White v F.F. Thompson Health Sys., Inc.
2010 NY Slip Op 05900 [75 AD3d 1075]
July 2, 2010
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, September 1, 2010


Catherine B. White et al., Respondents,
v
F.F. ThompsonHealth System, Inc., et al., Appellants.

—[*1]Ward Norris Heller & Reidy LLP, Rochester (Thomas S. D'Antonio of counsel), fordefendants-appellants.

Michael T. DiPrima, Rochester, for plaintiffs-respondents.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Ontario County (William F. Kocher, A.J.),entered October 23, 2009 in an action for, inter alia, a permanent injunction. The order grantedthe motion of plaintiffs for a preliminary injunction.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is reversed on the law without costs, themotion is denied, and the preliminary injunction is vacated.

Memorandum: Catherine B. White (plaintiff) is a resident of Ferris Hills at West Lake(Ferris Hills), an independent senior living facility owned and operated by defendants. FerrisHills does not provide medical or health care services to its residents. The residents or theirfamilies may, however, hire their own aides to come to the facility to provide treatment and care.Pursuant to the Residency Agreement executed by plaintiff when she moved into her apartmentat Ferris Hills, she is required to "comply with all reasonable procedures, policies and rules" setby defendants at that time or in the future. In response to complaints from residents and theirfamilies concerning inappropriate conduct by aides at the facility, defendants subsequentlyrequired all aides who enter Ferris Hills to sign a Caregiver Agreement (agreement), which setsforth rules and regulations for aides to follow while at the facility. Defendants also required theresidents who employed the aides to sign the agreement. Plaintiff and her sons objected to theproposed agreement and, despite the fact that defendants made several accommodations forplaintiff and struck various provisions of the agreement at her sons' request, plaintiff refused tosign it. When defendants notified plaintiff that her aides would be prohibited from enteringFerris Hills if she and they did not sign the agreement as modified, plaintiffs commenced thisaction seeking, inter alia, injunctive relief. Plaintiffs also moved by order to show cause for apreliminary injunction enjoining defendants from prohibiting plaintiff's three aides from enteringFerris Hills. Supreme Court issued a preliminary injunction, and defendant appealed. We nowreverse.[*2]

To prevail on a motion for a preliminary injunction, themoving party must establish, inter alia, that irreparable harm will result if provisional relief is notgranted (see Doe v Axelrod, 73 NY2d 748 [1988]). The prospect of irreparable harmmust be "imminent, not remote or speculative" (Golden v Steam Heat, 216 AD2d 440,442 [1995]), and, here, plaintiff failed to make such a showing (see generally GFI Sec., LLC v TraditionAsiel Sec., Inc., 61 AD3d 586 [2009]; Copart of Conn., Inc. v Long Is. Auto Realty, LLC, 42 AD3d 420,421 [2007]). As the director of Ferris Hills made clear in an affidavit submitted in opposition tothe order to show cause, defendants have no objection to the aides who currently provideservices to plaintiff, provided that they sign the agreement and follow the rules set forth therein.Plaintiffs did not dispute that point. Additionally, there is no evidence that any of plaintiff's aidesexpressed opposition to signing the agreement. Thus, plaintiff would be harmed by enforcementof the agreement only in the event that her aides refused to sign the agreement or failed tocomply with its rules, and there is no indication in the record that either scenario is likely tooccur. In the absence of a showing that plaintiff faced the imminent prospect of irreparable harmin the absence of provisional relief, the court abused its discretion in issuing a preliminaryinjunction, and, accordingly, there is no need for us to determine whether plaintiffs demonstrateda likelihood of success on the merits or whether the equities weigh in their favor (seegenerally Golden, 216 AD2d at 442).

All concur except Smith, J.P., and Pine, J., who dissent and vote to affirm in the followingmemorandum.

Smith, J.P., and Pine, J. (dissenting). We respectfully dissent. It is well established that aparty seeking a preliminary injunction "must establish, by clear and convincing evidence. . . , three separate elements: '(1) a likelihood of ultimate success on the merits; (2)the prospect of irreparable injury if the provisional relief is withheld; and (3) a balance ofequities tipping in the moving party's favor' " (Destiny USA Holdings, LLC v Citigroup Global Mkts. Realty Corp.,69 AD3d 212, 216 [2009], quoting Doe v Axelrod, 73 NY2d 748, 750 [1988];see J. A. Preston Corp. v Fabrication Enters., 68 NY2d 397, 406 [1986]). It is also wellestablished that "[a] motion for a preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound discretion ofthe trial court[,] and the decision of the trial court on such a motion will not be disturbed onappeal, unless there is a showing of an abuse of discretion" (Destiny USA Holdings,LLC, 69 AD3d at 216 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Axelrod, 73 NY2d at750). We conclude that Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that plaintiffsestablished their entitlement to a preliminary injunction prohibiting defendants from restrainingthree caregivers employed by Catherine B. White (plaintiff) from entering defendants' propertyat Ferris Hills at West Lake (Ferris Hills) solely to provide care to plaintiff.

Plaintiff entered into a Residency Agreement with defendant F.F.T. Senior Communities,Inc., doing business as Ferris Hills at West Lake (FFTSC), pursuant to which she would occupya one-bedroom apartment in the independent living facility at Ferris Hills. Pursuant to the termsof that agreement, plaintiff agreed "[t]o comply with all reasonable procedures, policies and rulesof Ferris Hills . . . including specifically those contained from time to time in anyResident Handbook, in each case as such procedures, policies and rules are now in effect or arehereafter amended or adopted." The Residency Agreement further provided, however, that "[n]oamendment of this Agreement shall be valid unless in writing executed by Ferris Hills. . . and [the r]esident."

