| Goode v Woodside |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 05728 [74 AD3d 1279] |
| June 29, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Lenron Goode, Jr., Respondent, v Scheniqua L. Woodside,Appellant, et al., Defendant. |
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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Scheniqua L. Woodsideappeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County(Solomon, J.), dated July 16, 2009, as denied that branch of her motion which was for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint and any cross claims insofar as asserted against her on theground that the action, insofar as asserted against her, is barred by the exclusivity provisions ofthe Workers' Compensation Law.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and thatbranch of the appellant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint andany cross claims insofar as asserted against her is granted.
The plaintiff and the defendant Scheniqua L. Woodside were co-employees of the EvelynDouglin Center (hereinafter EDC). On May 16, 2008, at approximately 4:30 p.m., after returningthe company bus for which the plaintiff was the driver and Woodside was the matron to an EDCparking lot, the plaintiff and Woodside went to Woodside's car, which was parked in the lot, inorder to travel to an EDC building where a mandatory staff meeting was to be held. Shortlythereafter, Woodside's car was involved in an accident with a vehicle driven by the defendantKarl L. Abbadessa. As a result of the accident, the plaintiff sustained a tear and "acute. . . derangement" of the medial meniscus of his right knee, for which he underwentsurgery. He received workers' compensation benefits for that injury.
The plaintiff sued both Woodside and Abbadessa. Woodside subsequently moved, inter alia,for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and any cross claims insofar as asserted againsther. The Supreme Court denied that branch of the motion which was for summary judgment. Wereverse.
Woodside established her prima facie entitlement to dismissal of the complaint insofar as itwas asserted against her by showing that she was acting within the scope of her employmentwhen the plaintiff, her co-employee, was injured while in her car (see Castro v Salem TruckLeasing, Inc., 63 AD3d 1095 [2009]; Garcia v Pepe, 42 AD3d 427 [2007]; Torrev Schmucker, 275 AD2d 365 [2000]; Christiansen v Silver Lake Contr. Corp., 188AD2d 507 [1992]). In opposition to the motion, the plaintiff, through his affidavit, confirmedthat Woodside was his co-employee and that the two of them were traveling in the course of theiremployment. Furthermore, it is undisputed that the plaintiff was awarded benefits for theworkers' compensation claim he made in connection with his injury. Therefore, the exclusivityprovisions of [*2]Workers' Compensation Law § 29 (6)barred the plaintiff from bringing this action against Woodside and that branch of her motionwhich was to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her should have been granted(see Macchirole v Giamboi, 97 NY2d 147 [2001]; Castro v Salem Truck Leasing,Inc., 63 AD3d 1095 [2009]; Garcia v Pepe, 42 AD3d 427 [2007]; Torre vSchmucker, 275 AD2d 365 [2000]; Christiansen v Silver Lake Contr. Corp., 188AD2d 507 [1992]).
Woodside also established her entitlement to dismissal of any cross claims asserted againsther by her unopposed showing that the plaintiff, her co-employee, did not suffer a "grave injury"as defined by Workers' Compensation Law § 11 (see Workers' Compensation Law§§ 11, 29 [6]; Meis v ELO Org., 97 NY2d 714 [2002]; Castro v UnitedContainer Mach. Group, 96 NY2d 398, 400-401 [2001]). Mastro, J.P., Florio, Belen andChambers, JJ., concur.