| People v Taylor |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 06531 [76 AD3d 717] |
| August 31, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Darian Taylor, Appellant. |
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Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (R. Doyle,J.), rendered February 4, 2008, convicting him of gang assault in the first degree and assault inthe first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of theevidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accordgreat deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observedemeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004], cert denied 542 US946 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the recordhere, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d633 [2006]). Specifically, the eyewitness testimony credibly established that the defendantphysically attacked the victim while aided by two or more other persons actually present, andthat a dangerous instrument was used in the attack, a conclusion which was supported by experttestimony.
The defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his claim that the evidence that heattacked the victim, or acted in concert with others in the course of doing so, was legallyinsufficient on the ground that an eyewitness's testimony in this regard was incredible as a matterof law (see People v Hawkins, 11NY3d 484, 491-492 [2008]). In any event, there is no merit to his contention that theevidence supporting his conviction of gang assault in the first degree was legally insufficient,since there was legally sufficient evidence that he was aided by two or more other personsactually present when he physically attacked the victim (see Penal Law § 120.07).Additionally, there is no merit to the defendant's contention that the evidence supporting hisconviction of assault in the first degree was legally insufficient, since there was legally sufficientevidence that he employed a dangerous instrument when he physically attacked the victim(see Penal Law § 120.10 [1]).
The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court committed reversible error in denying hischallenges for cause to certain prospective jurors is without merit. "The determination as towhether a prospective juror can provide reasonable jury service in a given case is left largely tothe discretion of the trial court, which can question and observe the prospective juror during voirdire" (People v Davis, 221 AD2d 653, 654 [1995] [internal quotation marks omitted];see People v Callaghan, 220 AD2d 609 [1995]). Viewing as a whole the voir diretestimony of each juror challenged by the defendant at trial and raised on appeal, as we must(see People v Blyden, 55 NY2d 73, 78 [1982]; People v Goodwin, 64 AD3d 790, 792 [2009]), the Supreme Courtdid not err in denying the defendant's challenges for cause as to juror No. 7 (see People v LaValle, 3 NY3d 88,103 [2004]; People v Busreth, 35AD3d 965, 966 [2006]), and juror Nos. 10, 12, and 13 (see CPL 270.20 [1] [b]).Accordingly, the defendant's contention regarding the exhaustion of his peremptory challengeshas been rendered academic (see CPL 270.20 [2]).
The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion indenying his application to exclude uniformed firefighters from the courtroom throughout the trialis without merit (see 22 NYCRR 700.2, 700.3; McEachron v Glans, 1999 WL33597331 [ND NY 1999]; Woods v State, 490 So 2d 24, 26-27 [1986] [Fla], certdenied 479 US 954 [1986]).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit. Dillon, J.P., Balkin, Lott and Sgroi,JJ., concur.