Haracz v Cee Jay, Inc.
2010 NY Slip Op 05515 [74 AD3d 1147]
June 22, 2010
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 25, 2010


Joseph Haracz, Respondent,
v
Cee Jay, Inc., Appellant,and Adelphi Contractors, Inc., Respondent.

[*1]Baxter Smith & Shapiro, P.C., Hicksville, N.Y. (Arthur J. Smith and Louis B.Dingeldey, Jr., of counsel), for appellant.

James J. Killerlane, P.C., New York, N.Y. (David Samel of counsel), forplaintiff-respondent.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Cee Jay, Inc., appealsfrom an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Lefkowitz, J.), entered May 13, 2009,which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as assertedagainst it.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff, an auto mechanic, allegedly slipped and fell on a wet floor in the garage of hisemployer's automotive repair shop. The premises were owned by the defendant Cee Jay, Inc.(hereinafter Cee Jay), and were leased by the plaintiff's employer, Blue Chip Automotive(hereinafter Blue Chip). Following the accident, the plaintiff applied for and received benefitsunder the Workers' Compensation Law from Blue Chip, and then commenced this action torecover damages for personal injuries against Cee Jay and Adelphi Contractors, Inc., a contractorhired by Cee Jay to repair a recurrent leaking condition of the roof.

The Supreme Court properly denied Cee Jay's motion for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaint insofar as asserted against it on the ground that the action is barred by the exclusivityprovisions of the Workers' Compensation Law (see Workers' Compensation Law §11). Cee Jay failed to submit sufficient evidentiary proof to establish that it was an alter ego of,or engaged in a joint venture with, Blue Chip (see Degale-Selier v Preferred Mgt. & Leasing Corp., 57 AD3d825, 826 [2008]; Masley v HerlewRealty Corp., 45 AD3d 653, 654 [2007]; Longshore v Davis Sys. of CapitalDist., 304 AD2d 964, 965 [2003]). Moreover, the record established that the plaintiff wasemployed solely by Blue Chip and that Cee Jay was a separate legal entity from Blue Chip, andcould not be considered the coemployee of the plaintiff (see Workers' CompensationLaw § 29 [6]; Masley v Herlew Realty Corp., 45 AD3d at 654; O'Connor v Spencer [1997] Inv. Ltd.Partnership, 2 AD3d 513, 514-515 [2003]; Virga v Medi-Tech Intl. Corp., 296AD2d 546, 547 [2002]; Richardson v Benoit's Elec., 254 AD2d 798, 799 [1998];Casas v 559 Warren St. Realty Corp., 211 AD2d 742, 743 [1995]).[*2]

Cee Jay's remaining contention is not properly before thisCourt. Rivera, J.P., Covello, Balkin and Hall, JJ., concur.


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