interfere unless there is no rational basis for theexercise of discretion or the action complained of is arbitrary and capricious" (Matter of Pellv Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck,Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222, 230-231 [1974] [internal quotation marks and citationsomitted]). Action is arbitrary and capricious when it "is without sound basis in reason and is. . . taken without regard to the facts" (id. at 231). In determining whetheran administrative action is arbitrary and capricious, courts do not decide credibility issues orweigh evidence (see Matter of Lewis v DeBuono, 257 AD2d 787, 788 [1999]; Matterof Brown v New York State Dept. of Health, 235 AD2d 957, 958 [1997], lv denied89 NY2d 814 [1997]).

Here, we reject petitioners' argument that respondents' determination to remove Prestigefrom the tow list was arbitrary and capricious, and based wholly upon speculation andconjecture. Rather, respondents relied upon evidence that Brooks failed to report an accident andmisled a state trooper in order to obtain permission to use a highway U-turn so he couldimproperly solicit a tow for a disabled vehicle, and that another improper attempt to solicit a towby a Prestige employee on the same day resulted in a confrontation that distracted a trooper andcompromised officer safety. In our view, the foregoing provided a rational basis for respondents'removal of Prestige from the tow list, particularly in light of Prestige's two prior suspensionsfrom the tow list for similar conduct. Absent any evidence, however, that Marty's was involvedin the incidents that prompted Prestige's removal or that it had ever been removed from any ofthe three police tow lists on which it has been included for more than 20 years, we agree withSupreme Court that there was no basis for the removal of Marty's from the tow list.

Petitioners' remaining arguments require little further discussion. Contrary to petitioners'contention, we conclude that respondents substantially complied with the procedure set forth inthe Zone 1 tow policy for removing operators from the tow list (see generally Matter ofHanchard v Facilities Dev. Corp., 85 NY2d 638, 642-644 [1995]). Petitioners were notified[*3]that they would be removed from the tow list, provided witha fair opportunity to respond in writing, and the factual basis for the removal was adequately setforth in respondents' notice of removal. Petitioners' assertion that they requested a formalhearing—as opposed to a fair opportunity to be heard and submit witnessstatements—is unsupported by the record. In any event, petitioners assert no property orliberty interest implicating due process such that a predetermination hearing would be required,and no statutes or regulations requiring such a hearing have been brought to our attention(see Matter of Loyal Tire & Auto Ctr. v New York State Thruway Auth., 227 AD2d 82,85-86 [1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 804 [1997]; see also Matter of Taylor v New YorkState Dept. of Correctional Servs., 248 AD2d 799, 799-800 [1998]). Given Prestige'srepeated prior removals from the list and familiarity with the process, there is no merit topetitioners' assertion that they were prejudiced by respondents' failure to inform them that theycould reapply for inclusion on the list after six months or have a meeting with the Zone 1commander. Finally, there is no indication that respondents' determination flowed from bias (see Matter of D'Souza v New York StateDept. of Health, 68 AD3d 1562, 1564 [2009]), and we cannot conclude under thecircumstances presented herein that the penalty was "so disproportionate to the offense, in thelight of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness" (Matter of Pell vBoard of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck,Westchester County, 34 NY2d at 233 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

Peters, Spain, Rose and Kavanagh, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed,without costs.


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