Cinelli Bldrs., Inc. v Ferris
2010 NY Slip Op 06405 [76 AD3d 608]
August 17, 2010
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, September 29, 2010


Cinelli Builders, Inc., Respondent,
v
Steven Ferris et al.,Appellants.

—[*1]Twomey, Latham, Shea, Kelley, Dubin & Quartararo, LLP, Riverhead, N.Y.(Christopher D. Kelley of counsel), for appellants.

Gold, Stewart, Kravatz, Benes, LLP, Westbury, N.Y. (Christopher J. Benes of counsel), forrespondent.

In a hybrid action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, and proceedingpursuant to CPLR article 75 to compel arbitration, the defendants/respondents appeal, as limitedby their brief, from (1) so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Spinola, J.),entered November 18, 2008, as denied that branch of their motion which was pursuant to CPLR3211 (a) (1) to dismiss the complaint/petition based on documentary evidence, and (2) so muchof an order of the same court entered January 5, 2009, as, upon reargument, in effect, vacated somuch of the order entered November 18, 2008, as granted that branch of their motion which wasto stay arbitration, and directed the parties to proceed to arbitration.

Ordered that the orders are affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.

The defendants/respondents (hereinafter the defendants) contend that the Supreme Courtshould have dismissed the complaint/petition because the plaintiff/petitioner (hereinafter theplaintiff) was not licensed in the Village of East Hampton to perform home improvements at thetime the plaintiff entered into a construction contract with the defendants. Under then-section11-1 of the Code of the Village of East Hampton, the definition of "home improvement"excluded "[t]he construction of a new home." The contract between the parties called for theconstruction of a new home. The plaintiff's principal, Angelo Cinelli, asserted that the proposedplans called for the removal of all structures on the subject property, and that prior to thecommencement of the construction of the new home, "every structure, every foundation, thepool, the pool house and every piece of building wood, pipe, nail, wire and piece of concrete thatexisted . . . was removed from the property."

Based on the foregoing, the defendants failed to establish conclusively that the plaintiff wasengaged in home improvement as that term was then defined in the Code of the Village of EastHampton (see Marciano Constr. Corp. v Stout, 12 Misc 3d 1152[A], 2006 NY Slip Op[*2]50874[U] [2006]; see generally Goshen v Mutual LifeIns. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]; cf. J.M. Bldrs. & Assoc., Inc. v Lindner, 67 AD3d 738, 740-741[2009]; Blake Elec. Contr. Co.v Paschall, 222 AD2d 264, 265-266 [1995]). Therefore,the Supreme Court correctly denied that branch of the defendants' motion which was pursuant toCPLR 3211 (a) (1) to dismiss the complaint/petition based on documentary evidence.

The Supreme Court also correctly directed the parties to proceed to arbitration. In aproceeding to compel arbitration, a threshold issue for the court is whether the parties made avalid agreement to arbitrate (see Matter of County of Rockland [Primiano Constr. Co.],51 NY2d 1, 6-7 [1980]; Shah v MonpatConstr., Inc., 65 AD3d 541, 543-544 [2009]). Since the defendants failed to dispute theplaintiff's assertion that every structure was removed from the subject property prior to thecommencement of construction of the new home, no substantial question was raised as towhether the plaintiff was engaged in home improvement and, concomitantly, whether thecontract containing the arbitration clause was unenforceable because the plaintiff was unlicensedto perform home improvements in the Village of East Hampton at the time it executed thecontract (see CPLR 7503 [a]; Nasso v Loeb & Loeb, LLP, 19 AD3d 465 [2005]; Matter ofChapnick v Cohen, 203 AD2d 362 [1994]; see generally JMT Bros. Realty, LLC v First Realty Bldrs., Inc., 51AD3d 453, 454 [2008]).

The defendants' remaining contention, that they were improperly deprived of the opportunityto submit an answer, is without merit (see CPLR 404 [b]; Matter of Dodge, 25NY2d 273, 286-287 [1969]; Matter ofJulicher v Town of Tonawanda, 34 AD3d 1217 [2006]). Fisher, J.P., Covello, Hall andSgroi, JJ., concur.


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