| People v Patel |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 05428 [74 AD3d 1098] |
| June 15, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Vinod Patel, Appellant. |
—[*1] Kathleen M. Rice, District Attorney, Mineola, N.Y. (Tammy J. Smiley and Donald Berk ofcounsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Kase, J.),rendered January 11, 2007, convicting him of rape in the first degree, criminal sexual act in thefirst degree (two counts), and incest, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. The appealbrings up for review an order of protection issued at the time of sentencing.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that his plea was not knowing and voluntary is unpreserved forappellate review since he failed to move to withdraw his plea (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Johnson, 73 AD3d 951[2010]; People v Vasquez, 40AD3d 1134 [2007]; People vWilson, 37 AD3d 744, 745 [2007]). The narrow exception to the preservation rule,which arises when the defendant's plea recitation of the facts underlying the crime castssignificant doubt on the defendant's guilt or otherwise calls into question the voluntariness of theplea (see People v Lopez, 71 NY2d 662 [1988]), is inapplicable in this case. In anyevent, the record of the plea proceeding establishes that the plea was knowing and voluntary (see People v Elcine, 43 AD3d1176, 1177 [2007]).
The defendant has no basis to complain about the length of the sentence imposed, since thesentence was part of the negotiated plea bargain (People v Gheradi, 68 AD3d 892, 893 [2009]; People v Rodriguez, 32 AD3d 481[2006]; People v Kazepis, 101 AD2d 816, 817 [1984]). In any event, the sentenceimposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise itsdiscretion in determinating the duration of the final order of protection entered against him(see CPL 530.12 [5]).
Under the circumstances, the minimum period of postrelease supervision (hereinafter PRS)that the sentencing court could have imposed was 2½ years (see Penal Law §70.45 [2] [f]). Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court did not misapprehendits sentencing discretion with respect to that period (cf. People v Britt, 67 AD3d 1023, 1024 [2009]). Moreover, thedefendant specifically agreed [*2]to the imposed term of PRSduring the plea proceeding.
By pleading guilty, the defendant forfeited his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,raised in his supplemental pro se brief, to the extent that it does not directly involve the pleabargaining process (see People vPerazzo, 65 AD3d 1058 [2009]). Furthermore, the defendant's claim is based partiallyon matter dehors the record, which cannot be reviewed on direct appeal (see People v Haynes, 70 AD3d718, 719 [2010]; People vRodriguez, 32 AD3d 481 [2006]). To the extent that the claim can be reviewed on thisappeal, the record reveals that the attorney who represented the defendant during the pleaproceeding provided him with effective assistance (see People v Benevento, 91 NY2d708, 712 [1998]; People v Ford, 86 NY2d 397, 404 [1995]; People v Baldi, 54NY2d 137, 147 [1981]; People vHolland, 44 AD3d 874 [2007]).
The defendant's remaining contentions raised in his supplemental pro se brief are withoutmerit (see People v Hansen, 95 NY2d 227 [2000]). Skelos, J.P., Angiolillo, Dickersonand Leventhal, JJ., concur.