| Hauser v Adamov |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 05364 [74 AD3d 1024] |
| June 15, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Denada Hauser, Appellant, v Arkidiy Adamov et al.,Defendants, and George Paul Franz, Respondent. |
—[*1] James G. Bilello, Westbury, N.Y. (Patricia McDonagh and Annette Hader of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from so much ofan order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Knipel, J.), dated June 24, 2009, as granted themotion of the defendant George Paul Franz for summary judgment dismissing the complaintinsofar as asserted against him.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The plaintiff, Denada Hauser, was a passenger in a vehicle driven by the defendant BorisKleyman, and owned by the defendant Arkidiy Adamov, which was traveling on the BrooklynBridge. In front of the vehicle driven by Kleyman was a vehicle driven by the defendant GeorgePaul Franz. In front of the vehicle driven by Franz was a vehicle driven by the defendant RiazAhmid. The vehicle driven by Ahmid stopped and the vehicle driven by Franz struck it frombehind, then stopped. The vehicle driven by Kleyman struck the vehicle driven by Franz frombehind. According to Franz, approximately five seconds elapsed between the impact with thevehicle driven by Ahmid and the impact with the vehicle driven by Kleyman.
Hauser commenced an action to recover damages for personal injuries against Adamov,Ahmid, Kleyman, and Franz. Franz moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaintinsofar as asserted against him. The Supreme Court, inter alia, granted Franz's motion forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him. Hauser appealsfrom so much of the order as granted Franz's motion.
A rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle creates a prima facie case of negligence againstthe operator of the moving vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference ofnegligence by providing a non-negligent explanation for the collision (see Ramirez v Konstanzer, 61 AD3d837 [2009]; Jumandeo vFranks, 56 AD3d 614, 615 [2008]; Arias v Rosario, 52 AD3d 551 [2008]; Hakakian v McCabe, 38 AD3d493 [2007]). Here, Franz submitted evidence, in the form of his deposition testimony, thatthe vehicle driven by him was stopped when it was struck from behind by the vehicle driven byKleyman. In [*2]opposition to Franz's prima facie showing of hisentitlement to judgment as a matter of law, Hauser failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to theinference of negligence on the part of Kleyman by providing a non-negligent explanation for thecollision, or to demonstrate that any negligence on the part of Franz contributed to the accidentbetween the vehicle driven by Franz and the vehicle driven by Kleyman (see Bournazos vMalfitano, 275 AD2d 437 [2000]; see also Bucceri v Frazer, 297 AD2d 304 [2002]).Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted Franz's motion for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him. Fisher, J.P., Lott, Austin and Sgroi, JJ.,concur.