People v Seabrook
2010 NY Slip Op 06385 [76 AD3d 606]
August 10, 2010
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, September 29, 2010


The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Devere Seabrook, Appellant.

[*1]Lynn W. L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (William Kastin of counsel), for appellant.

Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Rhea A. Grob, andAnna Fee of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Collini, J.),rendered July 21, 2005, convicting him of assault in the first degree and assault in the seconddegree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

There is no merit to the defendant's argument that he was deprived of his right to present adefense when the Supreme Court precluded certain testimony of a prospective witness. Althougha defendant may not be precluded from introducing extrinsic evidence "where the issue to whichthe evidence relates is material" to those "issues that the jury must decide" (People vCarroll, 95 NY2d 375, 386 [2000], quoting People v Knight, 80 NY2d 845, 847[1992]), a defendant may be precluded from introducing extrinsic evidence of collateral matterswhen the sole purpose of offering such evidence is to impeach credibility (see People vPavao, 59 NY2d 282, 288 [1983]; People v Gilleo, 70 AD3d 1049, 1050 [2010]).

The defendant contends that he was present in the complainants' apartment, as a participantin a drug transaction, when two unknown assailants entered the apartment and assaulted thecomplainants. The defendant asserts that he was not a participant in the crime, and that thecomplainants had wrongly implicated him because they mistakenly believed that he had set themup. At trial, when defense counsel cross-examined the complainants with regard to drug activity,they denied any involvement in dealing drugs. In response, the defendant sought to call a witnesswho would have testified, inter alia, to having a drug-dealing relationship with one of thecomplainants. Such testimony was collateral to the issues to be determined at trial. Thus, theSupreme Court providently exercised its discretion in precluding that testimony (see People vAska, 91 NY2d 979 [1998]; People v Ragland, 240 AD2d 598 [1997]; see also People v Alexander, 16 AD3d515 [2005]). Covello, J.P., Angiolillo, Leventhal and Austin, JJ., concur.[*2]


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