After FFTSC began experiencing problems with caregivers who would solicit other residentsat Ferris Hills and take advantage of residents financially, FFTSC sought to have all caregiverssign a Caregiver Agreement establishing a code of conduct for caregivers. Notably, residentswere also required to sign the Caregiver Agreement. Plaintiff's sons, including plaintiff Scott C.Smith, opposed the proposed Caregiver Agreement because, inter alia, it afforded FFTSC theability to terminate a caregiver "immediately" and solely at its discretion should it determine thatthe caregiver failed to comply with the Caregiver Agreement or otherwise [*3]engaged in "[i]mproper professional or personal conduct orunethical practices."[FN*]

When plaintiff's sons and defendants were unable to reach an agreement concerning theCaregiver Agreement, FFTSC informed Smith that, if FFTSC did not receive a signed CaregiverAgreement by a certain date, FFTSC would deny access to plaintiff's caregivers who had notsigned a Caregiver Agreement. Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking, inter alia, apreliminary and permanent injunction, and they also moved by order to show cause for apreliminary injunction.

Contrary to defendants' contentions, plaintiffs have the requisite standing to bring this action(see generally Caprer v Nussbaum,36 AD3d 176, 182 [2006]), and plaintiffs' assertions of potential injury are neitherspeculative nor conclusory (cf. Matterof Bolton v Town of S. Bristol Planning Bd., 38 AD3d 1307 [2007]). We thus turn tothe merits of plaintiffs' motion.

We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that plaintiffs hadestablished a likelihood of success on the merits. Although the Residency Agreement requiresplaintiff to comply with "all reasonable procedures, policies and rules" that were then ineffect or thereafter adopted, the question of what is reasonable is a question of fact (emphasisadded). Furthermore, the Residency Agreement also provided that it could not be amendedwithout a resident's written consent. Thus, the Residency Agreement is ambiguous concerningwhether FFTSC could require a resident to sign a Caregiver Agreement giving FFTSC the solediscretion to terminate a resident's caregivers. "It is not disputed that the [Residency Agreement]was drafted by defendant[s] and any ambiguity therein should be resolved against [them]"(Hodom v Stearns, 32 AD2d 234, 236 [1969], appeal dismissed 25 NY2d 722[1969]).

We likewise conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that plaintiffshad established the prospect of irreparable harm. Plaintiff is a 90-year-old woman who has usedthe same caregivers for approximately five years. Those caregivers provide highly personalhygienic care to plaintiff and have earned her trust over the years. To give FFTSC the ability todeny those caregivers access to plaintiff at its sole discretion creates a potential for immenseirreparable harm. Such a loss cannot be adequately compensated for by money damages (see Olean Med. Group LLP vLeckband, 32 AD3d 1214 [2006]; Klein, Wagner & Morris v Lawrence A. Klein,P.C., 186 AD2d 631, 633 [1992]). Furthermore, it is well settled that the loss of a trustedemployee can constitute irreparable harm (see generally Purchasing Assoc. v Weitz, 13NY2d 267, 274 [1963], rearg denied 14 NY2d 584 [1964]; Urban Archaeology Ltd. v Dencorp Invs.,Inc., 12 AD3d 96, 105 [2004]).[*4]

Finally, although we conclude that defendants' overallgoal of protecting the vulnerable, elderly residents of Ferris Hills from rogue caregivers islaudable, we agree with the court that the potential immediate loss to plaintiff of her trustedcaregivers is not outweighed by that goal. Although defendants have identified no concerns withrespect to plaintiff's caregivers and, indeed, have conceded that they do not pose any threat toFerris Hills residents, the proposed Caregiver Agreement nevertheless gives FFTSC the power todeny those caregivers access to plaintiff at its sole discretion based on its determination that theyengaged in unprofessional, improper or unethical conduct. Thus, recognizing that "[e]ntitlementto a preliminary injunction 'depends upon probabilities, any or all of which may be disprovenwhen the action is tried on the merits' " (Destiny USA Holdings, LLC, 69 AD3d at 216,quoting J. A. Preston Corp., 68 NY2d at 406), we conclude that the court did not abuseits discretion in determining that the balance of equities lies in plaintiffs' favor.

Because our review is limited to a determination whether the court abused its discretion ingranting the preliminary injunction and we find no such abuse, we would affirm.Present—Smith, J.P., Carni, Lindley, Sconiers and Pine, JJ.

Footnotes


Footnote *: We note that different versionsof the proposed Caregiver Agreement appear in the record on appeal. The one submitted byplaintiffs in support of their motion for a preliminary injunction is the version that they were sentby FFTSC. That version does not afford the caregivers or the resident notice or an opportunity tobe heard before FFTSC can deny access to the caregiver on the ground that the caregiver, interalia, engaged in "[i]mproper professional or personal conduct or unethical practices." A versionof the Caregiver Agreement submitted by defendants in opposition to plaintiffs' motion includedsuch a provision. While that provision could refute plaintiffs' contentions concerning irreparableharm, we feel constrained to rely on the version of the Caregiver Agreement sent to plaintiffs andattached to their motion.


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