| Kaprall v WE: Women's Entertainment, LLC |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 05518 [74 AD3d 1151] |
| June 22, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Robert Kaprall, Respondent, v WE: Women'sEntertainment, LLC, et al., Appellants. |
—[*1] Stein Riso Mantel, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Edward R. Minson of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, tortious interference withcontractual relations, and tortious interference with business relationships, the defendants appeal,as limited by their notice of appeal and brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court,Nassau County (Austin, J.), dated August 7, 2008, as denied those branches of their motionpursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) which were to dismiss the causes of action to recover damages forbreach of contract, tortious interference with contractual relations, and tortious interference withbusiness relationships insofar as asserted against the defendants Peggy Willenberg, MelanieMetz Trockman, and Upper-Midwest Storm Tours, LLC, and the cause of action to recoverdamages based upon quantum meruit/unjust enrichment insofar as asserted against the defendantWE: Women's Entertainment, LLC.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The plaintiff, a Minnesota-based creator and producer of television programs, entered intonegotiations with the defendants Peggy Willenberg and Melanie Metz Trockman, who areMinnesota residents, and who own the defendant Upper-Midwest Storm Tours, LLC (hereinafterStorm Tours) (hereinafter collectively the Minnesota defendants), to produce a television seriesabout tracking extreme weather. Willenberg and Trockman are known as the "Twister Sisters."Storm Tours provides guided tours to tourists who wish to follow storms and other extremeweather. The plaintiff approached the defendant WE: Women's Entertainment, LLC (hereinafterWE), a New York corporation, about developing the series. In return for considering theplaintiff's idea, WE required him to sign a release stating that if WE developed a televisionprogram based on the "same or similar" idea as he presented, he would "have no interest in orclaim thereon." WE did not develop the plaintiff's idea but, several months later, WE produced aseries starring Willenberg and Trockman, which was the same or similar to the idea the plaintiffhad proposed.
As a result, the plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages from the defendants forbreach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortiousinterference with [*2]contractual relations, tortious interferencewith business relationships, and based upon quantum meruit/unjust enrichment. The defendantsmoved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to, inter alia, CPLR 3211 (a) (1), (5) and (8). TheSupreme Court granted those branches of the motion which were to dismiss the cause of actionalleging a breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as to all the defendants, andthe cause of action to recover damages based upon quantum meruit/unjust enrichment as to theMinnesota defendants. The Supreme Court otherwise denied the defendants' motion. Thedefendants appeal.
"The meaning and scope of a release must be determined within the context of thecontroversy being settled" (Matter of Schaefer, 18 NY2d 314, 317 [1966]; see Zichron Acheinu Levy, Inc. vIlowitz, 31 AD3d 756 [2006]), and a general release cannot be construed "to covermatters which the parties did not desire or intend to dispose of" (Cahill v Regan, 5 NY2d292, 299 [1959]; see Rotondi vDrewes, 31 AD3d 734, 735-736 [2006]). Contrary to the defendants' contention, theplaintiff raised factual issues regarding the scope of the subject release based on the context andcircumstances of its execution (see generally Mangini v McClurg, 24 NY2d 556, 563[1969]; Lefrak SBN Assoc. v Kennedy Galleries, 203 AD2d 256 [1994]; Perritano vTown of Mamaroneck, 126 AD2d 623, 624 [1987]). Given the paucity of evidence in therecord relating to this pre-answer motion, it cannot definitively be determined at this juncturewhether the release was intended to cover the plaintiff's present claims (see e.g. Rimberg & Assoc., P.C. v JamaicaChamber of Commerce, Inc., 40 AD3d 1066, 1067 [2007]). Accordingly, the SupremeCourt properly denied those branches of the defendants' motion which were pursuant to CPLR3211 (a) (1) and (5) to dismiss the causes of action alleging breach of contract, tortiousinterference with contractual relations, and tortious interference with business relationships as tothe Minnesota defendants, and the cause of action to recover damages based upon quantummeruit/unjust enrichment as to WE as barred by a release (see e.g. Ofman v Campos, 12 AD3d 581 [2004]).
New York courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant who "transacts anybusiness within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state" (CPLR302 [a] [1]), even where that defendant has never physically entered the state (seeParke-Bernet Galleries v Franklyn, 26 NY2d 13, 17 [1970]), "so long as the defendant'sactivities here were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the transaction andthe claim asserted" (Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460, 467 [1988]). Here,the plaintiff satisfied his burden, at this stage of the litigation, of showing that this standard hasbeen met (see Fischbarg v Doucet,9 NY3d 375, 380 [2007]; DeutscheBank Sec., Inc. v Montana Bd. of Invs., 7 NY3d 65, 71 [2006]; Crystal Cove Seafood Corp. v ChelseaHarbor, LLC, 47 AD3d 670 [2008]; Cornely v Dynamic HVAC Supply, LLC, 44 AD3d 986, 986-987[2007]). Moreover, exercising jurisdiction over the Minnesota defendants in the circumstancespresented here would not be inconsistent with traditional notions of due process, fair play, andsubstantial justice (see International Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 US 310, 316 [1945];LaMarca v Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 95 NY2d 210, 216 [2000]; Opticare Acquisition Corp. v Castillo,25 AD3d 238, 248 [2005]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch ofthe defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8) to dismiss the causes of actionalleging breach of contract, tortious interference with contractual relations, and tortiousinterference with business relationships as to the Minnesota defendants for lack of jurisdiction(see e.g. Shore Pharm. Providers, Inc. vOakwood Care Ctr., Inc., 65 AD3d 623, 624 [2009]). Dillon, J.P., Balkin, Dickersonand Lott, JJ., concur. [Prior Case History: 20 Misc 3d 1132(A), 2008 NY Slip Op51702(U).]