| People v Herndon |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 05902 [75 AD3d 1083] |
| July 2, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Anthony C. Herndon, Appellant. |
—[*1] William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (Brenton P. Dadey of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Onondaga County Court (Anthony F. Aloi, J.), renderedFebruary 21, 2008. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of criminalpossession of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlledsubstance in the seventh degree.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of criminalpossession of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.16 [1]) andcriminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree (§ 220.03), defendantcontends that the prosecutor's peremptory challenge with respect to an African-Americanprospective juror constituted a Batson violation. We reject that contention inasmuch asthe prosecutor offered legitimate, nonpretextual reasons for exercising a peremptory challengewith respect to that prospective juror (see generally People v Smocum, 99 NY2d 418,422-423 [2003]).
We also reject the contention of defendant that County Court erred in refusing to suppressthe drugs found in his vehicle and on his person. "The automobile exception to the warrantrequirement authorizes the search of a vehicle when the police have probable cause to believethat the vehicle contains contraband, evidence of a crime or a weapon" (People vDaniels, 275 AD2d 1006 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 962 [2000]; see People vBelton, 55 NY2d 49, 54-55 [1982], rearg denied 56 NY2d 646 [1982]; People vGoss, 204 AD2d 984, 985 [1994], lv denied 84 NY2d 826 [1994]). Here, the policehad probable cause to search the vehicle in question based on the observations of an experiencedpolice detective who observed what appeared to be a hand-to-hand drug transaction inside thatvehicle in an area known for drug activity (see People v Jones, 90 NY2d 835, 837[1997]; People v Kirkland, 56AD3d 1221 [2008], lv denied 12 NY3d 785 [2009]). Moreover, the court alsodetermined that defendant voluntarily consented to the search of the vehicle and his person at thescene. The court's determination "should not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous orunsupported by the [suppression] hearing evidence" (People v Scaccia, 4 AD3d 808, 808 [2004] lv denied 3NY3d 647 [2004]), and that is not the case here (see People v Tejeda, 217 AD2d 932,933-934 [1995], lv denied 87 NY2d 908 [1995]).[*2]
Finally, we have considered defendant's remainingcontentions and conclude that they are without merit. Present—Martoche, J.P., Smith,Centra, Sconiers and Pine, JJ.