| People v Pratt |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 06891 [77 AD3d 1337] |
| October 1, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Colleen Pratt,Appellant. |
—[*1] Jason L. Cook, District Attorney, Penn Yan (Allison O'Neill of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Yates County Court (W. Patrick Falvey, J.), rendered September1, 2009. The judgment convicted defendant, upon her plea of guilty, of grand larceny in the third degreeand criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree (two counts).
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting her upon her plea of guilty of onecount of grand larceny in the third degree (Penal Law § 155.35) and two counts of criminalpossession of a forged instrument in the second degree (§ 170.25). We reject the contention ofdefendant that her waiver of the right to appeal was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered(see People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248,256 [2006]). The responses of defendant to County Court's questions during the plea colloquyestablish that she "understood that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those rightsautomatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty," and that she voluntarily waived the right to appeal (id.; see People v Tantao, 41 AD3d1274 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 882 [2007]). The valid waiver by defendant of the rightto appeal encompasses her challenge to the severity of the sentence (see 6 NY3d at 255).To the extent that the further contention of defendant that she was denied effective assistance ofcounsel survives her plea and valid waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Boyzuck, 72 AD3d 1530 [2010]), we conclude that hercontention lacks merit. Defendant "receive[d] an advantageous plea and nothing in the record castsdoubt on the apparent effectiveness of counsel" (People v Ford, 86 NY2d 397, 404 [1995]).
Finally, we reject the contention of defendant that the court erred in ordering that she pay a 10%surcharge pursuant to Penal Law § 60.27 (8) on the amount of restitution imposed, in light of theevidence submitted by the Probation Department in support of the imposition of the surcharge (CPL420.10). Present—Smith, J.P., Carni, Lindley, Sconiers and Pine, JJ.